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[1] The International Development Research Centre (IDRC), acting on behalf of the 
SISERA Steering Committee, engaged Bannock Consulting to conduct an 
assessment of the performance of the Secretariat for the Institutional Support for 
Economic Research in Africa (SISERA), and in the light of this assessment, to make 
recommendations concerning the programme’s future strategic directions and the 
management and governance structures necessary to pursue this strategy. The 
document presents our assessment and recommendations.  
[2] We reviewed the specific actions undertaken by SISERA to support African 
economic research centres under five categories:  
[3] Strengthening of institutional support: This was carried out through core grants, 
seed grants, technical support, training of researchers and measures to improve 
capacity utilization 
• This support was in most cases well targeted and effective. Institutional support 
played a role in enabling Partner Institutes such as CREA, DPRU, and EPRC 
not only to establish themselves as centres of research excellence in their area 
of focus (in each case poverty), but also to forge close links to their national 
policy community and to play a highly visible and significant role in policy 
dialogue. SISERA also achieved success with some Emerging Centres. AIAE is a 
particularly good example: through the dynamism of its founding Director, and 
the creation of a very effective network of research associates, it has, after only 
three years, come to play a very visible and high profile role in Nigerian policy-
making. Additionality is always hard to determine in these circumstances, but 
there is little doubt that the SISERA network includes some of the most vibrant 
and dynamic policy research institutes in Africa. 
• Collaboration with the World Bank Institute was particularly successful and 
allows SISERA to organize training for researchers in the area of poverty 
reduction. The responses to our questionnaire and our interviews suggested that 
such training was one of the most popular activities initiated by SISERA, and 
research related to poverty reduction has been a common denominator among 
the most successful centres (EPRC, CREA, DPRU). The decision by the WBI to 
discontinue their collaboration with SISERA (due to a change in WBI policy) 
was thus highly unfortunate. Efforts to replace this support with resources from 
UNDP are to be encouraged. 
[4] Enhancement of managerial capacity of economic research centres: This 
component of the Secretariat’s work was focused on key individuals within each 
institution; e.g. directors and finance officers, who were reached through meetings, 
workshops, seminars and training; and mentoring. 
• This was carried out through a ‘hands on’ approach, which involved regular 
visits by Secretariat staff, and in depth discussions with the centre directors of 
the problems they were experiencing. This hands on approach is a distinctive 
feature of SISERA’s activities, and helps to differentiate it from competing 
institutions such as ACBF. 
• The expertise and experience accumulated as a result of this approach to 
capacity building is in many respects unique to SISERA and a key strength to be 
exploited, as it formulates its strategy for the future. 
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• The heavy workloads on the Secretariat staff have meant, however, that SISERA 
has done relatively little as an institution to develop this expertise. We 
recommend that SISERA make this a key element of its organizational learning 
strategy for the future. This will require in turn a more comprehensive 
monitoring and evaluation effort, in order to compile additional evidence and 
learn lessons concerning best practices in capacity building. In addition, 
SISERA has much too low an institutional profile and ‘brand recognition’ in the 
development policy research community generally and among donors (and 
potential supporters) in particular. Additional staff and a clearer strategic 
direction regarding these areas specifically are needed to enable SISERA to 
strengthen its profile and establish its ‘brand’ as a recognized centre of 
excellence in building capacity for policy analysis and dialogue. 
[5] Actions to improve the networking of African economic research centres: In 
addition to organizing regular meetings of centres in its network, SISERA launched 
two sub-regional networks. 
• ROCAPE was only launched very recently, and so has relatively few activities to 
report. SEAPREN was launched several years ago, but was relatively inactive 
until NEPRU assumed responsibility for managing the network in 2003. Since 
then SEAPREN has been very active, holding regional meetings and launching 
collaborative research projects for which it has helped securing funding. 
• The logic and strategy behind these networks is, however, somewhat unclear. 
They do not seem to be vehicles for direct capacity building, as is SISERA itself. 
And since the networks are constructed on a purely geographical basis, the 
centres in the network are unlikely to share the same thematic interests. What 
then should be the research agenda of such networks? Regional integration is, 
of course, one possible common policy issue which might be the basis for 
common activities in the sub-networks, since they are constructed on a regional 
basis. The sub-regional networks could very well decide to pursue research on 
regional integration issues, but this is likely to prove problematic in terms of 
policy impact, since the regional integration institutions are generally rather 
weak, and in most cases lack the capacity to demand and absorb policy research 
and analysis. So even if the sub-regional networks successfully pursue a 
regional integration research agenda, they may well find it difficult to achieve 
significant policy impact because of the absence of absorptive capacity for 
research among policy-makers at the regional level. On balance, then, the 
strategy behind the sub-regional networks remains problematic. 
[6] Linking researchers and end-users: This was also viewed as important task for 
SISERA. In principle, this is the responsibility of the individual research centres and 
the sub-regional networks. In practice, SISERA has not played a direct role in 
linkages at the national level, but instead has focused on fostering linkages with 
regional and global actors such as the African Development Bank and the World 
Bank Institute.  
• The links established by SISERA at the regional and international levels have 
proved useful and worthwhile. At the regional level, the collaboration with 
AfDB has led to a visiting scholar program. At the international level, SISERA 
has, through the EAGER and SAGA projects, helped establish links between the 
centres in its network and institutions such as Cornell. 
• SISERA has no competitive advantage in acting as an intermediary between 
research producers and users at the national level: this is better left to the 
centres in the network, which know their research and policy communities better 
than the Secretariat. SISERA can encourage its centres to build these linkages, 
and SISERA’s ultimate impact depends on the centres’ success in doing so.  
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• Those centres in the network which have been particularly successful in 
building these linkages seem to have enjoyed this success because of the 
personality of their director, and on their director’s ability to identify emerging 
‘hot’ policy issues and focus the centre’s research on these issues. This makes 
success inevitably somewhat fragile. 
[7] We found it useful to characterize SISERA’s rather complex set of principles, 
strategies and activities in terms of ‘Five Ms’: 
i. Money: Core and seed grants, resources available through research projects 
such as SAGA, and dissemination and connectivity grants. 
ii. Mentoring: Advice and guidance provided to the directors of the research 
centres, as well as to their staff (including finance officers and administrators) 
and to researchers; and technical support. 
iii. Meeting: Conferences, seminars, workshops and meetings which allow the 
centre directors to meet other directors, donors and end users. 
iv. Monitoring: Monitoring of the projects and research carried out by the centres 
to ensure compliance with minimum standards, and the appropriate utilisation 
of financial resources and implementation of the work programme. 
v. Mediating: Acting as an intermediary or broker between African researchers 
and policy research institutes and donors outside the region 
[8] The impact of SISERA’s interventions on its partner institutions varied considerably 
across these five areas. While all directors interviewed consider their participation 
in the network as beneficial for their institutions, the different M’s are valued in 
very different ways by each director. Some directors valued highly the mentoring 
provided by the Secretariat, while others valued the financial support provided by 
SISERA, since it gave the directors ‘breathing space’ – time to reflect; resources to 
hire new researchers, the opportunity to explore new issues, etc. Some emerging 
Centres found the opportunity to meet their peers particularly valuable as a way of 
reducing their isolation. 
[9] SISERA has, since its inception, followed a consistent strategy of working with 
policy research institutions instead of individual researchers. This strategy was 
predicated on the assumption that there existed in most countries adequate capacity 
to carry out policy research and analysis, in the sense that there were a sufficient 
number of researchers trained in modern research techniques, and any deficiencies 
in such capacity would be addressed by institutions such as AERC. Instead, the key 
obstacle to high quality, ‘home grown’ policy research was identified as the lack of 
well functioning research institutions within which researchers could pursue their 
careers. For many countries it was reasonable to make this assumption, and 
institutional weakness is indeed endemic in the region. But SISERA’s experience 
with its emerging centres suggests that in some countries, at least, there is a 
deficiency of well trained researchers. In these circumstances, attempts at 
institutional strengthening may prove ineffective. 
[10] We also assessed the perceived benefits of SISERA interventions from the viewpoint 
of government institutions and determine the value-added of its activities to policy-
making. Assessing the impact of research and analysis on policy is an inherently 
difficult exercise, and there are few if any quantitative studies which are in any way 
conclusive. Measuring the impact of ‘upstream’ interventions in capacity building, 
of which SISERA and the centres in its network are an example, is a particular 
challenge.  
• Overall, we would conclude that the impact on policy has been mixed. Some 
policy research institutes in the SISERA network have been outstandingly 
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successful in pursing a research programme which has had a significant impact 
on policy discussions and dialogue within their country, and now both 
government and civil society look to these institutes to take a lead in producing 
new and relevant research on certain key policy issues. Other institutes in the 
SISERA network, in contrast, have had little if any influence on policy. 
[11] Impact on the policy process remains an important goal of the programme, and so it 
is important for SISERA to understand why some of its partners have been so 
successful, and others have had so little impact. 
[12] Based on his own experience in Indonesia, Peter Timmer argues that there are  
“… four factors that can make policy oriented research successful. First, the analyst 
should be involved with the same policy-makers or in the same policy setting for the 
long term. Second, there is a need to find a balance between keeping analysis and 
advice confidential and the ultimate publication of the key models and results. 
Third, the analysts should rely on the analytical paradigms of the mainstream of the 
economic profession even while examining deviations from their underlying 
assumptions. Lastly, there should be continuing demand from policy-makers for 
problem-oriented analysis.”   
[13] Our interviews and discussions did not suggest that Timmer’s second and third 
conditions raised any particular issues in the SISERA context. His fourth condition, 
that policy-makers must have a genuine demand for analytical work, does, however, 
seem to be an issue in some countries in sub-Saharan Africa, in particular the 
francophone countries and limits the impact of research on policy in a number of 
countries. Our discussions suggested that in many countries in which SISERA 
works, the ‘demand side’ of the policy market is still very weak: many governments 
are unreceptive to new ideas and research findings, or if receptive, lack the staff 
with skills to understand technical research results well enough to identify the 
policy implications of the research. SISERA has certainly strengthened the supply 
side of the policy market, but in many countries the demand side remains a 
significant obstacle to bridging the gap between research and policy.  
[14] Whether SISERA could realistically extend its activities to strengthening analytical 
capacity within government is not at all clear, given SISERA’s limited resources 
and the large number of countries in which it operates. 
[15] Leaving aside these weaknesses on the demand side, Timmer’s observations also 
help identify what may be the most important factor affecting whether SISERA’s 
partner institutes have an impact on policy: sustained focus on a few key policy 
issues. In order to be successful in policy outreach, then, SISERA’s partners must 
‘place their bets’, focusing their efforts and resources on just a few key policy issues 
(and on the ministries and researchers likely to be involved in these issues), and 
sustain this focused commitment for over a period of at least several years. The 
most successful centres in the SISERA network seem to have placed their bets in this 
fashion, and in most cases have focused on poverty as their area of focus. 
[16] We also carried out an institutional assessment of SISERA. 
[17] We assessed first its operational capacities. The most important concern regarding 
operational capacity is the delay in appointing a permanent Executive Director. 
Elias Ayuk has performed very well as Acting Executive Director. He has not only 
provided day to day leadership for the Secretariat but has also recently launched a 
very valuable strategic planning exercise. Nevertheless, he has had to perform in 
effect two jobs, and the human resources of the Secretariat are stretched very thin 
indeed as a result. Centres in the SISERA network are clearly aware of this, and it 
has caused concern among many of the centre directors and staff. In addition the 
workload on individual staff is too high; the existing network includes over 20 
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economic research institutions in 18 countries, and the Secretariat receives as well 
a stream of requests from other centres that wish to join the network. It is clear that 
the Secretariat requires additional human resources. 
[18] The absence of an Executive Director and more importantly, insufficient staff 
numbers has also had an effect on the orientation of SISERA. Current staff are 
focused on internal organisation, process and activities, with relatively less 
attention paid to outwardly oriented, ‘external’ activities such as profile raising and 
attendance at international conferences and workshops. 
[19] Access to funding and funding sources has decreased in the near past particularly 
due to the gap between donor funding cycles. Initially SISERA received funding 
from IDRC, CIDA, USAID, Coopération Francaise, DGIS, the EU and the AfDB. At 
present, only IDRC, Coopération Francaise and USAID (through the SAGA 
programme) are major donors, and changes in USAID policies give some concern 
regarding the longer term prospects for its support to SISERA. Recent developments 
have, however, been encouraging: SISERA has recently received a grant from AfDB 
and DGIS has approved one of CAD1.3 million over 4 years. 
[20] Another problem experienced by SISERA has to do with timing of donor funding. 
The delay between the contract negotiation with donors and the signature of 
contracts has meant that on some occasions SISERA’s ability to provide support to 
the members of its network has been subject to delays, which frustrate the centres 
and reduce their loyalty to SISERA. 
[21] The simple and rather flat structure of SISERA and its governing body facilitates 
timely monitoring and evaluation of the performance of each staff member and is a 
source of strength. The small number of staff in the Secretariat means, however, that 
it is often difficult to sustain contact with some of the emerging centres, particularly 
those operating in difficult circumstances. This makes it difficult for SISERA to 
design and pursue an effective exit strategy for unsuccessful centres, which would 
help it focus its resources more effectively in centres with more potential for 
development. 
[22] We also assessed SISERA’s adaptive capacities.  
[23] The ability of the staff to adapt and respond to changes in the environment is 
significantly hindered by their current workloads. Programme officers need to keep 
up to date with issues such as the interests of donors, emerging policy issues, as 
well as methodological advances and new research techniques. To do this they 
require time dedicated to learn, reflect and innovate. This cannot be achieved with 
the current staff numbers and workloads. 
[24] Although considerable effort is focused on management of the Secretariat, the 
severe time pressures on the staff limit the time they have available for longer term 
planning. As a result, much of the reflection and organizational learning and 
innovation seem to be occasioned by external evaluations. This is undesirable: 
learning and adapting should take place within the organization on an ongoing 
basis. This is important, not only for the effectiveness of SISERA, but for its ability 
to attract, motivate and retain good staff.  
[25] We examined SISERA’s online presence. The url for the website is cumbersome, but 
more important, links to the IDRC website. While formally appropriate, this tends to 
reinforce perceptions of an excessively close relationship, which may complicate 
relationships with other donors. It would be better to register another url, such as 
www.sisera.org.sn. 
[26] The SISERA web page provides basic information regarding the Secretariat and its 
activities but little (besides contact information) on the centres in the network. This 
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is important because the web page appears to be intended to inform third parties, 
rather than to serve as a tool or service provider for the research centres which are 
members of the network. It does not serve either purpose effectively. 
[27] Improved monitoring and evaluation is central to the strengthening of SISERA’s 
adaptive capacities. Evaluation is inherently difficult for SISERA, because it 
intervenes to build capacity far upstream in the policy analysis and dialogue 
process. It is difficult, to say the least, for SISERA to properly measure its success, 
because this success depends to a large extent on the actions and behaviour of the 
centres in the network, and their actions are only indirectly influenced by SISERA. 
[28] Measuring the impact of policy research itself is widely regarded as a difficult and 
challenging exercise. Measuring the impact of initiatives to build capacity for policy 
research is harder still. Nevertheless, SISERA’s monitoring and evaluation efforts to 
date seem largely confined to some quantitative indicators of programme activities, 
with relatively few attempts to measure the impact of these activities on the 
behaviour of the centres in the SISERA network, and no systematic attempt to 
measure the impact of the Centres on the policy process at the national level.  
[29] While acknowledging that this is a very difficult task, we recommend that more 
systematic attempts be made in future to measure the impact of SISERA on the 
institutions with which it works directly – the centres in its network. We recommend 
that SISERA do this by adopting an alternative approach, Outcome Mapping, which 
focuses on determining whether or not these activities are having an effect on the 
behaviour of those targeted. A change in the behaviour of ‘boundary partners’, 
rather than the fact that particular activity has been completed, is likely to be a 
more accurate and useful indicator for both management and accountability 
purposes. 
[30] An analysis of the environment within which SISERA operates clearly shows that 
this environment has changed. Most importantly it has done so partly due to the 
actions of SISERA. One change is of particular importance over the longer term: 
the dramatic shift in aid modalities, as donors move from project-oriented to 
programme-oriented support, and from there to general budget support.  
[31] This presents both opportunities and (in the longer term) serious threats to policy 
research institutes and may, over time, have profound implications for the policy 
research institutes in SISERA’s network.  
[32] The opportunities are clear – the shift to general budget support, devolved decision-
making and local contracting should increase the demand for policy analysis on the 
part of developing country governments. This increased demand should widen the 
opportunities available to the policy research institutes already in the SISERA 
network and stimulate the emergence of new centres which can in time join the 
network.  
[33] The threats are less obvious, but these same changes in aid modalities are likely to 
pose serious problems for policy research institutes in developing countries. At 
present policy research institutes in developing countries have a range of potential 
clients. A shift to general budget support will replace this range of clients with a 
single client – the country’s own government. It could become difficult, for instance 
for any research institute to publish research critical of, or embarrassing to the 
government when that government is the only purchaser of policy research in the 
country. 
[34] Without a tradition of support for policy research by the philanthropic sector or the 
private sector in Africa, this threat is a serious one. As a result, it may be that 
donors have to make commitments over the longer term to secure the independence 
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of policy research institutes, and this may be one role which SISERA might play, as 
an efficient manager of such support – the mediating activity.. 
[35] We argue that SISERA must address four strategic issues over the medium term: 
• The Programme’s strategic directions, i.e. whether it should continue to focus 
on its current set of activities, or attempt to diversify its portfolio of activities. 
• Whether SISERA can exist as a “stand alone” institution, or alternatively 
should seek another institutional home or a long-term, strategic partner – and if 
so, how this partner should be chosen.  
• Both the choice of strategic directions and the choice of an institutional home or 
long-term partner raise issues concerning SISERA’s management and 
governance. 
• The need for a higher and more stable level of funding over the medium term, 
which is in turn linked to the perception of SISERA among donors and potential 
supporters of the programme; the need to establish a clear identity and a higher 
profile for SISERA among the donor community and the impact on this identity 
and profile of SISERA’s current relationship with IDRC and its future 
relationship with IDEP and the UN system. 
[36] The Programme’s strategic directions must take into consideration SISERA’s 
competitive advantages. Here it is useful to return to the roles played by networks, 
and SISERA’s ability to play the six possible roles which can be played by networks: 
• Filter  
• Amplifier 
• Investor / Provider 
• Facilitator 
• Convenor 
• Community builder 
[37] It is clear that SISERA can and does act as an investor through its grants and 
training activities, and this has formed a large part of its work. It has also acted as 
a facilitator through organizing training workshops, the publication of the SISERA 
Working Paper series, and other activities. It has not been particularly active as an 
amplifier, and currently does not devote significant resources to this role, but there 
is no reason to think it would not have the technical competence to play this role 
should it decide to do so. In addition SISERA, through its programme of technical 
assistance, staff visits to centres, and meetings of centre directors has also helped 
build a strong sense of community among the directors and staff of the centres in its 
network. 
[38] Assessing SISERA’s ability to play the other two roles, of filter and convenor, was 
more complex. Our view is that SISERA should not seek to act as an intermediary 
between research users and research producers, first, because it has no particular 
technical or informational advantage in doing so, and second, because this 
undermines the role and position of the research centres which it is trying to 
strengthen. 
[39] SISERA does, however, have a strong competitive advantage in performing the 
filtering and convening roles with respect to institutions based outside Africa (for 
example donors, international organizations, other research institutions, etc.). In 
this case, SISERA can play an effective “brokering role” between local researchers 
and research institutes and the rest of the world. To some extent the programme has 
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already begun to play this role with respect to the EAGER and SAGA projects, and 
has done this very effectively.  
[40] Before considering possible institutional homes for SISERA, we ask whether the 
programme does indeed need a home, or whether it has a sustainable future as a 
free standing institution. Our view is that the programme might be organized as a 
free standing and autonomous institution, but the experiences of other networks 
suggest some potential difficulties with such an arrangement: 
• The lack of critical mass within such an institution as small as SISERA (which is 
much smaller than AERC, for example) 
• The resulting potential for intellectual and professional isolation of the person 
heading SISERA if it is located outside an academic institution or a policy 
research institute 
• The difficulties often experienced in establishing strong governance structures 
for networks such as SISERA 
[41] On balance, we think the issue of lack of critical mass and intellectual isolation 
point in the direction of basing SISERA within a host institution, but it is difficult to 
reach a definite conclusion on this issue.  
[42] Nonetheless, if SISERA does need a home, the first point to note is that the 
appropriate choice of a home depends on what SISERA is and does. The choice of 
strategic directions for SISERA is still subject to discussion, but the point to 
remember is any choice of strategic directions has implications for the choice of a 
partnership or a merger.  
[43] If SISERA were located within another institution, such an arrangement could take 
one of two forms:  
• The programme might be “housed” within another policy research or teaching 
institution. In this arrangement there is symmetry between the partners, in the 
sense that both the programme and its partner are involved in economic policy 
or teaching. 
• The alternative is one in which the programme is “hosted” by another 
institution which is not primarily engaged in economic policy research or 
capacity building. This arrangement is asymmetric, in the sense that SISERA 
and its host have different missions. Maintaining a distinct identity and mission 
for the programme seems more likely under an asymmetric arrangement, since 
the institutions involved are likely to have somewhat different missions, 
operating procedures and governance structure, and so merging these 
structures will be less natural and straightforward. This is in essence the 
situation since 1997: SISERA has existed as a Secretariat within IDRC – a much 
larger institution, with a broader mandate than SISERA. 
[44] The proposed move to IDEP would represent an asymmetric arrangement, and the 
key concern raised by a possible move to IDEP is SISERA’s programmatic 
autonomy and the authority of its Steering Committee in establishing and 
monitoring this programme. It is our understanding that such autonomy and 
authority have been successfully embedded in a draft agreement with IDEP and 
ECA (to which IDEP is responsible). We are, however, sceptical that such 
autonomy will be accepted at other levels of the UN system, and would not be 
surprised if the current draft agreement were not called into question by UN 
headquarters in New York. 
[45] Should an agreement with IDEP not be possible, we recommend that the search for 
an appropriate partner or host begin again immediately. The selection of such a 
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partner should be guided by the same set of considerations outlined in IDRC’s own 
guidance document for the establishment of secretariats. These include: 
• strategic direction 
• the need to develop a sound and realistic business plan  
• a systematic approach to performance management 
• an accountability framework 
• operational and structural issues 
[46] At the same time as the search for a new host takes place, and in parallel with this 
search, we strongly recommend that fresh consideration be given to the alternative 
of establishing SISERA as a free standing institution, despite the problems of 
governance and professional isolation that this may entail. 
[47] Two final points should be made about the management and governance of SISERA. 
First, the delay in appointing a permanent Executive Director is very unfortunate, 
and has been a major obstacle to the continued growth and success of SISERA. That 
the programme has achieved good results over the past two years is due, in our 
view, to two factors: 
• The soundness of the initial conception of SISERA and the strategic directions it 
has pursued: SISERA is fundamentally a very good idea, and satisfies an 
important need in Africa 
• The ability and dedication of the Secretariat’s staff, in particular the Acting 
Executive Director and the Coordinator for Programme and Operations. The 
Acting Executive Director, for example, has not only filled an important gap in 
the organization’s leadership, but has continued his work as a programme 
officer, working closely with centres in the SISERA network and helping to 
identify new members who might join the network. The other members of the 
Secretariat’s staff, including the Programme Officer, also display a very high 
degree of dedication and professionalism.  
[48] Second, there is a need to strengthen SISERA’s governance structures. It is difficult 
to make detailed recommendations in this respect until the issue of SISERA’s 
institutional home has been resolved, but as part of any strengthening SISERA will 
need to engage in a fuller planning process, to ensure that all parties have the 
information they need to fulfil their roles. The Steering Committee will need 
financial and programmatic information more than annually to assess 
implementation of agreed plans and adjust where necessary. Management will need 
the formal guidance of a Steering Committee to assure that it is on the agreed path 
and will, ideally, benefit from the Committee’s contacts and complementary 
perspectives to make rigorous strategic decisions. 
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3 INTRODUCTION 
[50] The International Development Research Centre (IDRC), acting on behalf of 
the SISERA Steering Committee, engaged Bannock Consulting in October 
2003 to conduct an assessment of the performance of the Secretariat for the 
Institutional Support for Economic Research in Africa (SISERA), and in the 
light of this assessment, to make recommendations concerning the 
programme’s future strategic directions and the management and governance 
structures necessary to pursue this strategy. The document presents our 
assessment and recommendations. The assessment was carried out by 
Stephen Yeo, with the collaboration of Ibrahima Hathie and Enrique 
Mendizabal. 
[51] Stephen Yeo is a Principal Consultant in Bannock’s Public Sector Division, 
where he is responsible for work on economic policy issues, international 
trade, and private sector development and for its work on knowledge 
management for policy analysis. Before joining Bannock, he was Chief 
Executive of the Centre for Economic Policy Research, the leading European 
research network in economics and the focus of most European research on 
international trade policy. He has extensive experience in trade policy 
research, as well as involvement in building capacity for policy analysis in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. In 1995 he worked with the Department of Trade and 
Industry in South Africa to establish the Trade and Industrial Policy 
Secretariat (TIPS, www.tips.org.za), which provided policy advice to the 
Department, through a project funded by IDRC in Ottawa. He has served on 
the TIPS Advisory Board since 1997. More recently he worked with IDRC to 
establish the Southern African Trade Research Network (SATRN, 
www.satrn.org), which was launched in 2001. He currently chairs SATRN’s 
Technical Advisory Committee. He has also worked with the Ford 
Foundation to evaluate their Initiative in International Economics, and with 
IDRC in evaluating their global programme in Technology, Employment and 
Competitiveness.  
[52] Ibrahima Hathie is Professor and Department Head of the “Tronc commun” 
at the Ecole Nationale d’Economie Appliquée in Dakar. He received his 
Ph.D. in Agricultural & Resource Economics from the University of 
Connecticut in 2000. His research interests lie in agricultural policy, 
environmental economics and participatory research methods. He is a 
member of the African Trainers Network on Agricultural Policy Analysis 
and the author (with R. A. Lopez) of “The Impact of Market Reforms on the 
Senegalese Peanut Economy” in the Journal of International Development. 
[53] Enrique Mendizabal is a research analyst at Bannock Consulting. He has a 
BA in Economics from the University of the Pacific in Peru, and an MSc in 
Social Policy and Planning for Developing Countries from the London 
School of Economics (LSE). He has worked as a research assistant at the 
Secretariat of the Andean Community, specializing in the negotiations to 
liberalise trade in services within the region. He has also participated in 
numerous competitiveness assessments of the Peruvian economy, studies of 
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foreign direct investment and worked with the Peruvian FTAA team. More 
recently he has specialised in the theoretical and practical use of the 
Sustainable Livelihoods Approach, applying it to the border region between 
Malawi and Mozambique. He is now undertaking the background research 
on the links between global markets and the artisanal and small scale mining 




[54] The specific objectives of the evaluation, as set out in the Terms of 
Reference, are: 
i. Review and assess the specific actions that SISERA has undertaken to 
provide technical and financial support to African economic research 
centres and to reduce the isolation of these centres. 
ii. Assess the perceived benefits of SISERA’s interventions from the 
viewpoint of its partner institutions and determine the value added of its 
activities to economic research centres. 
iii. Assess the perceived benefits of SISERA interventions from the 
viewpoint of government institutions and determine the value added of its 
activities to policy-making. 
iv. Assess SISERA’s governance structure and staff composition in light of 
the Secretariat’s mandate. 
v. Evaluate the relationships between SISERA and its donors and other 
capacity building institutions in AFRICA, e.g. AERC, ACBF, etc. 
vi. Determine the challenges and associated risks facing SISERA in the 




[55] The evaluation of SISERA was carried out between October 2003 and 
January 2004. We approached the evaluation of SISERA and the research 
centres in its network from two different perspectives.  
[56] First, we identified the possible strategic roles which can be played by 
SISERA – and by the research centres in its network: 
i. Filter  
ii. Amplifier 
iii. Investor / Provider 
iv. Facilitator 
v. Convenor 
vi. Community builder 
[57] The first two roles are often used to characterize the role of the media, but 
they apply to policy research institutes and networks as well. They can be 
explained very simply. We all suffer from ‘information glut’ – there are just 
too many things to pay attention to and think about. ‘Filters’ provide an easy 
means of deciding what to pay attention to. ‘Amplifiers’ take a given 
message and present in ways that allow it to be understood and absorbed 
more quickly and easily.  
[58] For producers of research (whether in universities or policy research 
institutes) ‘investors’ play an important role, providing resources – money to 
carry out research (the provider role) or services which make it easier to do 
research (the facilitator role). The facilitator role has a variety of aspects, 
including the organization of conferences and meetings, and the publication 
of working papers and policy briefs.  
[59] The ‘convening’ role is also important, both for research producers and 
research users. For research producers convening involves the ability to 
identify and bring together ‘the right group of researchers’ to plan and carry 
out a research project. For research users, convening involves whether the 
organization, process or network is perceived as ‘the place to look’ and ‘the 
people to consult’ on a given policy issue, and whether it has the ability to 
bring together the right policy-makers and researchers to discuss a particular 
policy issue. This is not merely a question of filtering (which might mean 
nothing more than a good working paper series) but involves the ability to 
command an audience in the policy community and private sector, which 
depends on authority and credibility.  
[60] Networks also play an important role in building and sustaining research 
communities (which are themselves networks). Standards and shared values 
play an essential role of the life of any community, and the research 
community is no exception. In research communities such standards can 
involve the expectation not only that research is of high quality, but (in some 
environments) that research is done at all! The importance of setting a such 
 18
standard is hard to measure in quantitative terms, but experience suggests 
that networks can play a valuable role in creating the expectation that doing 
research is an essential part of one’s professional career, and in maintaining– 
and raising the standards of the research which is done. Standard setting is a 
classic example of a public good with important externalities: networks can 
help create this important public good, which benefits both the research 
community and the users of research. 
[61] These six roles provide a useful framework in which to analyse the activities 
of policy research institutes and networks in order to judge their 
effectiveness and impact. We use this framework to analyse not only the 
activities of SISERA itself (which is the hub of a network of research centres 
and an intermediary between donors and the research centres in its network) 
but also the research centres in the SISERA network (which are also the hub 
of their own networks, and intermediaries between producers and users of 
policy research). 
[62] This approach is not enough, however, to help us to understand the 
characteristics that allow the institutions to be effective and have an impact 
on policy. 
[63] To explain effectiveness, we shift the focus to a second perspective – the 
internal capacity of the organization and the external environment that it 
confronts. Here, we adopt a framework used in recent work on the evaluation 
of capacity building.1 
[64] This approach involves four broad groups of factors:  
• operational capacities (resources, knowledge, and processes) 
• adaptive capacities (resources, knowledge, and processes)  
• the external environment facing the institution 
• the institution’s internal environment. 
[65] Operational and organisational capacities depend on factors that include: 
• staffing 
• infrastructure and technology 
• financial resources 
• strategic leadership 
• programme and process management 
• networks and linkages with other organizations and groups. 
[66] The external environment depends on: 
                                                 
1 Douglas Horton et al., Evaluating Capacity Development: Experiences from Research and 
Development Organizations around the World, Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 
2003. [also available at http://web.idrc.ca/ev_en.php?ID=32194_201]. This work draws in turn on 
Lusthaus, C., M.H. Adrien, G. Anderson, F. Carden, and G.P. Montalvan. 2002. Organizational 
assessment. A framework for improving performance. Ottawa/Washington DC: International 
Development Research Centre and Inter-American Development Bank; and Lusthaus, C., G. Anderson, 
and E. Murphy. 1995. Institutional assessment: A framework for strengthening organizational capacity 
for IDRC’s research partners. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre. 
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• the administrative and legal systems in which the organization operates 
• the policies and political environment that influences the organization; 
• the social and cultural milieu 
• the technology available 
[67] The institution’s internal environment depends on factors that include  
• incentive and rewards systems 
• the organizational ‘climate’ or ‘culture’ 
• the history and traditions of the organization 
• leadership and management style 
• clarity and acceptance of the organization’s mission 
• extent of shared norms and values promoting teamwork and pursuit of 
organizational goals 
• organizational structure. 
[68] Finally we use these two perspectives to analyse the strategic choices facing 
SISERA in 2004 and beyond. The six roles help identify areas where 
SISERA might have a competitive advantage in capacity building and 
networking institutions in Africa, and so inform SISERA’s strategic choices. 
The institutional assessment framework, on the other hand, highlights what is 
necessary for SISERA to implement its strategic choices and achieve its 
strategic goals.  
[69] The structure of the report responds to the requirements of both the Terms of 
Reference and the assessment framework outlined above. The objectives of 
the former are presented in Section 7 and those of the latter are developed in 
Section 8. Some of the information required to respond to the concerns 
expressed by the objectives of the evaluation, in fact, are also necessary 
inputs for a more complete assessment of the performance of SISERA.  
[70] Therefore Section 7.1 deals with the review of the specific actions that 
SISERA has undertaken since 1997. Section 7.2 discuses the benefits of 
SISERA as perceived by the partner institutions. This section is largely based 
on in-depth interviews and questionnaires answered by key personnel of the 
centres. Section 7.3 follows a similar aim to discuss the perceptions of 
policy-makers. The structure of SISERA’s governance and staff composition 
is discussed in Section 7.4. Finally, Section 7.5 offers a picture of SISERA’s 
relationships with other institutions. 
[71] Section 8, based on the methodology mentioned above, uses this information 
and carries out an assessment of SISERA’s organisational capacity.  
[72] Section 9 draws from these to put forward a series of recommendations 
regarding SISERA’s new strategic role for the future. In this section we 
consider the challenges associated with SISERA’s external environment, the 
sub-regional networks, its financial sustainability, the move to IDEP and the 
new roles SISERA should play.   
[73] Finally, Section 10 presents a set of conclusions and recommendations. 
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[74] The team carried out the following activities to obtain the information 
necessary for this evaluation: 
i. Desk work: desk work was conducted to obtain information from the 
centres and other local and regional initiatives to build the picture of the 
external environment. This stage of literature review also allowed us to 
learn about SISERA’s history and place it in the context of this 
evaluation. 
ii. In-depth interviews: Interviews were conducted with key players within 
and outside the SISERA network to obtain a thorough understanding of 
the activities of the Secretariat. These interviews were carried out during 
meetings with centre directors and staff, and via extended telephone 
interviews. 
iii. Questionnaires: A questionnaire was distributed to all SISERA centres to 
determine the following:  
o How has SISERA assisted each institution? In what ways has SISERA 
strengthened the institution’s internal capacity to carry out its mission? 
These questions focus on the difficulties experienced as an 
organization before the SISERA intervention, whether the assistance 
from SISERA was well targeted, i.e. did it address the most important 
difficulties faced; and the extent to which the SISERA assistance has 
enabled them overcome these difficulties. 
o What has been the impact of SISERA’s assistance on activities and 
outputs? These questions focus on changes in the nature of the 
research carried out, workshops and conferences organized, and the 
publications issued to communicate research results to policy-makers.  
o Has SISERA’s assistance increased the impact on the policy process in 
the centre’s country? It is difficult to trace the impact of research on 
policy choices: there are possible many reasons why a policy has been 
chosen. These questions focus instead on ‘intermediate’ indicators: 
whether the centre met more often with policy-makers to discuss its 
research, whether policy-makers cited the centre’s research in their 
public statements or background papers on policy issues, and whether 
the centre’s research was used in the media or in public debates over 
policy issues. 
o In what ways has SISERA strengthened each institution’s internal 
capacity to carry out its mission? These questions focus on the 
difficulties experienced as an organization before the SISERA 
intervention, whether the assistance from SISERA was well targeted, 
i.e. did it address the most important difficulties faced; and the extent 
to which the SISERA assistance has enabled them to overcome these 
difficulties. 
o Are you satisfied with the assistance you have received from SISERA? 
These questions focus on whether the assistance from SISERA has 
been satisfactory and has dealt with their needs. 
o In what ways does the assistance provided by SISERA differ from that 
provided by other donors or funding institutions? These questions 
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focus on whether SISERA assistance is more timely, efficient, well-
targeted or more flexible that other assistance received. 




6.1 SISERA: The Background 
[76] In 1997, USAID, CIDA and IDRC recognised that to successfully tackle 
Africa’s economic challenges, African countries needed to invest in the 
development of human and institutional capital that would be capable of 
providing policy-makers with sound economic policy advice. Such policy 
advice would have greater credibility and ownership if it were provided by 
locally based researchers and research centres, and so priority was given to 
strengthening local ‘Policy Research Institutes’ (PRIs). These PRIs suffered 
from a lack of both human and financial resources, and were in particular 
relatively isolated from the policy community and civil society in their own 
countries. The Secretariat for Institutional Support for Economic Research in 
Africa (SISERA) was established to foster the emergence of such locally 
owned and driven policy research institutes.  
[77] SISERA’s goals were:2 
• To improve working conditions and incentive systems in research 
centres; 
• To improve managerial capacity and governance structure; 
• To facilitate networking among centres and users of their work; 
• To facilitate funding of commissioned research work by the centres; 
• To support training activities for researchers as part of their research 
centres; and 
• To improve the dissemination of research results, particularly among 
current and potential users. 
[78] To achieve these goals, SISERA’s strategy might be summarised into three 
pillars: 
i. capacity building 
ii. capacity utilisation 
iii. institutional networking. 
[79] These pillars served as the foundation for what was identified by SISERA as 
the four main components of its strategy: 
i. Broad Geographical Coverage: In order to draw on the experiences of a 
range of African countries, and to have a broad impact on policy analysis 
and dialogue, SISERA’s activities are directed at the whole of Sub-
Saharan Africa. SISERA has two working languages, English and 
French, which reinforce the aim of broad geographical coverage. 
                                                 
2 SISERA Medium-term Strategy, p.2 
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Similarly, SISERA has identified a number of institutions that represent 
the region and that include well established and promising centres. The 
Secretariat has also recognised the special challenges faced by 
Francophone research centres which are the result in part of their 
isolation due to the language barrier, and has given priority to 
Francophone centres in West and Central Africa.  
ii. Leveraging Existing Networks and Initiatives: SISERA’s actions and the 
centres’ potential research results need to take advantage of and to 
leverage other initiatives in the region. Hence it has established links with 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the 
African Development Bank (AfDB), the World Bank Institute (WBI), the 
African Universities Union (AUU), the African Economic Research 
Consortium (AERC), and Cornell and Clark Atlanta universities. These 
relationships aim to allow the SISERA network to benefit from 
established networks, knowledge acquisition and dissemination of 
research results among African and global policymaking circles.  
iii. Mobilization of partners: This involves mobilisation at three levels: 
policy research institutes, donors and policy-makers. At the institute 
level, SISERA facilitates the organisation of meetings, discussion and 
publications that will allow for the exchange of information and 
experiences. At the donor level, the Secretariat seeks to maintain close 
contact with donors to maintain the high profile of the network and its 
members. At the policy-maker level, SISERA has chosen a strategy based 
on the presence of key regional organizations in its own governing 
structure (Steering Committee) and sustained interaction with senior 
African policy-makers.  
iv. Participation in intellectual fora: This is one of the means through which 
SISERA aims to make its research useful and influential in policy-
making.  
[80] These main components are then implemented through six specific program 
activities: 
i. Strengthening of institutional support: This is provided through 
institutional and capacity utilization grants, technical support and training 
of human resources. The objective is to strengthen the institution’s 
capacity to produce high quality, policy relevant research. 
ii. Enhancement of managerial capacity: An important component of the 
enhancement of managerial capacity is the support provided to the 
directors of the research centres through seminars, training sessions and, 
most significantly, mentoring. These activities typically serve as 
opportunities to exchange information and experiences with other 
directors, thus helping to disseminate and encourage the adoption of best 
practices. 
iii. Networking of African economic research centres: SISERA works 
directly with institutions rather than individuals, and aims to create 
networks of research centres as opposed to networks based around 
individual researchers. In addition to its own network of Emerging 
Centres and Partner Institutes, SISERA has established two ‘sub-
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networks’, covering Southern and Eastern Africa (SEAPREN) and 
Western and Central Africa (WECAPREN / ROCAPE). 
iv. Linking researchers and end-users: As the core of SISERA’s mission, its 
efforts are focused towards developing the necessary institutional 
capacities that will allow research centres to reach and influence the end-
users of their research. An underlying goal of SISERA is to reduce the 
isolation faced by African research centres so that they can actively 
participate in policy discussions, debate and dialogue between civil 
society and the government in their own country, and in addition play a 
more active role in the world ‘market’ for policy ideas with respect to the 
region’s own development.  
v. Collaboration with other African initiatives and institutions: 
Collaboration with other institutions or networks brings about the 
exchange of experiences and builds contacts with potentially influential 
civil society actors. Although some of the links with other institutions 
have been a response to funding needs, others are driven by the demand 
from the research centres for specific training and technical support. 
Hence the collaboration with the AfDB, for instance, through a visiting 
scholar program; and with the WBI in the provision of workshops on the 
analysis of policies for poverty reduction. 
vi. Internal activities: These activities include the publication of research 
results, resource expansion, meetings of SISERA’s Steering Committee 
and/or the institutions’ directors, audits and consultancies that might 
address specific technical or managerial concerns expressed by the 
research centres or observed by SISERA staff. 
[81] This is, in summary, the formal strategy of SISERA. In practice, we found it 
useful to characterize this rather complex set of principles, strategies and 
activities in terms of ‘Five Ms’: 
i. Money: Core and seed grants, as well as resources available through 
research projects such as SAGA. It also includes dissemination and 
connectivity grants. 
ii. Mentoring: Advice and guidance provided to the directors of the research 
centres, as well as to their staff (including finance officers and 
administrators) and to researchers; and technical support. 
iii. Meeting: Conferences, seminars, workshops and meetings which allow 
the centre directors to meet other directors, donors and end users. 
iv. Monitoring: Monitoring of the projects and research carried out by the 
centres to ensure compliance with minimum standards of quality, as well 
as the appropriate utilisation of financial resources and implementation of 
the work programme. 
v. Mediating: Acting as an intermediary or broker between African 
researchers and policy research institutes and donors outside the region 
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6.2 The environment in which SISERA operates 
[82] SISERA can be characterized as a network of policy research institutes, with 
a secretariat acting as the hub of the network. This characterization is 
accurate, but does not take account of the full complexity of the environment 
within which SISERA operates, which is in fact a set of interlocking 
networks. Our review of SISERA’s Annual Reports between 1997 and 2003 
and the Medium-term Strategy and Indicative Work Program (2000) suggests 
that these networks have the structure depicted in Diagram 1. 
[83] The diagram below shows one way of depicting this web of networks. A 
number of points are worth noting:  
• Both SISERA and the research centres play a role as intermediaries or 
network hubs. SISERA acts as an intermediary or broker between donors 
and the research centres in the SISERA network. Each research centre in 
turnh acts as an intermediary or broker, i.e. as a hub of a network 
comprising its researchers and the users of its research outputs. 
• IDRC (and to a certain extent IDEP) plays a similar role to SISERA, 
building capacity of institutions (often networks) around the world. 
• There are a number of other networks involving SISERA. SISERA acts 
as a hub connecting donors not only with individual research centres but 
also with the two regional sub-networks of SISERA research centres 
(SEAPREN and ROCAPE) 
• SISERA has direct contacts with some of the end users of the research 
output of the research centres in its network.  
• The centres act as hubs between the knowledge acquired or shared 
through the network and the end-users of their research.  
• The centres also act as hubs linking donors and the researchers.  
• Some users of research use the output of more than one SISERA research 
centre 
• Some donors who support SISERA also give support to individual 
centres in the SISERA network 
• The sub-regional networks (SEAPREN and ROCAPE) are formally the 
responsibility of SISERA; although they are becoming more independent 
through their direct interaction with other institutions, donors and users.  
• Other institutions provide similar and complimentary services to some of 
the members of SISERA 
[84] With this complex structure in mind we will first evaluate the performance of 
SISERA and then of the research centres themselves. We must therefore 
focus on the activities that make up the capacity building process and the 
state of both hubs.  
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7 ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES 
 
[85] The specific objectives of the evaluation, as set out in the Terms of Reference, 
are: 
i. Review and assess the specific actions that SISERA has undertaken to 
provide technical and financial support to African economic research centres 
and to reduce the isolation of these centres. 
ii. Assess the perceived benefits of SISERA’s interventions from the viewpoint 
of its partner institutions and determine the value added of its activities to 
economic research centres. 
iii. Assess the perceived benefits of SISERA interventions from the viewpoint of 
government institutions and determine the value added of its activities to 
policy making 
iv. Assess SISERA’s governance structure and staff composition in the light of 
the Secretariat’s mandate 
v. Evaluate the relationship between SISERA and its donors and other capacity 
building institutions in AFRICA, e.g. AERC, ACBF, etc. 
vi. Determine the challenges and associated risks facing SISERA in the context 
of its current objectives and identify new strategic opportunities.  
[86] We focus on issues (i) to (v) in the section which follows, and return to issue (vi) 
in Sections 9 and 10. 
7.1 Specific Actions Undertaken by SISERA 
[87] In this section we review and assess the specific actions that SISERA has 
undertaken to provide technical and financial support to African economic 
research centres and to reduce the isolation of these centres. 
[88] To evaluate the specific actions undertaken by SISERA to support African 
economic research centres it is necessary to trace its activities. The following 
section presents a critical review of these activities according to the five specific 
program activities described above (strengthening of institutional support, 
enhancement of managerial capacity of research centres, networking of African 
research centres, linking researchers and end-users, and collaboration with other 
institutions).  
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7.1.1 Strengthening of institutional support 
[89] Institutional strengthening is provided through core and seed grants, technical 
assistance, training for researchers and capacity utilization initiatives. According 
to SISERA’s Annual Reports and information provided by the Secretariat, these 
constitute the bulk of all its activities. Their main characteristics are described 
below: 
• Core grants: Core grants are awarded to Partner Institutions with the 
objective of strengthening their capacity to design, implement and 
disseminate research agendas with strong local inputs. The grants may cover 
the costs of research support facilities, research projects, and participation in 
seminars and publications. In general, core grants are designed to augment 
the capacity of the institution and not merely that of the individual researcher. 
Hence the request for the grant must be accompanied by documentation 
supporting its intended role in overall institutional strengthening.  
• Seed grants: Seed grants have the same purpose as core grants but are 
designed for institutions with lower capacity to absorb resources (Emerging 
Centres). 
• Technical support: Technical support is provided through a process of visits 
to the centres, in which SISERA programme staff determine the progress in 
implementation of on-going projects and identify problems that are being 
encountered by the institution. Typical issues which arise include difficulties 
in developing proposals, their ability to manage funds and carry out research 
within the projects’ time limits, etc. From these visits, SISERA is able to 
organize training initiatives or meetings among the members and other 
networks to exchange information and update their skills. 
• Training of researchers: This support includes training, sabbaticals and 
internships in conjunction with regional (e.g. the African Development 
Bank), global (e.g. the World Bank Institute) and academic institutions (e.g. 
the Programme de Troisième Cycle Inter-Universitaire, PCTI). Training has 
as an objective the development of the capacity to analyze, formulate and 
implement policies on current economic issues; while creating and 
strengthening bonds and networks among researchers, research centres and 
clients. 
• Capacity utilization: Capacity utilization support aims at providing funding 
for centres to use more fully their existing capacity in research that will serve 
the institution’s priorities and contribute towards raising their profile. The 
support comes in the form of research competition funds, such as the 
Strategies and Analysis for Growth and Access (SAGA) grants funded by 
USAID beginning in May 2002.  
[90] A list of these activities since 1997 is presented in Table 1. It should be noted 
that in its initial phase (from 1997 to 1999) SISERA focused on establishing its 
institutional structures and securing resources from donors, and not on providing 
financial and other support to the research centres in its network. 
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[91] Since 1997 core grants have been awarded to all Partner Institutions with the 
exception of CEDRES (in Burkina Faso) and CIRES (in Cote d’Ivoire). CREA, 
CEREG and CIRES, however, received doctoral grants and, CIRES a SAGA 
grant during the current fiscal year (from April 2003). CEDRES and CIRES 
have received a relatively high number of technical support visits (5 for 
CEDRES and 3 for CIRES) and training of researchers activities (47 person days 
for CEDRES and 62 for CIRES). And since CIRES is the only Partner Institution 
to be awarded a SAGA grant, it could be said that the technical and capacity 
building effort paid off. Nonetheless, while CEDRES’s Director, Dr. Soulama, 
highly valued these support visits and training activities, in an interview he 
suggested that his institution was going through a difficult period due to internal 
factors, and would soon put forward new proposals. 
[92] Seed grants were awarded to 5 of the 11 Emerging Centres, except INESOR in 
Zambia (which opted instead for a connectivity grant). Training of researchers 
was less consistent in the case of the Emerging Centres. Only, GREAT, in Mali, 
benefited from significant training activities (although NISER, LEA, GESDRI 
and GREAT had some, too). Technical support visits, however, were consistent, 
and most centres, probably with the exception of AIAE (which received some 
training), enjoyed visits almost annually. LEA, in Gabon, for instance, has been 
visited almost every year since 1999, and so has GESDRI, in Gambia, since 
2000.  
[93] These visits show a close relation to the award of institutional support grants. 
NIEP in South Africa, for example, received one visit each year since 2001, prior 
to the seed grant during the current fiscal year (which was accompanied with 78 
person days of training of researchers).  
[94] GREAT’s case is interesting, because it has been pointed out as an example of an 
unsuccessful centre by almost all those we interviewed. In fact, the Secretariat 
noted that the centre lacked the internal capacity needed to use the seed grant 
which it received, and wanted to return the grant. It constitutes, however, a 
useful experience for SISERA which has now learned how to design a strategy to 
deal with institutions such as GREAT, which is less a centre than a loose 
grouping of researchers working together. In this case, the grant helped create a 
centre.  
[95] It is significant that of the 11 Emerging Centres affiliated to SISERA, only 6 
received some kind of institutional support. In fact, during the course of our 
evaluation we were able to determine that some centres were considered 
‘unaccounted’ for and communication with them was sporadic and unreliable. It 
is fair to ask what SISERA and such centres have gained from the partnership; 
and whether SISERA’s limited resources would be better utilized in working 
with other centres or networks. An interesting example of this isolation is the 
case of CEE in Madagascar. Clive Gray (HIID) suggested that the centre is 
performing reasonably well, considering that the head [Pepe Andrianomanana] 
is somewhat on his own. SISERA did not report any activities involving CEE 
until recently through collaboration with SAGA and as the result of USAID’s 
new five-year strategic plan for Madagascar launched in October 2003. Failure 
 31
to maintain contact with this centre does not seem to be the fault of the 
Secretariat, which made repeated attempts to contact the centre, without success.  
[96] Maintaining contact with some Emerging Centres has clearly been problematic, 
either because of difficulties peculiar to the Centre or because of political 
turbulence and disruption. In these circumstances, despite the efforts of the 
Secretariat, contact is difficult to maintain. Augmenting the human resources 
available to the Secretariat may be the answer in some cases, but in others the 
Secretariat may need to consider a more explicit ‘exit strategy’ for weak or 
failing institutions. This is discussed in more detail below. 
[97] During our interviews the question often arose of whether SISERA needed an 
exit strategy for its successful members, which would allow them to ‘graduate’. 
While this may indeed be necessary, the experience of the emerging centres 
suggests that a more pressing issue is whether SISERA needs to articulate an exit 
strategy ‘at the low end’. 
[98] This is, of course, a difficult issue, requiring much judgement. The conditions 
under which many centres operate are indeed very difficult, and patience and 
determination is essential in nurturing institutions in these circumstances. On the 
other hand, the are clearly some environments and some centres that cannot and 
will not flourish whatever assistance is provided by SISERA. A more clearly 
articulated strategy for ending these unsuccessful interventions would seem to be 
desirable. 
[99] In this respect is it worth noting that SISERA’s strategy of working with policy 
research institutions instead of individual researchers was predicated on the 
(implicit) assumption that there existed in most countries adequate capacity to 
carry out policy research and analysis, in the sense that there were a sufficient 
number of researchers trained in modern research techniques, and any 
deficiencies in this capacity would be addressed by institutions such as AERC. 
Instead, the key obstacle to high quality, ‘home grown’ policy research was 
identified as the lack of well functioning research institutions within which 
researchers could pursue their careers. For many countries it was reasonable to 
make this assumption, and institutional weakness is indeed endemic in the 
region. But SISERA’s experience with emerging centres suggests that in some 
countries, at least, there is a deficiency of well trained researchers. In these 





Table 1: SISERA’s Activities – 1997 -2003 
 (July)1997/99 1999 /00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 April 1 2003 to Feb. 2004 
SISERA 
Total Expenditure on SISERA 2,308,608 1,364,879 866,146 1,763,921 3,667,611 (to Sept. 30)  1,189,693 
Number of staff employed by 
Secretariat 
2 (in 97) then 4 (in 
98) 4 4 4 
5 
 (+ the IDRC regional 





Institutional support grants  
- volet doctoral      62,970 
Technical Support – visits number 2 1 1  1  
Training of researchers 3 
- number of person days   30 3 14  
PI’s meeting attendance Yes4 No5 Yes6 Y7 N8 Y9 N10 N11 Y12 
Yaoundé II / CEREG       
                                                 
3 Please note that Basic Poverty Courses organized in collaboration with WBI, included the participation of researchers not coming from SISERA’s Partner Institutions 
i.e. from universities and participants from the DRSP national teams. For more details, see annual reports 2001-2002 and 2002-2003. 
4 Dakar, April 9-10, 1998 
5 Abidjan, Nov. 24-25, 1998 
6 Harare, March 6-7, 1999 
7 Böhn, Dec. 6-8, 1999 apart the GDN conference 
8 Accra, July 13-15, 2000 
9 Ouagadougou, May 2-4, 2001 
10 Dakar, Nov. 27-28, 2001 
11 Kampala, Nov. 18-20, 2002 
12 Bamako, June 16-19, 2003 
 33
 (July)1997/99 1999 /00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 April 1 2003 to Feb. 2004 
Institutional support grants 
- core grant (yaoundé II) 
- thematic  










Technical Support 1  2  1  
Training of researchers  
- number of person days  10  3   
Research project grants SAGA      53,846 
PI’s meeting attendance Y-Y-Y Y Y Y-Y Y Y 
CIRES 
Institutional support grants  
- volet doctoral 2     69,660 
Technical Support  2   1  
Training of researchers  
- number of person days   20 21 21  
Research project grants SAGA      47,797 52,627 
PI’s meeting attendance Y-Y-Y Y N N-Y Y Y 
CREA 
Institutional support grants  
- dissemination 
- core grant 










Technical Support 2   1 1 1 
Training of researchers  
- number of courses 












Research project grants  
- Network (preliminary meetings) 
- SAGA 
    34,141  93,117 
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 (July)1997/99 1999 /00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 April 1 2003 to Feb. 2004 
PI’s meeting attendance Y-Y-Y Y Y Y-Y Y Y 
DPRU 
Institutional support grants  
- managerial capacity 
- core grant 





Technical Support    1 1 1 
Training of researchers 
– number of courses      
 
one 
Research project grants SAGA      114,657 
PI’s meeting attendance N-Y-Y Y Y Y-N Y Y 
EPRC 
Institutional support grants 
- connectivity 
- core grant 






Technical Support   1 1 1  
Training of researchers  
- number of courses 



















PI’s meeting attendance Y-Y-Y Y Y Y-Y Y Y 
ESRF 
Institutional support grants core grant  218,000     
Technical Support 1 1  1 1  
Training of researchers  
- number of courses 
- number of person days 








PI’s meeting attendance Y-N-Y Y Y Y-Y Y Y 
ISSER 
Institutional support grants  
- core grant   278,000    
Technical Support 1 5 1 1 1 1 
Training of researchers   One     
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 (July)1997/99 1999 /00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 April 1 2003 to Feb. 2004 
- number of courses 
- number of persondays 
One 
21 
PI’s meeting attendance N-Y-N Y Y Y-Y Y Y 
IPAR 
Institutional support grants  
- core grant     295,340  
Technical Support    1 1  
Training of researchers  
- number of courses 
- number of person days 





PI’s meeting attendance N-N-N N N N-Y Y Y 
NISER 
Institutional support grants 
- core grant 
- connectivity 




Technical Support   1  1 1 
Training of researchers  
- number of person days  40   35  
PI’s meeting attendance N-Y-Y Y Y N-Y Y Y 
EMERGING CENTRES 
AIAE 
Institutional support grants  
- seed grant     49,700  
Technical Support    1  1 
Training of researchers  
- number of courses 
- number of person days 






PI’s meeting attendance N-N-N N N N-N Y Y 
GESDRI 
Institutional support grants  
- seed grant     47,140  
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 (July)1997/99 1999 /00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 April 1 2003 to Feb. 2004 
Technical Support   3 1 1 1 
Training of researchers (number of 
courses or number of person days 
spent at courses) 
      
PI’s meeting attendance N-N-N N N N-Y Y N 
GREAT 
Institutional support grants  
- seed grant   43,100    
Technical Support  2  1   
Training of researchers 
- number of person days   20 31 14  
PI’s meeting attendance N-N-N Y Y Y-Y Y Y 
INESOR 
Institutional support grants 
 - connectivity    51,320   
Technical Support 1  1 1   
PI’s meeting attendance N-N-N Y Y N-N Y N 
LEA 
Institutional support grants 
- seed grant  33,506  45,400   
Technical Support 1 1 1 1  1 
Training of researchers  
- number of courses 
- number of person days 








PI’s meeting attendance N-Y-N Y N Y-N N N 
NIEP 
Institutional support grants  
- seed grant      54,230 
Technical Support    1 1 1 
Training of researchers - number of 
person days      
 
78 
PI’s meeting attendance N-N-N Y Y N-N Y Y 
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 (July)1997/99 1999 /00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 April 1 2003 to Feb. 2004 
MEMBERS OF NETWORKS (Seapren or Wecapren) 
BIDPA 
Technical Support 1 3     
Training of researchers (number of 
courses or number of person days 
spent at courses) 
      
Research project grants  
- network (preparatory meeting)  67,209     
PI’s meeting attendance N-N-N Y Y N-N Y N 
CEPEC 
Technical Support 1    1  
Training of researchers  
- number of person days    
 
231 (see note 3)   
PI’s meeting attendance N-N-N N N N Y N 
NEPRU 
Technical Support     2 1 
Training of researchers (number of 
courses or number of person days 
spent at courses) 
      
Research project grants  
- SAGA 
- SEAPREN 







PI’s meeting attendance N-N-N Y Y N-Y Y N 
OTHER SUPPORT13 
ACEG:  African Centre for Economic 
Growth 
- dissemination grant 








                                                 
13 Represents grants to other institutions in the African economic research area to fund thematic seminars or publications 
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 (July)1997/99 1999 /00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 April 1 2003 to Feb. 2004 
ACMF: African Capital Markets 
Forum 





   







   
AERC: African Economic Research 
Consortium 












ATPS: African Technology Policy 
Studies Network 
- seminar 






Training of researchers  
- number of person days 
    132   
CIEREA (Burkina Faso)15 
- PTCI 
- other 




55,376      
                                                 
14 Represents number of researchers/courses and sector public staff/courses attendance for the Distance learning courses on Fiscal Policy organized in collaboration 
with WBI. 
15 Represents mainly the supports to the “Programme de 3e cycle inter universitaire – PTCI” (phase II) and to the volet doctoral. The grant for the Phase I was signed in 
1994 and the funds provided from CIDA, USAID and IDRC. The total amount disbursed for the Phase I (from 1994 to 1999) was of $ 2,514,191 CA. The project is 
managed by SISERA. 
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 (July)1997/99 1999 /00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 April 1 2003 to Feb. 2004 
DGEP: Direction générale de 
l’économie et de la planification 
Training of researchers  
- number of person days 













    
ENDA Tiers Monde 
- seminar    
 
25,000   
PSCGT: Pan-African Consultative 
Forum on Corporate Governance 
- seminar 






GDN: Global Development Network 




    
University of Cape Town 
- seminar    
 





7.1.2 Enhancement of managerial capacity of economic 
research centres 
[100] SISERA has opted for a “hands on” approach to enhance managerial capacity of 
the centres in its network. Hence an important component of the Secretariat’s 
work is focused on key individuals within each institution; e.g. directors and 
finance officers. To do this, SISERA resorts to various activities among which 
we can highlight the following: 
• Meetings; 
• Workshops, seminars and training; and  
• Mentoring. 
[101] At meetings, directors and staff from the centres have the opportunity to 
network, share experiences and best practices and receive specialized training. 
The training provided by SISERA seems to have responded to their concerns, 
which underscores SISERA’s ability to respond flexibly to the needs of its 
partners and helping to ensure its continue relevance. For example, there were 
presentations on institutional self-assessment and fund raising in the fiscal year 
2002/3; and during the fiscal year 2001/2, the finance officers of some 
institutions (CREA, GREAT, LEA, CEDRES, CEREG and PTCI) received 
training in financial management of projects. On more than one occasion, 
centres’ directors have expressed their desire to improve their institutional self-
assessment techniques.  
[102] Fund raising capacities are particularly important in determining the success of 
SISERA’s effort to strengthen the African institutions. To ensure the 
sustainability of their activities and maximize the impact of their research the 
centres require a continued inflow of funds. SISERA might therefore consider 
providing additional training in fundraising to allow centres to access funds 
without its assistance or intervention. This might be the subject of a future 
presentation or training session, or (more likely) the focus of ongoing assistance 
to the centres. 
7.1.3 Networking of African economic research centres 
[103] The most important initiative by SISERA in this area has been the launching of 
two sub-regional networks: the West and Central Africa Policy Research 
Network (WECAPREN) in the anglophone countries, and the Réseau de 
Recherche Ouest et Centre Africain sur les Politiques Economiques (ROCAPE) 
in the francophone countries; and the Southern and Eastern Africa Policy 
Research Network (SEAPREN). These networks have exposed SISERA 
members to other institutions thus expanding the links and opportunities for 
funding and practice.  
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[104] ROCAPE was only launched very recently, and so has relatively few activities to 
report. SEAPREN was launched several years ago, but was relatively inactive 
until NEPRU assumed responsibility for managing the network in 2003. Since 
then SEAPREN has been very active, holding regional meetings and launching 
collaborative research projects for which it has helped securing funding. 
[105] While SEAPREN is now active and functioning well, a larger question remains 
of the strategic intention behind these sub-regional networks. At one level, of 
course, they pursue interesting and worthwhile activities and so make a broad 
contribution to capacity building and policy-making. At another level, however, 
the logic behind these networks is somewhat unclear. They do not seem to be 
vehicles for direct capacity building, as is SISERA itself. And since the networks 
are constructed on a geographical basis, the centres in the network are unlikely to 
share the same thematic interests or research agendas. Regional integration is, of 
course, one possible common policy issue that might be the basis for common 
activities in the sub-networks, particularly since the sub-networks are 
constructed on a regional basis. The sub-regional networks could very well 
decide to pursue research on regional integration issues, but this in turn is likely 
to prove problematic in terms of policy impact, since regional integration 
institutions in Africa are, almost without exception, rather weak, and in most 
cases lack the capacity to demand and absorb policy research and analysis. So 
even if the sub-regional networks successfully pursue a regional integration 
research agenda, they may well find it difficult to achieve significant policy 
impact because of the absence of a demand for their research among policy-
makers at the regional level. On balance, then, the strategy behind the sub-
regional networks remains problematic. 
[106] The assistance that SISERA provided to other African economic research 
centres, institutions and networks is also important. For the same reason as 
above, it provided grants to other institutions to fund thematic seminars, 
publication of African economic research and educational programmes; e.g. 
training at the Masters Doctoral level in the francophone countries through the 
Programme de Troisième Cycle Inter-Universitaire (PTCI).  
[107] Meetings of directors and researchers within and outside the network are 
important. Among the perceived benefits from participating in SISERA, the 
directors interviewed highly value these opportunities. This is more so among 
the Francophone centres, which, because of language and strong hierarchical 
structures, tend to work in relative isolation. Nonetheless, and although SISERA 
has made it clear that it assists institutions rather than individuals, some centres, 
particularly those linked to academic institutions, have suggested the need to 
organise scientific meetings and seminars to reduce the isolation of researchers. 
Targeting individual researchers and increasing their individual human capital 
can certainly benefit the institution in which they work. Isolated and potentially 
successful researchers (who have perhaps benefited from training funded by 
SISERA) have strong incentives to leave the institution in which they are based 
in order to further their careers or simply to gain access to a broader research and 
policy community. If on the other hand, these researchers are targeted and 
integrated into this community through their institution, the incentives to remain 
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in the institution increase. If they do stay, the institution is strengthened in a 
more sustainable way by the augmentation of its human resources.  
[108] This could be an explanation for the difficulties experienced by GREAT, for 
example, which finds it difficult to retain its better trained researchers. It is also 
possible, however, that these problems are due as well to a lack of transparency 
in the management of the centre and personality conflicts within the institution 
(which the Secretariat is working to address). 
7.1.4 Linking researchers and end-users 
[109] SISERA has also performed this role, though this is more properly the 
responsibility of the sub-regional networks and/or the individual research 
centres. Since its creation, the Secretariat has established contacts with local, 
regional and global research users in order to help strengthen its profile or 
provide services to its member centres. SISERA has, for instance, developed 
Visiting Scholar programmes with the African Development Bank, and is in the 
process of doing so with the Banque Central des Etats de l’Afrique de Ouest and 
the Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale.  
[110] Essentially, SISERA has focused on the establishing linkages at the regional and 
international levels, and this seems the correct strategy. Many centres in the 
SISERA network, of course, participate within their own national policy-making 
processes, advising parliamentary committees and policy analysts within their 
own countries (e.g. EPRC is advising the government of Uganda on poverty 
issues and NISER is using core grant to organize workshops with legislators). 
However, these contacts must be made by the centres themselves and not all 
centres seem to have been successful in achieving this. Also it has been noted 
that SISERA has not been able to position its brand-name in the African 
economic ‘research market’, which limits its ability to help the smaller emerging 
centres achieve recognition from their own policy communities. To the extent 
the SISERA builds stronger linkages at the regional and international levels, this 
‘brand recognition’ (for promoting high quality, policy relevant research) is 
likely to spill over at the national level and benefit the centres. 
[111] One issue of concern is the imbalance between the work carried out to strengthen 
research centres’ institutional capacities and end users’ capacity to demand and 
use the research produced by the centres. In principle it would be desirable for 
SISERA to address both the supply and demand, but in practice it has focused on 
the producers of research, particularly in the initial period following its creation. 
As a consequence, many centres (e.g. IPAR, IDEP, CEPC and CIRES) report 
difficulties in engaging with policy-makers in their countries because there is 
little interest in research. Dr. Kibua (IPAR) adds that there is no demand for 
knowledge on the part of the private sector in Africa, which views research as 
the responsibility of the government, and who believe that research institutes 
should work for the private sector on a pro-bono basis. This is important 
particularly since there are strong reasons to believe that the private sector will 
will need to play a growing role over the longer term in the financial 
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sustainability and independence of research centres in Africa, as we discuss 
below.  
[112] Ideally, then, SISERA should engage more actively in not only linking with end 
users, but also, if possible, strengthening their capacity to demand and apply the 
knowledge produced at the research centres. Otherwise, SISERA’s intervention 
might contribute to the brain drain or discourage potentially successful centres. 
Alternatively, SISERA could improve the centres’ own outreach capacities 
providing them with the tools necessary to independently engage and lobby 
governments, thus creating a demand for their own services.  
7.1.5 Collaboration with other institutions 
[113] SISERA has been relatively successful collaborating with other institutions. 
During its first phase (1997/9) it worked towards establishing long-term 
relationships with regional and global institutions. Hence, in 2000, it began 
working in collaboration with the AfDB and the World Bank Institute. The latter 
provided SISERA, until the most recent fiscal year, with training for researchers 
in the area of poverty reduction. The departure of the WBI may have a 
significant effect on the members of the SISERA network. The responses to our 
questionnaire and our interviews suggested that such training was one of the 
most popular activities initiated by SISERA, and research related to poverty 
reduction has been a common denominator among the most successful centres 
(EPRC, CREA, DPRU); and it has been so recognised by the centres’ directors.  
[114] An important feature of SISERA’s governance structure is the composition of its 
Steering Committee, which includes members of the Economic Commission for 
Africa (ECA), the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC), the 
Association of African Universities (AAU) and the African Development Bank 
(AfDB). This helped ensure that SISERA is responsive to the African context. 
[115] SISERA’s relationship with USAID has resulted in new opportunities through 
the SAGA program. Similarly, Cornell University and Clark Atlanta University 
cooperate with SISERA in research and training activities that benefit the 
African research institutions. Finally, during 2000 and 2001, SISERA 
participated in a Global Development Network Conferences in Bonn and Tokyo. 
These links with international institutions give SISERA exposure within a wider 
forum and help raise the quality standards within the network. This suggests that 
efforts need to be made in both directions to ensure that SISERA will become a 
more visible member of the international economic research community. 
[116] SISERA is an IDRC Secretariat, and as such, is legally and administratively part 
of IDRC. The perception of a very close relationship to IDRC has made it 
difficult on occasion for other IDRC Secretariats (such as TIPS) to raise core and 
project funding from other donors, and has on at least one occasion caused 
difficulties with one of SISERA’s supporters. This might make it difficult for 
SISERA to broaden its support by attracting other donors. On the other hand, the 
proposed move to IDEP may give rise to exactly the same perception and 
problems, since it is part of the UN System. A particular effort must be made to 
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establish a clearer perception of the identity and achievements of SISERA on the 
part of international development agencies. A more vigorous publicity and 
outreach campaign has a role to play in this. 
[117] In summary, SISERA has passed through two very distinctive phases. In the 
first, which is fully described in its mid-term evaluation, it engaged in its own 
institution building. During this period, 1997/9, SISERA was engaged in 
creating the appropriate network governance structure and establishing strong 
links with donors and end-users of the centres’ research. 
[118] From 1999, however, SISERA’s work has consisted of more of harvesting the 
fruits of the first phase, building its relationships with a wider range of partner 
institutes and emerging centres. To some extent, however, it has seemed to lose 
momentum towards the end of the second period. This may be a natural reaction 
to the institution building in the first phase and the network building of the 
second phase, but the loss of momentum may have been exacerbated by three 
factors: 
• The difficulties since 2002 in appointing a permanent Executive Director  
• Insufficient staff numbers, particularly at the Programme Officer level. This 
was compounded by the need for the senior Programme Officer to fill the 
role of Acting Executive Director, in addition to carrying out his normal 
duties 
• Uncertainty concerning the institutional home for SISERA in the long term. 
[119] This has affected SISERA in a number of ways. The training activities in poverty 
analysis, carried out in collaboration with the World Bank Institute, seem to have 
been highly popular with the centres, and helped position some of these centres 
to play a key role in the formulation of their countries’ poverty reduction 
strategies. Management and policy changes at the WBI, however, led the 
Institute to end its collaboration in 2002. The end of the collaboration seems to 
have had little or nothing to do with SISERA, and everything to do with the 
WBI’s internal policies and priorities. SISERA has begun negotiations with the 
UNDP to replace the WBI, but these negotiations inevitably take time, and it is 
unfortunate that such an important and popular activity has been interrupted by 
circumstances beyond the control of the Secretariat.  
[120] In addition, SISERA’s has much too low an institutional profile and ‘brand 
recognition’ in the development policy research community and among donors 
(and potential supporters). Additional staff and a clearer strategic direction 
regarding these areas specifically would have enabled SISERA to address this 
issue in a timely fashion. 
[121] The period of uncertainty through which SISERA has gone through with respect 
to partnerships and funding from donors may to some extent also be explained 
by an incorrect perception about the relationship between SISERA and IDRC. 
Although SISERA functions in programmatic terms as an autonomous 
institution, its legal and financial status as an IDRC secretariat, and its perceived 
closeness to IDRC (for instance, its interim Executive Director until March 
2003, Dr. Gilles Forget, is IDRC’s regional Director for West and Central 
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Africa) has blurred the that independence and possibly complicated relationships 
with potential collaborators and donors.  
7.1.6 Evolution of SISERA expenditure  
[122] As described above, SISERA places a significant emphasis on training activities 
for researchers. The task of capacity building within the institutions was taken 
seriously from the start; this can be seen in Figure 3 below. Expenditures on 
programme activities are dominated by training, managerial capacity building 
and core grants. The lower levels of expenditure for programme activities during 
2000/1 are explained by a considerable drop in training initiatives and the 
absence of core grants. On the other hand, the rise in operational expenses is 
explained by explicit provision in the budget figures (for the first time) for the 
salaries of SISERA staff. It is also important to notice that the 2000/1 fiscal year 
was a transition year, between the first and the second phase; and the overall 
budget decreased in 16% with respect to the previous fiscal year. 
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Table 2: SISERA – Expenditure 1997-2003 
Expenditures (in Canadian Dollars) 1997-9 
1999-
2000 2000-1 2001-2 2002-3 
              
Program Activities             
Training    1629041 438241 288602 351081 1398558
Sabbaticals and Internships  22212 4586       
Managerial capacity building  90178 93947 58375 122344 86806
Electronic connectivity of centres 0 14124 4000 43000 8320
Collaborative research  63065 192261 45305 88148 341946
Core grants   100000 186411 0 498000 623358
Seed grants   0 33506 32275 1684 125540
Dissemination   0 1564 36629 29901 88957
Total Program Activities  1904496 964640 465186 1134158 2673485
As a percentage of total expenses 90% 93% 54% 64% 73%
              
Technical Support             
Salaries        79095 108322 403862
Travel        19481 52516 74167
Relocation       0 39149 14503
Steering and technical committee meetings 8690 5897 1080 26575 23687
Total Technical Support      99656 226562 516219
As a percentage of total expenses 0% 0% 12% 13% 14%
              
Operational Expenses            
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Salaries        149483 197519 68671
Staff training     3211 743 1489 1479
Rent    15000 18000 18000 18000 25125
Travel        44559 63277 61456
Capital Equipment   10530 4800 0 11232 41166
Non-capital Equipment    1200 5394 176 996
Communication costs  4152 0 3240 1993 4553
Office expenses   10102 2044 411 873 594
Printing and reproduction    2572 2898 2475 3698
Other      3723 4110 5626 594
Professional and special services   0 24202 20925 41700
Overhead    162905 32950 48264 79616 227875
Total Operational Expenses  202689 68500 301304 403201 477907
As a percentage of total expenses 10% 7% 35% 23% 13%
              
Total Expenditures   2107185 1033140 866146 1763921 3667611
 
 
[123] Figure 3 shows SISERA’s expenditure by category. Most significant is the 
importance of programme activities in the secretariat’s budget. It is worth noting 
that: 
• SISERA devotes a significant proportion of its funds directly to the centres in 
its network. This assistance is also marked by a clear ‘investment’ period 
before 2000/1, and a ‘production’ period thereafter.  
• SISERA’s costs in ‘delivering’ these programmes (its operational costs) are 
surprisingly small – currently about 13% of the total budget. If there were to 
be a significant drop in funding, this would inevitably affect programme 
activities – there is little if any slack to cut. This vulnerability should, 
however, stimulate sustained efforts to secure additional sources of income, 
while keeping operational expenses at their current low levels.  
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[124] For many institutions, the costs of delivering their activities are a matter of 
concern – because these costs are too high. For SISERA, these costs are, if 
anything, a matter of concern because they are too low! While this reflects in 
part an admirably lean and efficient organization, it is also the result of staff 
numbers that  are too low relative to the organizations mission and objectives. 
Overall, SISERA’s delivery costs are surprisingly low – too low. 
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7.2 Impact on partners 
[125] In this section we assess the perceived benefits of SISERA's interventions from 
the viewpoint of its partner institutions and determine the value added of its 
activities to its network. 
[126] The impact of SISERA interventions on its partner institutions vary in form and 
magnitude. While all directors interviewed consider their participation in the 
network as beneficial for their institutions, the services are valued in different 
ways by each director. A common perception, best articulated by Haroon Bhorat 
of DPRU, is that the support provided by SISERA gives directors ‘breathing 
space’. Financial support in particular, but also the technical assistance, training 
of researchers and other related activities, give directors time to reflect; resources 
to hire new researchers, the opportunity to explore new issues, etc. Table 3 
reviews the ways in which SISERA’s support has benefited some of the 
centres.16  
[127] Among the various effects of SISERA’s assistance on the centres, according to 
their directors, it is possible to highlight the following: 
• Difference in the perceptions of SISERA’s policies across the centres: While 
SISERA awarded AIAE CAD 5,000 for two research papers, it gave NIEP 
CAD 23,000 for two research projects. As a consequence, their perceptions 
of the relevance of the financial support are different. To the question is the 
size of SISERA’s support for research projects realistic, in the sense that it 
provides the resources necessary to achieve the stated objectives of the 
research proposal? answers included: 
No. For instance in the SEED grant we got, $5000.00 was for two (2) 
research papers, but in reality it could barely suffice for one. 
Okey G. Oji (AIAE) 
Yes, because in between the two research projects supported by SISERA, 
our researchers do undertake other commissioned research projects. 
SISERA is more flexible compared with other donors. 
Moses Rangata (NIEP) 
 
• Difference in opinion: While AIAE is very satisfied with SISERA’s 
adherence to timelines, NIEP considers it unsatisfactory. In fact, it suggests 
that this is because the Secretariat is currently understaffed. Although these 
perceptions refer to very specific, and probably unrelated and one-off cases, 
they do point out the importance of consistency. Similarly, while the 
Secretariat argues that AIAE’s seed grant of CAD 49,700 is significant, the 
centre’s opinion is that the grant was not realistic with respect to the funding 
needs and work plan; even though the seed grant seems to cover about 65% 
of the essential costs of running the institution. 
                                                 
16 Information from questionnaires submitted via e-mail to the directors of the institutions and interviews 
with them at their offices, November 2003 – January 2004. 
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• Different stages: Partner institutions and emerging centres are in different 
stages of development. Thus NISER, a large and well established institution, 
does not believe that SISERA’s assistance had any significant effect on its 
ability to influence the policy process and that NISER is unlikely to make 
large changes in its research agenda simply as a result of SISERA’s 
assistance. For GESDRI, however, SISERA’s support has had a tremendous 
impact, introducing the centre into the wider economic research community 
for the first time.  
• Meetings: SISERA has been successful in reducing the isolation of the 
research centres in its network but still more needs to be done, mostly among 
the emerging centres, and particularly the Francophone ones.  
• Magnet: It is also important to note that of the centres below all but AIAE 
reported having approached SISERA to join. This means that the SISERA 
initiative had created expectations among the research community. SISERA 
must be careful to satisfy the expectations of those who joined; otherwise 
incentives to participate are lost and the network, as a whole, looses.  
• Demand: There is a perception that more needs to be done about the external 
environment, particularly on the demand side. Successful emerging centres 
might soon find that potential users of their research lack the interest in or 
capacity to absorb policy research.  
• Others: Other donors and networks play an important role in the centres’ 
work. The sub-regional networks, in particular SEAPREN, are gradually 
playing a growing role in the work of the centres. Similarly, AERC and 
ACBF provide support that is sometimes complementary and sometimes 
competitive. CEPEC, for instance gives ACBF priority over SISERA because 
it provides them with more financial resources and ACBF was responsible 
for creating CEPEC. 
• Internal problems: There is a perception among the centres that SISERA has 
staff shortages and governance difficulties. These perceptions might become 
more widespread as the move to IDEP advances and implications of a new 
institutional home are not yet clear to all members of the network. It should 
also be noted that this issue could be easily addressed by increasing the 
participation of the partner institutions and emerging centres in the 
governance of SISERA. Many have suggested that a representative of the 
members joins the Steering Committee on a rotating basis. 
• Overall satisfaction: All questionnaire respondents, as well as most of those 
interviewed, held the common view that SISERA’s assistance, with all its 
possible problems, was, at least, satisfactory, and, with few exceptions, of 
better quality than that provided by other capacity building institutions, such 
as ACBF.  
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Table 3: Responses to the Questionnaire – Some Highlights 
Centre AIAE NISER NIEP GREAT CEPEC GESDRI 
How has SISERA 
assisted your 
institution? 
The seed grant 
awarded by 
SISERA is not 
realistic (at 
CAD5,000 for two 
research projects it 
is only 65% of 
estimates).  
Core grant from 
SISERA was realistic 
although they have had 
to tailor their objectives 
to match the resources 
and assistance 
available. They have 
also benefited from 
SISERA’s broader 
support; rather than 
NISER’s original focus 
on specific research 
topics. 
NIEP’s seed grant is 
realistic considering 
the requirements. It 
provides resources 
necessary for two 
research projects 
(CAD11,500 each). 
They have also 
benefited from a 
three day workshop 
and the visits of 
SISERA’s Senior 
Program Officer 
who helped then 
write the proposal 
for the seed grant. 
However, support to 
NIEP is recent, and 
prior to the seed 
grant, they and only 
received 2 visits; 
only since 2003 





benefited from a 
seed grant from 
SISERA and 
technical support 
and training. These 
two are extremely 
important for the 
institution.  The 
grant has provided 
GREAT with funds 
to obtain basic 
equipment and 
cover rent costs.  
CEPC has only 
received financing for 
the training of 
researchers on 
poverty reduction 
policies from the 
World Bank Institute. 
Not surprisingly, it 
considers financial 
assistance crucial.  
For GESDRI, the 
seed grant allowed it 
to establish itself as 
an emerging centre 
and engage in 
economic research 
for the first time. 
The grant, although 
realistic in terms of 
research, does not 
cover the staff 
salaries. Also, 
although, technical 
visits have been 
reported by SISERA 
(6 in total) 
GESDRI’s Director 





What has been the 
impact of SISERA’s 




were led to new 
areas of research 
under the SAGA 
competition. This 
has proven to be 











SISERA has not yet 
allowed them to 
carry out significant 
research on these 
new topics nor 
participate of more 
meetings. 
SISERA’s assistance 
has provided NISER 
with funds to research 
new topics and enhance 
the depth of its research 
and analysis. It has not, 
however, influenced its 
research methodology 
or interests.  
The funds have also 
allowed them to 
purchase new software 
and hold more 
workshops and 
meetings with local 
researchers and policy 
makers. In general, the 
assistance is welcomed 
but primarily to 
strengthen their own 
structure. 
SISERA’s support 
has not yet yielded 
significant changes 
in methodology, 




Also they continue 




makers and other 
stakeholders. 
The response to the 
questionnaire and 
the interview do 






training have for its 
researchers. It is 
not clear if this had 
had an impact on 
the quality of its 
activities.  
CEPEC is optimistic 
of receiving financial 
assistance to research 
new topics and 
develop new 
methodologies and 
capacities to improve 
the quality of their 
research. So far they 
have been able to use 
the help from 
SISERA to organize 
meetings with policy 
makers and 
researchers. 
The principal impact 
of SISERA on 
GESDRI is that 
without the seed 
grant it would not 
have been able to 
carry out economic 
research. Hence, the 
effects of SISERA’s 
assistance are not 




your impact on the 
policy process in 
your country? 
SISERA’s grant 
was the first and 
gave AIAE the 





institutions such as 





resulted in an 
improved public 












financial agencies.  
NISER acknowledges 
SISERA support but 
can not determine if 
SISERA’s assistance 
has been crucial in 
increasing their impact 
on the policy process. 
They attribute this to 
their 50 year history 
and experience.  
Again, the 
assistance has not 
matured yet. NIEP 
does report to be 
engaged more 
closely with policy 
makers but the fruits 
of this are still 
uncertain.  
 The impact they have 
on the policy process 
has improved 
slightly, but more 
work needs to be 
done on the external 
environment in 
Guinea; since there is 
still no culture of 
research.  
 




capacity to carry out 
its mission? 
SISERA provided 
the foundation for 
an improved 
research 





support to NISER has 
not been entirely 
successful in their view. 
Staff training has only 
been limited and 
difficulties still remain. 
In other areas, such as 
A problem that has 
not received much 
attention by 






difficulties in the 
qualification of its 
staff that were 
solved by the 
assistance of 
SISERA. However, 
it has expressed 
SISERA has 













to identify its 
stakeholders and 
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their accounting and 
financial controls. 
While SISERA has 
significantly 







electricity supply.  
SAGA has provided 








have not yet been 
able to establish 
strong relations with 
them. Also they 
have not yet 
properly identified 





networking with other 
SISERA centres, 
although assistance has 
been effective, 
lingering difficulties 
remain. NISER does 
report success, 
however, in identifying 
other relevant research 
organisations and 
building strong 
relationships with them. 
Also, they still require 
support in more topical 
research, publishing of 
findings, engaging with 
stakeholders and 
organising workshops 











linking with other 
relevant research 
organisations within 
and outside the 
SISERA network. 
trouble keeping the 
most capable 
researchers. It has 





although a deficit 





GREAT has not 




ROCAPE.  other relevant 
research institutions 
(particularly 
considering that this 
is a new area for 
them). More needs 
to be done to tighten 
its relationship with 
stakeholders, and 
other centres within 
and outside the 
SISERA network. 
Also, only partial 
assistance was 






needs to be done in 
these areas.  
Are you satisfied 
with the assistance 
you have received 
from SISERA? (in 




In general, AIAE is 
satisfied with 
SISERA’s 
assistance. And it is 
very satisfied with 
its adherence to 
timelines.  
In general, NISER is 
very satisfied with 
SISERA’s assistance 
and considers its 
responsiveness to their 
needs to be its major 
strength.  






















is satisfied with 
GESDRI is very 
satisfied with 








In what ways does 
the assistance 
provided by SISERA 
differ from that 
provided by other 
donors or funding 
institutions 
In all cases, it 
considers its 
assistance as the 
same or better that 
that provided by 
others. It highlights 
that SISERA 
presents different 
avenues to suit their 
needs. 
In all cases, it considers 
its assistance as the 
same or better that that 
provided by others 
In all cases, except 
for its adherence to 
timelines, NIEP 
considers SISERA’s 
assistance to be the 
as good as or better 
than that of 
provided by other 
donors. It also 
perceives SISERA 
as a more flexible 
donor. 




In general assistance 
(financial and non-
financial) is mostly 
provided by ACBF  
and they remain as a 
priority.  





7.3 Impact on policy making 
[128] In this section we assess the perceived benefits of SISERA interventions 
from the viewpoint of government institutions and determine the value added 
of its activities to policy-making. 
[129] Assessing the impact of research and analysis on policy is an inherently 
difficult exercise, and there are few if any quantitative studies which are in 
any way conclusive.  
 
Table 4: Case Study – AIAE, A Rising Star in Nigeria 
 
In a remarkably short time, the African Institute for Applied Economics (AIAE) has become a leading 
player in the economic policy environment in Nigeria. Although founded only in 2001, it is already 
involved in several significant partnerships and projects with the Nigerian government and other 
international development actors such as the World Bank and DFID. Its success relates to four key 
factors:  
Training of research staff in econometrics and statistics in order to develop the research capacity.  
Focused research on key policy issues areas such as trade, regional integration and competitiveness, 
macro modelling, public sector management, poverty, income distribution and labour market issues. 
This has allowed AIAE to play a key role in recent policy studies, such as one on the potential impact 
of a common external tariff in ECOWAS on Nigeria’s balance of payments and real economy (funded 
by EU) and another on the evolution of the PRSP process in Nigeria (funded by UNECA). 
Policy advocacy: The former Director and now economic advisor to the President, Charles Soludo, 
enjoys the reputation of having a strong and dynamic personality. This has been crucial in selling the 
image of AIAE and disseminating its research results. High profile researchers and fellows have given 
AIAE a strong reputation in both the research and policy making communities. It has also established 
an international presence, through the conferences and workshops it has organized, which have 
attracted the participation of eminent researchers such as Joseph Stiglitz. And, finally, a it has given 
considerable emphasis to communications and dissemination, for example through its newly launched 
web page (www.aiae-nigeria.org).  
Networking: AIAE has twelve staff, but has strengthened its human resources by creating a network of 
almost fifty fellows who are based in other institutions in Nigeria. This gives it a strong and wide base 
for policy research and advocacy. 
Timing: AIAE was established at a particularly opportune time, after the new government had taken 
office and launched a wide ranging and comprehensive programme of reforms. Policy-makers were 
more receptive to research and new ideas, and the new sense of optimism encouraged researchers to 
believe their work might have some impact on the policy process.  
 
AIAE is a SISERA Emerging Centre, receiving an institutional support grant and training for its 
researchers in 2002/3. 
 
 
[130] Measuring the impact of investments in capacity building such as SISERA is 
therefore a considerable challenge: it can be done, but requires care and good 
judgement. The reason is simple: even when quantitative measures of desired 
(ultimate) impact are readily available, the chain of causal links between an 
intervention and a change in an impact measure can be long and complex, 
with the outcome affected by the actions of a large number of actors, and 
influenced by many elements in the surrounding environment. This is 
particularly true for ‘upstream’ interventions in capacity building, of which 
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SISERA and the centres in its network are an example. Assessing impact by 
associating a particular intervention with changes which take place 
‘downstream’ in the causal chain needs to be undertaken with some care, 
particularly when a complex chain of causality is posited. 
 
Table 5: Case Study – EPRC, Moving from Excellence in Poverty Research to Tackle a Broader 
Range of Issues 
 
The Economic Policy Research Center in Kampala was founded in 1994. Soon after assuming his post 
in 2000 the present Executive Director, John Okidi, quickly focused the Center’s research programme 
more closely on poverty issues in Uganda. EPRC quickly established a reputation for expertise in 
poverty issues and now plays a key role in the PRSP process in Uganda. 
For Okidi, SISERA provides only a small proportion of the support he receives, but its flexibility 
ensures that it is put to highly productive uses. Since SISERA’s assistance has been flexible, EPRC has 
been able to use it creatively to respond to its most important needs and priorities. EPRC, for instance, 
used some of SISERA’s financial assistance to improve its information and communication 
technologies and to hire a senior member of staff. Investment in technology and human resources can 
improve productivity directly.  
For EPRC SISERA’s support complemented that of another and much larger significant donor; ACBF. 
The proper use of the funds and their efficient allocation depends on the flexibility of the assistance and 
of the capacity of the directors and managers to manage it. EPRC has proven to have a strong 
foundation in the latter and can be seen as an example of the importance of such capacities for other 
less experienced directors. 
Flexibility in the use of the resources is also clear in EPRC’s choice of research areas. EPRC has 
established a strong position within Uganda as the most influential source of research on poverty 
issues. It has build on this strength, extending its research across a wider range of policy issues, 
including nutrition, food security, agriculture, microeconomic policies, tourism, competitiveness and 
trade and strengthening financial institutions. Where other centres have benefited from focusing on just 
a few policy issues, EPRC has had the human resources and institutional strength which enable it to 
expand beyond a poverty focus to tackle a wider range of issues.  
 
EPRC is a SISERA Partner Institute, and received a connectivity grant in 1999/2000 and an 
institutional support grant in 2002/3. 
 
 
[131] In order for impact assessments to be credible and convincing, our 
experience suggests it is useful to find measures of intermediate impact 
further up the causal chain, closer to point of the intervention itself. In the 
case of SISERA and the centres in its network, this would suggest examining 
not economic performance but the quality of the economic policies pursued 
in sub-Saharan Africa. If enhanced capacity leads to improved policy-
making, we might assess the impact of SISERA and its partner institutes by 
examining the quality of the policies pursued in the countries concerned. 
This is a promising approach, but works best when an intervention focuses 
on a very specific area of policy, so that it is easy to construct a (formal or 
informal) measure of the quality of policy. It might be feasible, for example, 
for macroeconomic policy, where one could construct a policy index based 
on inflation and growth (and possibly their volatility), or in trade policy, 
where one often measures the ‘openness’ of trade policy, or its anti-export 
bias.17 This approach is more difficult for a capacity building intervention 
                                                 
17 This presumes, of course the existence of a consensus that low inflation and openness to trade 
represent ‘good policies’. 
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such as SISERA, which aims to strengthen institutional capacity which can 
be applied across the entire range of economic policy issues. One way of 
addressing this issue which has been used in other impact studies has been to 
construct an index of overall ‘policy quality’. This is feasible, but difficult to 
do on an objective basis. 
[132] Our approach here is somewhat different. We think it is possible to 
demonstrate impact on policy through case studies of how the activities of 
the partner institutes and emerging centres have come to play a role in their 
national policy processes, and we present four case studies in this section.  
[133] Overall, we would conclude that the impact on policy has been very mixed. 
Some policy research institutes in the SISERA network have been 
outstandingly successful in pursuing research programmes that have had a 
significant impact on policy discussions and dialogue within their country, 
and both government and civil society look to these institutes to take the lead 
in producing new and relevant research on certain key policy issues. Other 
institutes in the SISERA network, in contrast, have had little if any influence 
on policy.  
[134] Impact on the policy process remains an important goal of the programme, 
and so it is important for SISERA to understand why some of its partners 
have been so successful, and others have had so little impact, and how the 
lessons of the successes can be used to assist partners who are struggling to 
achieve an impact on policy. 
[135] Here, it is worth bearing in mind experience from other countries. Based on 
his experience in Indonesia, Peter Timmer argues, for example, that there are 
“… four factors that can make policy oriented research 
successful. First, the analyst should be involved with the same 
policy-makers or in the same policy setting for the long term. 
Second, there is a need to find a balance between keeping 
analysis and advice confidential and the ultimate publication of 
the key models and results. Third, the analysts should rely on the 
analytical paradigms of the mainstream of the economic 
profession even while examining deviations from their 
underlying assumptions. Lastly, there should be continuing 
demand from policy-makers for problem-oriented analysis.” 18 
 
[136] Our interviews and discussions did not suggest that Timmer’s second and 
third conditions (confidentiality versus publication in the open scientific 
literature, and the degree of reliance on mainstream analytical paradigms) 
raised any particular issues in the context of SISERA’s partner institutes. 
[137] His fourth condition, that policy-makers must have a genuine demand for 
analytical work, does, however, seem to be an issue in some countries in sub-
Saharan Africa, in particular the francophone countries, and this limits the 
potential impact of research on policy in a number of countries in which 
SISERA operates, or would wish to operate. 
                                                 
18 C. Peter Timmer, ‘Adding Value through Policy Oriented Research: Reflections of a Scholar-
Practitioner,’ International Food Policy Research Institute: Impact Assessment Discussion Paper No. 4, 
October 1998 
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Table 6: Case Study – CREA and the Importance of Picking the Right Issue at the Right Time 
 
The story of the Centre de Recherches Economiques Appliqués (CREA) in Senegal is one in which a 
dynamic leader, who picked the right research issue at the right time, played a key role in achieving 
policy impact. 
When Abdoulaye Diagne was appointed Director of CREA in 1990, the institution had virtually no 
budget. Today, it hosts 25 active researchers and is widely recognised as a key source of research and 
publications in the region. It has been awarded dissemination, core and doctoral grants by SISERA and 
has played a key role in the SISERA network as an active participant in all meetings of the Partner 
Institutions.  
Diagne from the first championed two very important strategies. At an early stage he recognised the 
importance of poverty as an emerging area of research, one in which there were few African 
researchers but where there was a rapidly growing demand from policy-makers for good, locally-based 
research. Capacity building to develop an active presence in poverty research came as a result of 
participation in networks, particularly through IDRC’s MIMAP programme.  
Only a few months after the institute began its research in this field, the Ministry of Economics and 
Finance involved them in the preparation of the first PRSP for Senegal. It is unusual for a policy 
research institute to establish itself as a key player so quickly – but CREA was in the right place at the 
right time, and seized this important opportunity. So this first step was opportune, but very important in 
establishing CREA as a key source of research and policy analysis on poverty, and helped ensure 
CREA’s continued participation in research and the policy process. The institution has continued to 
focus and develop its expertise in poverty research, and now enjoys strong and durable partnerships 
with policy-makers in its government. Its research productivity, influence and impact on policy are 
widely recognized, both within Senegal and throughout the region. 
CREA’s experience highlights the importance of focusing on research which is relevant to emerging 
policy issues and is attuned to the demands of the users of research. Poverty, in this case, was a fast 
emerging issue in the African context and networks such as SISERA and MIMAP helped facilitate the 
transfer of knowledge and capacity building from the developed to the developing world.  
 
CREA is a SISERA Partner Institution, and has received institutional support, training for its 
researchers and research project grants (through SAGA). 
 
 
[138] The issue here may go beyond the government’s appetite for ideas and 
research results. One must consider as well a government’s ‘absorptive 
capacity’ – the ability of its policy analysts to understand the results of 
technical research and communicate the implications of this research to key 
policy-makers. Our discussions suggested that in many countries in which 
SISERA works, the demand side of the policy market is still very weak: 
many governments are unreceptive to new ideas and research findings, or if 
receptive, lack the staff with skills to understand technical research results 
well enough to identify the policy implications of the research. SISERA has 
certainly strengthened the supply side of the policy market, but in many 
countries the demand remains a significant obstacle to bridging the gap 
between research and policy.  
[139] Whether SISERA could realistically extend its activities to strengthening 
analytical capacity within government is not at all clear, given SISERA’s 
limited resources and the large number of countries in which it operates.  
[140] Leaving aside these weaknesses on the demand side, Timmer’s observations 
also help identify what may be the most important factor affecting whether 
SISERA’s partner institutes have an impact on policy: sustained focus on a 
few key issues. 
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Table 7: Case Study - DPRU, ‘Breathing Space’ to help the Unit Refocus on Poverty and Labour 
Market Research 
 
The Development Policy Research Unit at the University of Cape Town was founded in 1967, and 
played a key role during the apartheid era in supporting a broad range of independent research on social 
policy and labour issues. After the election of the first democratic government in 1994, many of the 
researchers in the Unit joined the government as key policy advisors. The Unit, however, lacked a clear 
focus on a manageable set of policy issues, since its work had grown to encompass a very wide range 
of issues, from social policy to regional integration. 
Support from SISERA gave DPRU’s Director, Dr. Haroon Bhorat, invaluable ‘breathing space’ which 
allowed him to refocus the Unit on a key issue facing post-apartheid South Africa: the endemic nature 
of poverty in South Africa, and its relationship to the country’s labour markets. SISERA’s financial 
support enabled the Unit to develop a longer term vision, allowed it to strengthen its human capital, 
pursue longer-term research initiatives and produce significant policy oriented research material on 
poverty and labour markets in South Africa. 
This ‘breathing space’ proved crucial because it allowed DPRU to develop a new generation of 
researchers and a new portfolio of research on labour markets and poverty in South Africa. DPRU has 
been able to develop a research agenda which reflects the needs of policy-makers in South Africa. At 
the same time, it has consolidated its position as one of the strongest centres of research on poverty and 
labour markets in Africa, with key links to leading researchers internationally. DRPU collaborates with 
Cornell University, for example, in holding an annual conference on labour markets and poverty.  
DPRU’s experience, Bhorat suggests, may be useful for SISERA itself – the network’s expansion 
should proceed be followed through a careful selection of institutions and close monitoring. DPRU’s 
use of the ‘breathing space’ provided by SISERA emerges as a good lesson to be learned by the 
network. In its move to a new institutional home, SISERA might well pause and consider its present 
and future roles.  
 
DPRU is a SISERA Partner Institute, and received institutional support grants in 2001/2 and 2002/3, 
and project support from SAGA in 2003/5. 
 
 
[141] This condition is likely to prove the most important factor affecting policy 
impact. In order to achieve significant policy impact, initiatives typically 
have to be sustained for a significant period of time, so that the researchers 
involved are able to build strong relationships and establish trust with their 
counterparts in the government ministries. This is not an insurmountable 
obstacle for the institutes in the SISERA network, but it does require a 
sustained commitment over a long period of time. This would in turn entail a 
decision to focus on a specific and limited number of policy issues, since the 
resources available to these institutes are unlikely to be sufficient for long-
term initiatives across a large number of policy areas. In order to be 
successful in policy outreach, then, SISERA’s partners may have to ‘place 
their bets’, focusing their efforts and resources on just a few key policy 
issues (and on the ministries and researchers likely to be involved in these 
issues), and sustain this focused commitment for over a period at least 
several years.  
7.4 SISERA’s governance structure and staff 
composition 
[142] This is addressed in more detail in Section 8. Two aspects of SISERA’s 
governance structure and staff composition are worth noting, however. First, 
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the present structure is very flat and simple. This is a distinct advantage for 
SISERA, since it facilitates the flow of information between the Steering 
Committee, the Staff and the Partner Institutions and in principle allows 
SISERA to act quickly and flexibly (provided, of course, the Secretariat is 
adequately staffed). 
[143] Second, the Secretariat has seen considerable staff turnover since SISERA 
was launched. Despite this turnover, it has maintained a highly dedicated and 
professional work culture. The staff are involved in a large number and wide 
range of tasks and duties and, although this might result in overload, there 
was no evidence to suggest that these responsibilities, where properly 
assigned, have been neglected. In the cases where important tasks had not 
been carried out, it was clear that this was the result of a failure to assign the 
appropriate priority and clear responsibility for the task and to ensure that 
adequate resources are available. The most important example would seem to 
be responsibility for external representation, strengthening the visibility of 
SISERA and establishing a clear profile and brand, where it is clear that this 
was given too low a priority and assigned too few resources. 
7.5 The relationship with other capacity building 
institutions in Africa 
[144] Again, this relationship is assessed in Section 8. Our view is that although 
SISERA, AERC and ACBF have different institutional structures (SISERA 
is an IDRC Secretariat while the other two are independent institutions) they 
provide similar and in some cases competing assistance. Their strength, 
however, relies on their potential to provide complementary assistance.  
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8 AN INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT: 
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
8.1 Assessment Framework 
[145] In the discussion which follows, we will use an organizational assessment 
framework which has proved useful in the evaluation of capacity building 
initiatives:19 
i. Operational and adaptive capacities: does the organization possess 
adequate resources, knowledge and processes?  
ii. Organisational performance: is the organization capable of meeting its 
goals and achieving its mission? 
iii. External operating environment: what is the environment in which the 
organization carries out its activities? 
iv. Internal environment: what factors within the organization influence its 
direction and the emphasis given to its activities? 
                                                 
19 Horton, Douglas, Anastasia Alexaki, et al. 2003. Evaluating Capacity Development: Experiences 
from Research and Development Organizations around the World. The Netherlands:  ISNAR/ CTA; 
Canada: IDRC 
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8.2 An Institutional Assessment of SISERA 
8.2.1 Operational capacities 
8.2.1.1 Personnel 
[146] An important concern regarding operational capacity is the inability – since 
2002 – to appoint a permanent Executive Director. This has diminished the 
focus on the leadership of the Secretariat. In addition and partly as a result of 
the lack of a permanent Executive Director, the workload on individual staff 
is far too high; the existing network includes over 20 economic research 
institutions in 18 countries, and in addition the Secretariat receives a steady 
stream of requests from new centres which wish to join the network, must 
deal with relationships with donors, and must function effectively in two 
working languages. It is abundantly clear that the Secretariat requires 
additional human resources in order to achieve its current objectives. 
[147] The Secretariat acknowledges that in the future there will be a need to hire 
more staff, and do not foresee any problems in finding the right people for 
the job; and it is certainly the case that so far they have been able to secure 
highly qualified personnel. At the same time, there is evidence that current 
staff numbers are too low: some centres in the network are visited only 
infrequently, and other centres are even difficult to contact by email or 
telephone. This suggests that there is insufficient staff to sustain regular 
contact with all the centres, and that additional staff, possibly based closer to 
these centres, are needed. 
[148] The absence of a permanent Executive Director and more importantly, 
insufficient staff numbers seems also to have had an effect on the 
‘orientation’ of SISERA. Current staff (e.g. financial assistant, program 
coordinator, program assistant and secretary) have quite understandably felt 
the need to focus on the internal organisation, process and activities, and so 
have paid less attention paid to outwardly oriented, ‘external’ activities such 
as raising the profile of SISERA among donors and the research community, 
establishing the SISERA ‘brand’ and participating in international 
conferences and workshops in order to gain exposure for SISERA. 
[149] In terms of the training for staff, SISERA faces a challenge due to the 
heterogeneity of institutions and environments within which it works, which 
places a premium on having a skilled and well trained staff. Training may be 
constrained by budgetary resources, but we think it is more likely that the 
more important constraint is the pressure on staff time, which again is the 
result of insufficient staff numbers. Even if budgetary resources are not the 
principal constraint at present, it is important to note that if SISERA moves 
to a new institutional home in IDEP, proper provision for training is included 
in its annual budget, so that SISERA does not have to rely entirely on IDEP’s 
own training policies and provision.  
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8.2.1.2 Infrastructure, technology and financial resources 
[150] Access to funding and funding sources has decreased in the recent past 
particularly due to the culmination of the funding cycle for some donors, 
which has resulted in gaps until the start of their next cycle. Initially SISERA 
received funding from IDRC, CIDA, USAID, Coopération Francaise, DGIS, 
the EU and the WBI. At present, only IDRC, Coopération Francaise and 
USAID (through the SAGA programme) are major donors, and changes in 
USAID policies give some concern regarding the longer term prospects for 
its support to SISERA. Recent developments have, however, been 
encouraging: SISERA has recently received a grant from AfDB and DGIS 
has approved one of CAD1.3 million over 4 years. 
[151] Another problem experienced by SISERA has to do with timing of donor 
funding. The delay between the contract negotiation with donors and the 
signature of contracts has meant that on some occasions SISERA’s ability to 
provide support to the members of its network has been subject to delays, 
which frustrate the centres and reduce their loyalty to SISERA. In addition, 
the delays have meant that two donors finance the same line items in 
SISERA’s budget, which has created problems in financial accountability to 
donors. Exchange rate movements, and the fact that it works in eighteen 
countries with different exchange rates, has also had a significant negative 
effect on SISERA’s access to secure funding for its activities. This implies 
that technical support provided by SISERA has on occasion not been 
matched by the financial resources needed to support institutional 
strengthening.  
[152] The Secretariat has determined that new sources of funding need to be 
secured for SISERA. An alternative approach, however, might be to develop 
(through technical assistance provided by SISERA) the research centres’ own 
capacity to raise funds. This need has already been expressed by the directors 
of the partner institutions. While superficially attractive, this strategy poses a 
number of problems for SISERA, the most obvious one being the possibility 
of the ‘disintermediation’ of SISERA if donors find they are able to deal 
directly with research centres. In this case SISERA would have to offer 
competitive and attractive complimentary services to secure the continued 
‘loyalty’ of centres that are successful in attracting such direct funding. It is 
also true that donors might not want to work with a diverse group of 
institutions. But on the other hand, this might give centres a broader range of 
possible donors or clients to work with; particularly in small projects for 
which it might be easier to obtain support. 
[153] The availability of office space and technology will have to be re-evaluated if 
and when the move to IDEP takes place. The recruitment of a new Executive 
Director will lead to a need for more office space but this will ultimately 
depend on the role that IDEP plays in the functioning of SISERA and its 
future needs. 
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8.2.1.3 Strategic Leadership 
[154] The inability to appoint a permanent Executive Director has created some 
difficulties for SISERA. Elias Ayuk has performed very well as Acting 
Executive Director. He has provided not only day to day leadership for the 
Secretariat but has also recently launched a valuable strategic planning 
exercise. Nevertheless, he has had to perform two demanding jobs, and the 
human resources of the Secretariat are stretched very thin indeed as a result. 
Centres in the SISERA network are clearly aware of this, and it has caused 
some concern among many of the centre directors and staff. It also seems to 
have contributed to SISERA’s low profile and lack of ‘brand recognition’, 
since the Secretariat has not had the resources to devote to external 
representation and raising the profile of SISERA. 
[155] SISERA recognises the need to develop strategic planning capacities among 
its own staff and has successfully launched a strategic planning exercise. 
Participatory methods are being used to ensure that the opinions of the 
partner institutions are taken into account in discussions of the network’s 
strategic options. Final decisions are, however, made by the Steering 
Committee. Participation of the successful partners depends on SISERA’s 
responsiveness to their concerns and expectations.  
[156] A positive aspect of SISERA’s organization is the simplicity of its 
governance structure. This facilitates communication between the Steering 
Committee and the research centres and is one of the sources of strength for 
SISERA. This communication is often indirect but now takes place more 
directly through sessions attended by both the centre directors and the 
Steering Committee members.  
8.2.1.4 Program and process management 
[157] Timing is an important element of program and process management, and in 
this area, SISERA has experienced some difficulties. As in the case of 
funding, the hiatus between the approval of the work plan by the Steering 
Committee (SC) and the start of the financial year has made it necessary on 
occasion for the Secretariat to begin the implementation of an activity before 
it is approved by the SC. While this does not seem to have resulted in any 
serious difficulties, it is nevertheless an undesirable practice. Such 
difficulties could be overcome by a good information system so that the 
Steering Committee is aware of the work plan and the key implementation 
dates. Accountability and responsibility for the use of funds in these cases 
could be assigned to the research centres, reporting back to the Steering 
Committee.  
[158] The simple and rather flat structure of SISERA and its governing body 
facilitates timely monitoring and evaluation of the performance of each staff 
member. The small size of the Secretariat also means that there are 
sometimes difficulties maintaining contact with individual centres, and there 
have been instances where the centres have not respond constructively to the 
Secretariat’s suggestions. Similarly, the information submitted by the centres, 
both in terms of performance evaluation and in the case of the research 
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proposals, is not always sufficient to allow SISERA to monitor the 
performance of the centres. Does this call for a uniform monitoring and 
evaluation system, which would require that each centre produce identical 
information, or should the monitoring and evaluation system continue to 
adapt to the capacities of each centre? Both options will require additional 
staff and closer monitoring of each institution, but the latter might make it 
difficult to compare performance across centres. On the other hand, a 
monitoring and evaluation system that gathered data on an ongoing basis 
would make it easier to assess the progress of the centres and would provide 
donors with more convincing evidence of SISERA’s achievements.  
8.2.1.5 Networks and linkages with other organisations and groups 
[159] As shown in Figure 1, which depicts the SISERA network, the Secretariat 
acts as a hub connecting donors and the research centres. Networking and 
linking with stakeholders is therefore a crucial aspect of its capacities. 
SISERA has made this task easier by creating two sub-regional networks, 
SEAPREN and ROCAPE, but there is a risk that these might become more 
import to the centres, at SISERA’s expense. To avoid this, SISERA should 
look for ways in which to integrate its activities with those of the sub-
regional networks (which include institutes which are not members of the 
SISERA network).  
[160] The Secretariat recognizes the need to increase its visibility among the donor 
community and to develop an outreach campaign to raise the profile of 
SISERA and its activities. It is not clear, however, who will be responsible 
for this activity. 
8.2.2 Adaptive capacities  
8.2.2.1 Personnel 
[161] The Secretariat’s ability to adapt and respond to changes in the environment 
is significantly constrained by its current heavy workloads. The Programme 
Officers in particular need to keep abreast of issues such as emerging policy 
issues, donor priorities, as well as methodological advances and new research 
techniques. To do this they require time devoted to learning, reflection and 
innovation. This cannot be achieved with the current staff numbers and 
workloads. 
8.2.2.2 Infrastructure, technology and financial resources 
[162] SISERA is heavily dependent on IDRC and USAID for funding: such an 
undiversified portfolio of support not only carries significant risks in terms of 
financial vulnerability, but also constraints its ability to secure new donors. 
After the funding cycle of some of its initial donors has come to an end, 
SISERA now faces the challenge of finding new supporters, and new donors 
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may be more interested in supporting other initiatives or only a subset of 
SISERA’s activities. The current reliance on support from IDRC and USAID 
might therefore increase inflexibility rather than promote adaptability.  
[163] As the network develops and acquires its own momentum, the centres will 
identify new needs and so are likely to make new demands on SISERA 
(particularly those which are more successful). Hence, SISERA needs to 
constantly improve its infrastructure and technological capacity to keep up 
with the evolving needs of its centres. For instance, although centres have 
requested online access to journals and other publications for use by their 
researchers, and this has been discussed at the Steering Committee, the 
request has not implemented.20 If these demands remain unsatisfied, the sub-
regional networks and other centre-to-centre links could develop outside the 
scope of the SISERA network and hence weaken it.  
[164] The use of technology, among other issues, requires a more effective use of 
the internet. This could help SISERA overcome various difficulties such as 
communication problems, lack of transparent information among current and 
potential members, dissemination of work, difficulty in accessing research 
tools and services, etc.  
8.2.2.2.1 SISERA’s online presence 
 
[165] The first point that needs to be made regarding SISERA’s online presence is 
that its url is far from memorable, which discourages new users from accessing 
the site. In addition, SISERA appears within the IDRC website. This is perfectly 
appropriate, given SISERA’s current status as an IDRC Secretariat, but it 
reinforces the close association of SISERA with IDRC, which has proved 
somewhat problematic, and makes it more difficult for SISERA to develop its 
own profile and identity. It would be preferable to register another url, such as 
www.sisera.org.sn. 
[166] The website could act either as a source of information for third parties (i.e. 
those outside Secretariat and the SISERA network) or as an ‘intranet’ for the 
network. The web page appears to be designed for the first purpose, i.e. to 
inform third parties, rather than to serve as an ‘intranet’ but in any event, it 
serves neither purpose well.  
[167] The web page provides basic information regarding the Secretariat and its 
activities but very little information (other than basic contact information) on the 
centres in the network. If the web page is designed to inform third parties of 
SISERA’s success in building strong research centres, it does not achieve this 
objective. It lacks information about the centres themselves and about the 
specific projects or broader research topics in which they are engaged; these 
could be useful for other centres and third parties. 
[168] Nor does the website serve as an ‘intranet’ for the centres in the SISERA 
network. There is no secure intranet for members of the network and the 
information provided regarding procedures to access grants, technical support 
                                                 
20 Such a request may sound simple but in fact involved a complex process of negotiation; and meeting 
it is also expensive. SISERA has already received an offer of TEAL for a discount price of US$20,000 
per subscription. 
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and training assistance is not detailed. Nor does the website provide access to 
reference libraries for use by researchers at the centres or show links to donors 
or end users.  
[169] The page displays only seven working papers produced by the centres in the 
network. This is a very small number, with no additions since 2002; and two of 
the seven papers share the same author. This is potentially very misleading, and 
might even lead a visitor to the site to think that the centres in the network have 
only produced seven papers since 1997! Our investigations revealed that the 
centres strongly prefer to publish their output in their own working paper series, 
which seldom acknowledge support from SISERA.  
[170] The current approach to working papers seems less than optimal. Instead of 
selecting only a small number of papers produced by the centres as ‘SISERA 
output’, it would seem far more sensible to insist, as a condition of institutional 
support, that SISERA support be acknowledged in each and every piece of 
output produced by the research centres. The SISERA website should then 
provide links to all the published output and activities of each of the centres in 
its network. It might even highlight especially interesting and important new 
publications or activities by the centres on the home page of the SISERA 
website, making it clear, of course, that these are activities of the Centres, not of 
SISERA. This would raise SISERA’s profile as a disseminator of research and 
improve the visibility of the individual centres’ working papers series. 
[171] The AERC and ACBF websites provide interesting contrasts with SISERA. 
They both have more accessible addresses (www.aercafrica.org and www.acbf-
pact.org) and provide much more information than SISERA. And although these 
are independent institutions (while SISERA is an IDRC secretariat) the higher 
visibility of AERC and ACBF was frequently raised in our interviews with 
researchers.  
[172] AERC offers more information regarding its services and provides access to 
a well organised online library. It is possible to search through categories of 
research topics and types of documents. The library offers a small abstract of the 
document and the possibility to download an electronic version.  
[173] AERC also provides access to an open discussion forum arranged by topics 
of interest. Another section provides links to regional institutions and centres 
with a small description of the organisation and the information and services 
available in their web pages. This page, as with the overall AERC web site, is 
interactive and allows the user to suggest new links (subject to approval). 
[174] ACBF provides information on grants and guidelines for grant seekers. It 
offers links to information resources and websites, as well as access to related 
electronic journals through the ACBF Library and Information Centre. 
[175] The ACBF web site also provides access to a complete list of projects with 
information on the institution, the budget and its main objectives and results. 
This is a very useful tool for other researchers, donor and en users.  
[176] In conclusion, we recommend that SISERA should implement some basic 
changes to its online presence.  
i. Name: A more appropriate web address should be used. This will provide 
the Secretariat with another tool to raise the profile of the brand 
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ii. Information resources: The SISERA web site should act as a portal for all 
stakeholders. Donors require more detailed information regarding the 
specific initiatives, the use of resources and the resulting products. Users 
need more access to final research, abstracts, presentations and user 
friendly tools they can use. Research centres need more access to 
supporting information, methodological tools, software, discussion 
forums, etc. 
iii. Interactivity: A good way to communicate with the Secretariat staff and 
Steering Committee and for them to constantly monitor the needs, 
concerns and perceptions of the member centres is to increase the ways 
through which they can interact within the SISERA web site. Contact 
information is not enough. Forms to suggest forums, discussions, 
literature, other networks’ web sites, various links, improvements to the 
web site, follow up workshops, etc. could be easily included.  
iv. Differentiating the users: Because different users of the web site require 
different information it would be advisable to provide secure additional 
information through secure access for donors, centres and ‘approved’ 
users.  
8.2.2.3 Strategic Leadership 
[177] Although efforts have been made to develop the strategic focus and 
management of the secretariat, the severe time pressures on the staff limit the 
time they have available for longer term planning. As a result, much of the 
reflection, organizational learning and innovation seems to be occasioned by 
external evaluations (see the evaluation by SYNAPSE in 2001). While these 
evaluations are needed to ensure accountability, the process of learning and 
adapting should be also conducted within the organization itself on an 
ongoing basis. This is important, not only for the effectiveness of SISERA, 
but for its ability to attract, motivate and retain good staff.  
[178] As SISERA expands, governance will necessarily become more complex. 
Should the network expand, bringing in new members while retaining the 
current members, or should it replace existing members of the network, 
either at the top (the successful centres) or at the bottom (the unsuccessful 
centres)? It will need to manage not only the introduction of new members 
but the interaction of the network with the increasingly important sub-
regional networks and other affiliated networks and institutions. How well 
prepared will it be to handle these changes as part of IDEP? 
8.2.2.4 Programme and process management 
[179] The Secretariat does not recognise any significant deficiencies in its adaptive 
capacities with respect to program and process management, and we agree 
with this assessment. The Secretariat does, however, acknowledge the need 
to monitor this issue as part of a move to IDEP. It is important to notice, 
however, that the evaluation has identified a problem in the timing of 
processes and SISERA’s role as a hub between donors and centres. This is 
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significant because it determines SISERA’s ability ot provide its members 
with timely assistance, which in turn requires quick access to funds. 
[180] It has also been stated that the gap created by the failure to appoint a 
permanent Executive Director has filled, not only (and most importantly) by 
the Acting Executive Director, but also to a certain extent by the Steering 
Committee and IDRC’s senior management. While expedient, it may be 
undesirable in the longer term: it tends to reinforce the perception of an 
overly strong link to IDRC and may even have made the need to appoint a 
permanent Executive Director seem less urgent. We view this as undesirable: 
a permanent appointment should be made without further delay.  
8.2.2.4.1 Monitoring and Evaluation 
[181] Monitoring and evaluation is central to the development of adaptive 
capacities. SISERA’s position in the very long chain of activities and 
behavioural changes that contribute to the ultimate goals of economic growth 
and poverty reduction in Africa makes monitoring and evaluation both more 
challenging and more important. It is difficult, to say the least, for SISERA 
to properly measure its success based on its own actions, because this success 
depends on the actions and behaviour of others; some of whom are only 
indirectly influenced by SISERA.  
[182] SISERA’s activities are, of course, ultimately focused on the institutions in 
its network. How can SISERA be sure that the changes it fosters in the 
centres’ governance structures, facilities and procedures do have an impact 
on the attitudes and behaviour of the researchers and on the output of the 
centres? And how can it know whether these changes in turn have any effect 
on policy-makers and policy analysts?  
[183] Figure 4 shows a very simplified version of the causal chain that underlies 
SISERA’s mission and the current scope of its monitoring and evaluation 
efforts. 















































[184] Measuring the impact of policy research itself is widely regarded as a 
difficult and challenging exercise. Measuring the impact of initiatives to 
build capacity for policy research is harder still. Nevertheless, monitoring 
and evaluation of SISERA seems largely confined to some quantitative 
indicators of programme activities, with relatively few attempts to measure 
the impact of these activities on the behaviour of the centres in the SISERA 
network, and no systematic attempt to measure the impact of these centres on 
the policy process at the national level.  
[185] The Progress Report by Activity for the SAGA Program is to some extent an 
exception, since it is based on the analysis of intermediate performance 
indicators. These indicators, however, only measure the extent to which 
SISERA carried out specific activities. They do not and are not designed to 
measure the achievement of its goals. This is something that requires a 
different approach, particularly in view of differences in the views expressed 
by the centres regarding SISERA’s performance and their perception of its 
impact on them. Clearer indicators will help build stronger support among its 
members and provide the Secretariat a better understanding of the obstacles 
which arise in meeting its goals.  
[186] While acknowledging that this is a very difficult task, we would recommend 
that more systematic attempts be made in future to measure the impact of 
SISERA, in the first instance focusing on the institutions with which 
SISERA works directly – the centres in its network. 
[187] We recommend the use of Outcome Mapping for this purpose. Outcome 
Mapping is designed to assist in the management, as well as the monitoring 
and evaluation, of development initiatives. It focuses not on the ultimate 
changes in the state of the world brought about by the initiative, but instead 
on the intended and actual changes in the behaviour of the initiative’s 
‘boundary partners’, those with whom it works directly. The focus is 
therefore on indicators which help reveal whether or not these programme’s 
activities have had the intended effects on the behaviour of those targeted. A 
change in behaviour of ‘boundary partners’ is likely to be a more useful 
indicator of success or failure than the mere fact of completing a programme 
activity. 
[188] This recommendation is further elaborated in Section 9.1.3 where SISERA’s 
competitive advantages are discussed. An improved system for monitoring 
and evaluation will not only assist the staff in managing the network, but will 
also can provide SISERA with evidence of its (considerable) achievements, 
which will not only help raise the profile and visibility of the network, but 
also help convince donors to support SISERA.  
8.2.2.5 Networks and linkages with other organisations and groups 
[189] As it has been identified above, SISERA needs to engage with its counterpart 
organizations in the capacity building field in Africa. Rather than providing 
competing services or performing similar roles, these need to the 
coordinated. This coordination has been proved difficult to achieve in 
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practice. The lack of a strong institutional brand that makes SISERA 
recognisable and appealing to successful centres in other networks or 
independent is also an obstacle that needs to be overcome.  
8.2.3 Organizational performance  
8.2.3.1 Relevance 
[190] It is undeniable that the creation of SISERA responded to a real and 
important problem facing African countries. Economic research centres 
needed support to produce local research and bridge the gap between them 
and African policy-makers. In this sense the existence of SISERA and the 
strategies which it pursues were highly relevant in 1997 and remain just as 
relevant in 2004.  
[191] The methods used by SISERA are well designed, since they effectively 
ensure continuous contact with the centres. This ensures that the staff, and 
through them the Steering Committee, are well aware of the changing 
internal and external conditions they have to face. For instance, visits to 
provide technical support and meetings with directors or financial officers 
provide SISERA staff with an opportunity to monitor the changing 
environments and capacities of the centres. The only difficulty at present is 
the lack of human and financial resources, which make it difficult for 
SISERA to act on what it learns.  
[192] The centres think that although SISERA does provide them with much 
appreciated support, more needs to be done to increase their communication 
with the Steering Committee. The request to have a rotating representative at 
the committee might respond to a perception that learning process by which 
SISERA keeps itself relevant to the needs of its members is perhaps too 
indirect.  
[193] Innovation has suffered because of insufficient staff numbers and the 
disruption in funding due to the gap between the end of one cycle and the 
start of another. To be relevant, the Secretariat needs to adapt to the changing 
external environment. SISERA’s success in capacity building of research 
institutions has, for example, created in some countries an imbalance with 
respect to the policy-making community. Politicians and government 
officials, as well as the private sector, have not developed the capacities 
needed to absorb the new knowledge produced by the centres. The interviews 
with directors of the centres and other individuals involved with SISERA 
point out at the need to address capacity building for this group.  
8.2.3.2 Effectiveness 
[194] While it is clear that SISERA has a clear mission, well known by its staff, it 
is not clear that this mission is known at all by all those affected by it. Not all 
staff at the partner institutes, for example, are aware of SISERA’s support! In 
one case, a senior member of staff at a partner institution was not aware of 
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SISERA, even though he was closely involved with the activities of 
SEAPREN! Although this may reflect individual idiosyncracies, it is also 
true some responsibility rests with SISERA, whose profile is far too low. It is 
also not clear if SISERA has developed the right set of formal indicators to 
monitor the achievement of its goals. Instead, it relies heavily on activity 
indicators that do not adequately capture the extent of its influence. 
[195] SISERA’s annual reports are based on a qualitative analysis and narrative 
description of its activities, and present few if any quantitative indicators to 
measure the performance of the centres in its network, or of SISERA’s 
contribution to the institutional strengthening process for these centres. Such 
indicators would be useful to guide the allocation of resources, to monitor 
individual centres and to raise awareness among the staff of the centres and 
others about SISERA’s mission and its success in achieving this mission. 
8.2.3.3 Efficiency 
[196] In practice, SISERA has pursued what we describe as the ‘5 Ms’ approach. 
The interviews showed that each director values the Ms in different ways. 
CEDRES’s Director, for example, considers that Mentoring is invaluable for 
the reinforcement of capacities at the centre’s level; CEPEC’s director 
prefers Money as a means of acquiring equipment, which is desperately 
needed. For the head of DPRU also values Money, which he argues can buy 
‘breathing space’ – time to think, plan ahead, identify new areas of research, 
hire new staff, etc. Finally, Dr. Couliabaly (GREAT) regards Meetings as the 
most important component of the support provided by SISERA, since this 
provides researchers at his centre with new options and views; without these 
meetings, the researchers would remain isolated.  
[197] Although these are individual perceptions, they do suggest that not all are 
needed in equal measure by all centres. Hence SISERA must design more 
tailor-made interventions, considering the specific circumstances of the 
centres. Visits by SISERA Programme Officers to centres with highly 
experienced directors (e.g. DPRU, CREA, EPRC) or providing financial 
support to those with little absorptive capacity (e.g. GREAT) would not be 
an optimum use of financial and human resources. The examination of 
SISERA’s activities does suggest that the weaker centres were given 
relatively more technical support and training of researchers.  
[198] Since the establishment of the governance structure, the SISERA network 
has grown in complexity. Its links with national, regional and international 
institutions has increased, two sub-regional networks have been created and, 
through them, new institutions have joined. And each centre now faces a 
different external environment with new internal capacities. This higher 
complexity means that the effective use of its limited financial and human 
resources is becoming increasingly important for SISERA.  
8.2.3.4 Financial viability 
[199] SISERA has unfortunately become heavily dependent on IDRC and USAID, 
although other donors are in the process of renewing their support or are 
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considering proposals put forward by the Secretariat. A significant portion 
(approximately 30%) of the resources necessary to fund the next phase of 
SISERA’s activities has already been secured, but there is much still to be 
done.  
[200] Its training activities have also been curtailed by the withdrawal of the World 
Bank Institute (due to a change in its operating policies, not because of any 
dissatisfaction with SISERA) although the UNDP has emerged as a possible 
alternative. The current move to find a new institutional home at IDEP has 
been strongly influenced by this disruption and it is seen as a way of 
reversing it. SISERA needs to be more pro-active in this respect. Centre 
directors have acknowledged the need to build fundraising capabilities within 
their own institutions. SISERA must do the same. This does not imply that 
the Secretariat is failing in this area. It does, however, highlight the need to 
further expand the range of funding sources available to SISERA. If the 
Secretariat is to play the role as the hub of its network of centres, then it must 
respond more efficiently to the centres’ funding needs. This may mean 
looking for smaller sources of funding for specific research projects, or 
supporting initiatives among one or two centres; a role more that more 
closely resembles a clearinghouse or broker.  
[201] Financial viability is hence strongly linked to SISERA’s success or failure in 
promoting itself. So far, it is clear that its visibility is low relative to other 
competing institutions, such as ACBF, in the eyes of policy-makers and end 
users (e.g. Allechi M’Bet, Economic Advisor to the President of Cote 
d’Ivoire). SISERA must embark on a marketing campaign to increase the 
visibility of its ‘brand’. For this it must increase its staff numbers: without 
more staff, SISERA simply does not have the human resources to engage in a 
vigorous outreach programme.  
[202] The financial viability of SISERA needs to be analysed in terms of what new 
challenges it will have to face in the future. It has been noted that a crucial 
area where intervention is needed is building absorptive capacity in the 
external environment, i.e. in the policy community. 
8.2.4 External environment 
[203] We have noted throughout this document that the external environment in 
which SISERA operates has changed; and these changes are due partly to 
SISERA’s own actions.  
[204] Two changes in SISERA’s external environment are particularly important:  
• The increased strength of some of SISERA’s partner institutes, which 
now play an vital and dynamic role in the process of policy dialogue and 
design in their countries 
• A dramatic shift in the way aid modalities, as donors move from project-
oriented to programme-oriented support such as SWAPS and pooled 
funding, and from these modalities to general budget support. This shift 
will, over time, have profound implications for the policy research 
institutes in SISERA’s network.  
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[205] Many of the partner institutes in SISERA’s network are outstandingly 
successful, and play an important role in their country’s policy process. As 
the suppliers of policy research grow in strength and sophistication (in some, 
but not all countries, of course) the constraints imposed by the demand side 
of the policy ‘market’ become increasingly important. 
[206] It has become increasingly necessary to address the existing capacity of the 
users of the public good (knowledge) that the research centres produce. 
While SISERA has focused on the supply of policy research, less has been 
done regarding the demand for such research.  
[207] It has been noted that SISERA’s ‘success stories’ are associated with the 
adoption of a sustained commitment to a programme of research that focuses 
on a few key policy issues. This requires not only stability within the centres, 
but also on the part of governments and donors. Volatility of governmental 
policy and donor interests will discourage centres from devoting time and 
resources to a small number of topics over a lengthy period and will instead 
promote opportunism in designing research programmes and giving policy 
advice. 
[208] Sustained focus on the part of the centres, then, needs to be accompanied by 
patience and sustained encouragement and support on the part of users and 
donors. SISERA already plays a role linking researchers with end users; it 
must also include the promotion longer-term planning in order to encourage 
sustained focus, and must attempt to educate both policy makers and donors 
of the advantages of taking a longer term view.  
[209] Francophone centres still report a sense of isolation from others in the region, 
particularly with respect to the Anglophone ones. This isolation is deepened 
by the strong hierarchical structures that govern social relations in general 
and those between researchers and policy-makers and other users, in 
particular. There is little demand for research and those that do demand it, 
undervalue it greatly.  
[210] Economic research in Sub-Saharan Africa has to be unavoidably tied to the 
fight against poverty. Not surprisingly, the centre’s directors have requested 
training in poverty reduction policies; and those focusing on poverty related 
research have been successful in reaching policy makers at their national 
governments and regional organisations. While there is an internal 
component in this, the external environment still to a large extent determines 
the demand for policy analysis. Policy-makers in some countries still have a 
1990s mindset, looking primarily to the IFIs and the bilateral and multilateral 
donors for guidance on ‘what policies matter’. In this sense, dependence 
persists, and a key challenge for SISERA and its partners is to make policy-
makers more aware of local alternatives.  
[211] More specifically for SISERA, uncertainties in the external environment 
have considerably complicated its funding strategy. Perceptions of its 
closeness to IDRC have complicated its relationships with some donors, and 
the move to IDEP has been extremely protracted, with no assurance of 
ultimate success. The relationship with this potential new host is uncertain. 
Given all these uncertainties, the dedication of the Secretariat are even more 
impressive.  
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[212] There are also changes underway in the external environment that are likely 
to have a profound impact over the longer term, not only on SISERA but also 
on policy research in developing countries more generally.  
[213] The ‘aid business’ has undergone an important shift in the past five years, 
‘projects’ to ‘programmes’. Old style aid consisted largely of isolated 
projects, driven by donor imperatives and largely disconnected from the 
recipient country’s own development plan. The new approaches are based 
around SWAPs (Sector Wide Approaches to Programming), pooled donor 
funding and general budgetary support. 
[214]  The idea behind SWAPS is simple: donor funding should focus not on 
projects, but on an entire sector, and all donor funding for a sector should 
support the government’s own programme for that sector. The government, 
not the donors, should take the lead in formulating and implementing policies 
for the sector. This in itself is a big change from project-based aid, and 
beyond SWAPs lie even more radical changes. ‘Pooled funding’ is the next 
step, in which donors pool their money in an account earmarked for that 
sector. Beyond pooled funding is general budgetary support, in which donors 
provide assistance that is not earmarked for a specific sector, but supports the 
general expenditure policies of the government.  
[215] This new style of development assistance is likely to have important impacts 
on the policy process in developing countries, with policy initiatives which 
are larger, and sector wide, as well as a greater emphasis on the host 
country’s ex ante ability to establish policy priorities and specify the desired 
impacts of its policies at sectoral and aggregate levels, and its ex post ability 
to monitor and measure policy impact (for its own purposes, and as part of 
accountability to the donors). Direct budget support in particular is likely to 
accelerate the trend toward host country project acquisition and contracting 
of development initiatives, with a consequent emphasis on local experts and 
expertise, as well as and a greater emphasis on financial management 
systems to reduce fiduciary risk faced by the donors. 
[216] This trend has significant implications for policy research institutes: 
• Direct budget support will accelerate the trend toward host country 
project acquisition and contracting and a more diverse group of clients; 
• Decision-making will be decentralized, with donor agency field offices 
increasingly setting the agenda; 
• Projects, where they still exist, will tend to be smaller and of shorter 
duration, with an increasing emphasis on local experts and expertise; 
• Where large, sector-wide projects are tendered, they are likely to be much 
larger in scale than in the past and cut across different areas of expertise, 
not often covered by any one institution; 
• Demand from donors at their headquarters level is likely to be for 
expertise which helps them to set the policy agenda for future assistance 
programmes, and to create mechanisms for channelling assistance to end 
users in ways which minimize the fiduciary risks to the donors and to 
monitor and evaluate the impact of these new funding modalities 
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[217] These changes present both opportunities and (in the longer term) threats to 
policy research institutes: 
[218] The opportunities are clear – the shift to general budget support, devolved 
decision-making and local contracting should increase the demand for ‘local’ 
policy analysis on the part of developing country governments. This 
increased demand should widen the opportunities available to the policy 
research institutes already in the SISERA network and stimulate the 
emergence of new centres which can in time join the network.  
[219] At the same, time, changes in aid modalities will pose serious problems for 
policy research institutes in developing countries (and not merely those in the 
SISERA network). At present policy research institutes in developing 
countries have a range of potential clients – bilateral and multilateral donors, 
the IFIs, their own government, international consulting firms, etc. If carried 
to its logical conclusion, the shift to general budget support will replace this 
range of clients with a single client – the country’s own government.  
[220] If there is a single purchaser in the market for policy research, this purchaser 
will have considerable market power, and this will have an important effect 
on the independence of policy research institutes, and possibly even on the 
quality of research they carry out. It will be difficult, for example, for any 
research institute to publish research critical of or embarrassing to the 
government when that government is the only purchaser of policy research. 
[221] It might be argued, of course, that policy research institutes everywhere in 
the world face the same problem: the government (or the public sector) is 
very often a large, if not the largest client for policy research. Why isn’t the 
independence of these institutes under threat? 
[222] The difference is that policy research institutes in developed countries 
typically have a more diverse range of funders, which include the 
philanthropic sector (foundations and wealthy individuals) and the private 
sector (corporations). These serve to offset the importance of the government 
as a client. 
[223] There does not exist, however, any tradition of support for policy research by 
the philanthropic sector or the private sector in developing countries, and it 
seems very unlikely that such a tradition will develop in the near future. As a 
result, it may be that donors may have to make commitments over the longer 
term to secure the independence of policy research institutes, and this may be 
one role that SISERA might play – as an efficient channel for such long term 
support. 
8.2.5 Internal environment 
[224] SISERA enjoys a productive internal environment. In its short history, it has 
created a strong governance structure. Its staff is highly motivated and 
dedicated to its work and is currently addressing the challenges it faces in 
dealing with changes in its external environment.  
[225] The organisation’s mission is clear to all those working in SISERA, and our 
investigations showed that policy-makers and practitioners involved with 
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economic research and policy-making in the region are also well aware of 
SISERA and its approach to capacity building. Partner institutions, with 
some exceptions, agree with these methods and welcome the emphasis on 
institutional capacity building. 
[226] The organisational structure of SISERA, as described throughout Section 8, 
is strong and simple. This allows the fast flow of information and the 
effective and efficient delivery of assistance to the research centres. 
[227] SISERA does, however, have face difficulties with respect to the incentive 
and rewards systems available to its staff and member institutions. One 
possible reason for the long delay in appointing a permanent Executive 
Director may have been the inability to offer a competitive salary, which in 
turn was due to the need to consider relativities with respect to IDRC salary 
levels. Other factors may have played a role as well, of course, including the 
uncertainties resulting from the protracted move to IDEP. 
[228] It has also some difficulties in the incentives and rewards faced by the 
centres. They need to be more proactive and rely less on SISERA’s 
(admirable) persistence in encouraging the submission of funding proposals, 
and more on their own efforts to seek out alternative funding sources and 
strengthen their contacts with users of their research.  
[229] In general, SISERA’s internal environment is an institutional strength. It 




9 CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIC 
OPPORTUNITIES: OPPORTUNITIES AND 
THREATS 
[230] In this section we discuss the challenges and risks facing SISERA in the 
context of its current objectives and identify new strategic opportunities. 
[231] We believe that SISERA must address four strategic issues over the medium 
term: 
• The Programme’s strategic directions, i.e. whether it should continue to 
focus on its current set of activities, or attempt to diversify its portfolio of 
activities. 
• Whether SISERA can exist as a “stand alone” institution, or alternatively 
should seek another institutional home or a long-term, strategic partner – 
and if so, how this partner should be chosen. A number of institutional 
homes or partnerships are of course possible, but extensive and lengthy 
discussions have taken place over the past two years with a view to 
locating SISERA within the Institute for Economic Development and 
Planning (IDEP), a United Nations agency based in Dakar.  
• Both the choice of strategic directions and the choice of an institutional 
home or long-term partner raise issues concerning SISERA’s 
management and governance. 
• The need for a higher and more stable level of funding over the medium 
term, which is in turn linked to the perceptions of SISERA among donors 
and potential supporters of the programme; the need to establish a clear 
identity and a higher profile for SISERA among the donor community; 
and the impact on this identity and profile of SISERA’s current 
relationship with IDRC and its future relationship with IDEP and the UN 
System. 
9.1 Strategic directions 
[232] The choice of strategic directions for SISERA should take account of three 
key considerations: 
i. At what level should the programme target its interventions? Individual 
researchers, clusters of researchers, or economics faculties within the public 
university system? 
ii. Has the programme successfully addressed the barriers to the lack of good 
quality policy analysis by locally based researchers that were identified in 
1997? If so, are there now different obstacles that the programme should 
tackle? 
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iii. What is the competitive advantage of the programme vis à vis other capacity 
building initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa? That is, which of the six roles can 
SISERA play more effectively than its competitors? 
9.1.1 The Level at Which Interventions take Place 
[233] This is an important issue. Capacity building interventions can take place at a 
number of levels, and there are clear tradeoffs in choosing among the levels. 
This is very clearly set out in the Kennan Institute report on the humanities 
and social sciences in the former Soviet Union: 
“… Given the enormity of the problems facing the region’s 
intelligentsia, where are the points of entry for Western 
organizations? Where can we get the most “bang for the buck,” 
and have the greatest impact? Where can our efforts best 
complement existing programs? The challenges are so large that 
programs must be targeted to address specific goals, and 
coordinated with other programs to maximize gain. Working 
with and supporting individual scholars is not sufficient, as those 
scholars must rely in the end on sustainable and collegial 
institutions. Working to reduce the impact of large, structural 
problems requires a scale of effort beyond the scope of any 
single Western institution as well as a long-term time horizon 
that is similarly unrealistic. Broad, systemic reform requires 
interaction with national bureaucratic and political institutions 
which, while not impossible, can diminish a program’s positive 
impact.” 21 
 
[234] As the Kennan Institute report makes clear, there are important tradeoffs 
involved in choosing the level of intervention. Intervention at the individual 
level has many attractions: it is easier to design incentives to encourage 
higher quality research, and to ensure accountability and transparency when 
one is dealing with individuals. AERC in sub-Saharan Africa, CEPR in 
Europe, NBER in North America – and the EERC Russia Programme – are 
clear testimonies to the advantages of interventions at the individual level. 
[235] On the other hand, such interventions fail to acknowledge that individual 
researchers do rely on the existence of well functioning institutions through 
which they can pursue their professional careers. Such institutions are 
important not only because they provide a salary and an income, but also 
because they facilitate the sharing of knowledge, interaction with one’s peers 
and scrutiny of research that are important in ensuring that improvements in 
the quality of research can be sustained outside the activities of the networks 
to which individual researchers may belong. If such well functioning 
institutions do not exist, then individual economists, if they are well trained, 
will typically pursue a mixture of teaching activities (through a university) 
                                                 
21 Bronson, S., N. Popson, B. A. Ruble, ‘Sustaining Intellectual Communities: A Strategy for 
Rebuilding the Social Sciences and Humanities in the Former Soviet Union from Within’, in The 
Humanities and Social Sciences in the Former Soviet Union: An Assessment of Need: Washington: The 
Kennan Institute, 2000. 
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and consultancy (typically with donor or government clients). Consultancy, 
while financially remunerative for the individual researcher, is typically a 
‘bilateral’ relationship between the consultant and the client, involving 
proprietary information that may not emerge in the public domain. As a 
result, there are relatively few spillovers from this work into the local 
research community, either in terms of spreading knowledge or improving 
research standards.  
[236] Since there are clear difficulties and drawbacks to interventions at both the 
individual and the systemic levels, it is tempting to consider interventions at 
a point between these two levels, and the Kennan report advocates the pursuit 
of this strategy: 
“As this report makes clear, we believe that steering a middle 
course between the large-scale programs, which seek to reform 
the system of higher education, and the small-scale programs, 
which seek to support scholars with individual grants, is the 
most sensible point of entry at this time. This middle ground can 
be viewed in a number of ways – rebuilding professional life, 
sustaining intellectual communities, building an infrastructure 
for the ‘invisible university’ – all capture to some extent the type 
of programming we believe can be most effective in addressing 
the problems at hand. The report will first set forth a review of 
the problems, then proceed to a discussion of existing models, 
and will conclude with a proposal for a comprehensive strategy 
for addressing what we view as ‘the missing middle.’ ” 22 
 
[237] In retrospect, the initial decision to focus SISERA’s efforts on building 
institutional capacity in policy research institutes roughly corresponds to the 
“missing middle” identified in the Kennan Institute Report. At present in 
SSA, AERC deals essentially with individual researchers through its grants 
competition and training activities. SISERA on the other hand has explicitly 
targeted its activities at policy research institutes. This reflected an explicit 
choice in the initial programme design and has proved, by and large to be 
successful, in the sense that it has built institutional capacity to carry out 
policy research, and a number of institutes which it has supported are now 
well managed, with highly qualified research staff and play a significant role 
in their country’s policy process. 
[238] SISERA does, of course, face competition in the institutional capacity 
building area from ACBF. It is noteworthy, however, that ACBF has to some 
extent reoriented its strategy recently, giving less emphasis to creating and 
strengthening institutions and more emphasis on “knowledge networking”. 
To the extent that this does represent a shift in direction for ACBF, it would 
suggest that the need for an institution such as SISERA will grow and not 
diminish, as the demand for local policy research capacity grows with 
                                                 
22 Bronson, S., N. Popson, B. A. Ruble, ‘Sustaining Intellectual Communities: A Strategy for 
Rebuilding the Social Sciences and Humanities in the Former Soviet Union from Within’, in The 
Humanities and Social Sciences in the Former Soviet Union: An Assessment of Need: Washington: The 
Kennan Institute, 2000. 
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changes in aid modalities, while there are less support for institutional 
strengthening. 
[239] The decision to focus SISERA on institutional capacity building was, then, 
easy to justify both at the time and in retrospect. The need to strengthen 
policy research institutes will, if anything, increase over the medium term. 
We would not, therefore, recommend that SISERA change this core focus of 
its activities. Instead, the challenge is to secure the additional financial and 
human resources that will allow SISERA to pursue this core objective more 
effectively in future. 
9.1.2 Obstacles to Improved Policy Analysis – Then and 
Now 
[240] The initial programme design in 1997 identified weaknesses in the capacity 
of policy research institutes. The operating assumption which formed the 
basis of SISERA’s initial strategy, and which has been maintained 
subsequently, is that there exists in most countries adequate individual 
capacity to carry out policy research and analysis, in the sense that there were 
a sufficient number of well trained researchers, and that if deficiencies in the 
number of well trained researchers exist, they can be addressed by AERC. 
The key obstacle to improved local policy research was identified as the lack 
of well functioning research institutions. 
[241] Our evaluation of the programme suggests that this assumption was correct 
for some, but not all of the countries of the region, and that in some of the 
countries in which SISERA experienced difficulties, this may have been due 
to the scarcity of trained researchers. Some of SISERA’s attempts to 
strengthen institutions have been unsuccessful in part because of the lack of 
good researchers to staff these institutions.  
[242] There have, however, been significant changes in the research community 
and the policy-making environment since 1997, and the key question now 
facing the SISERA is how its strategy should be designed to respond to these 
changes. 
[243] The key changes in the policy environment include: 
• There is a growing sense of self confidence within Africa, as evidenced 
by NEPAD and other initiatives, and with it, a sense that western, donor-
funded policy research is neither necessary nor sufficient in order to 
inform the policy process in Africa.  
• There are now stronger linkages between policy research institutes and 
the policy community in some countries, but the demand for policy 
research and government’s absorptive capacity remains an obstacle to 
bridging the gap between research and policy in many countries.  
[244] The research environment has changed as well: 
• A growing number of well run policy research institutes, producing high 
quality policy relevant research which has a significant impact on the 
policy process  
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• Collaborative research between scholars in North America and Europe, 
and those in Africa has emerged, and is now an important part of the 
work of both AERC and SISERA (through the SAGA project).  
[245] There have also been shifts in some donor priorities, including  
• Fatigue with capacity building 
• Some impatience with the lack of a demonstrable impact of capacity 
building on policy-making 
9.1.3 SISERA’s Competitive Advantage 
[246] Here it is useful to return to the roles played by networks, and SISERA’s 
ability to play these roles.23 
[247] Broadly speaking, we can identify six possible roles which can be played by 
networks: 
• Filter  
• Amplifier 
• Investor / Provider 
• Facilitator 
• Convenor 
• Community builder 
[248] How well placed is SISERA to play these roles? It is clear that the 
programme can and does act as an investor, through its grants and training 
activities, and this has formed a large part of its work. It has also acted as a 
facilitator through organizing training workshops, the publication of the 
SISERA Working Paper series, and other activities. It has not been 
particularly active as an amplifier, and currently does not devote significant 
resources to this role, but there is no reason to think it would not have the 
technical competence to play this role should it decide to do so. SISERA, 
through its programme of technical assistance, staff visits to centres, and 
meetings of centre directors has also helped build a sense of community 
among the directors and staff of the centres in its network. 
[249] Assessing SISERA’s ability to play the other two roles, of filter and 
convenor, is more complex. The programme has the technical and 
managerial capacity to play these roles, but one must first be clear whether 
SISERA is well placed to operate as an intermediary between research users 
(in the policy community) and research producers (based in the centres in its 
network), or whether its primary role is to act as an intermediary between 
donors and the research centres in its network. 
[250] Our view is that the latter role is the one that SISERA can play more 
effectively. It should not seek to act as an intermediary between research 
                                                 
23 Portes, R. and S. Yeo, ‘Think-Net’: The CEPR Model of a Research Network 
http://www.cepr.org/AboutCEPR/CEPR/CEPR_think.pdf 
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users and research producers, first, because it has no particular technical or 
informational advantage in doing so, and second, because this undermines 
the role and credibility of the research centres which it is trying to strengthen. 
[251] It is clear that SISERA has no informational advantage in acting as a filter or 
convenor between research users and producers within a particular country. 
SISERA’s partner institute in that country knows these users and producers 
much better than SISERA. There is little if any need for SISERA to act as a 
clearing house or filter for good research, since the research and policy 
communities are already well acquainted with each other at the national 
level. If SISERA is to play the role of a filter, it will only be through 
identifying, and linking good researchers outside the country with policy-
makers who would not otherwise have knowledge of these researchers. To a 
certain extent the Programme does this already in an indirect fashion, 
through its workshops and website, but this does not seem to be either 
focused or effective.  
[252] SISERA is better placed to perform the filtering and convening roles with 
respect to institutions based outside Africa (for example donors, international 
organizations, other research institutions, etc.). Such institutions, because 
they are based outside Africa, will have less knowledge of local researchers 
and institutions. In this case, SISERA can play an effective “brokering role” 
between local researchers and research institutes and the rest of the world. To 
some extent the programme has already begun to play this role with respect 
to the EAGER and SAGA projects, and has done this very effectively.  
[253] To make use of its competitive advantage, SISERA has to: 
• Make it an explicit part of its strategy; 
• Devise ways of exploiting this advantage; and 
• Make it visible. 
[254] To make itself more visible, SISERA has to exploit as many mechanisms as 
possible. We have suggested a stronger online presence and a hands-on 
approach towards publications and dissemination of work. We have also 
emphasised the importance of introducing monitoring and evaluation systems 
that would allow SISERA to track its achievements and collect evidence to 
demonstrate its effectiveness.  
[255] We noted above that although SISERA does currently monitor its activities 
with respect to the centres in its network, its monitoring and evaluation does 
not attempt to track in any detail (i) changes in behaviour of researchers, (ii) 
activities of the centres and (iii) changes in behaviour and activities of other 
stakeholders. Our suggestion is that the scope of SISERA’s evaluations be 
extended to changes in behaviour of the centres, and that the centres are 
given the responsibility for evaluating their researchers and use to which 
their research it put.  
[256] This is important because it was clear to us, based on the interviews, that not 
all centres or individual researchers used SISERA’s assistance in the same 
way. Changes in attitude are not within the control of SISERA, and indeed 
are difficult to engineer. SISERA can, however, by augmenting its 
monitoring and evaluation process, help assess the extent to which its 
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activities have the effect of improving the research capacity of centres and 
researchers in Africa and the resulting change in quantity and quality of 
research output. It can also evaluate the way in which the network, as a 
whole, has an effect on policy makers and policy in the region. 
[257] Each centre should then, in turn, be encouraged to track these effects on the 
boundary partners within their sphere of influence. Have policy makers 
changed their policies or views based on the research produced or 
consultancies offered? By mapping the direct outcomes of specific activities, 
SISERA can produce a clearer picture of the effectiveness of its assistance 
and the use that individual centres and researchers make of it.  
9.2 The Need for an Institutional Home or Strategic 
Partnership 
[258] Before considering possible institutional homes for SISERA, one should first 
ask whether the programme does indeed need a home, or whether it has a 
sustainable future as a free standing institution. Our view is that the 
programme might be organized as a free standing and autonomous 
institution. The experience of other research networks does, however, 
suggest that some practical difficulties are likely to arise from such an 
arrangement, which must be addressed carefully. 
[259] Arguments in favour of merging SISERA with a partner or placing it within a 
host institution are based on:  
• administrative and managerial economies of scale and scope 
• the lack of critical mass within such an institution as small as SISERA 
(which is much smaller than AERC, for example) 
• the current absence of any clear governance structure for the programme 
• the potential intellectual and professional isolation of the person heading 
the programme, if the programme is located outside an academic 
institution or a policy research institute 
• the difficulty of fundraising for a purely “virtual” institution such as 
SISERA  
[260] None of these arguments are in principle compelling enough to make the 
case for or against an institutional home or long-term partnership. It is thus 
worthwhile considering the experience of other research networks. 
9.2.1 A ‘Free Standing’ SISERA? 
[261] In this respect it is useful to examine whether other networks are housed 
within larger institutions or have a long-term relationship with partner 
organizations. NBER is independent and free standing, but is situated near 
and has close links to the Harvard and MIT economics departments (which 
has caused it to be identified with the Harvard and MIT faculty and has 
 86
occasionally caused difficulties with the Bureau’s relationship to other 
economics departments). CEPR is an independent institution, with no formal 
links to a university or other institution, but close working relationships with 
research centres in Brussels, Milan and elsewhere. AERC is also 
independent, but has close working relations with universities through its 
collaborative M.A and Ph.D programmes. The Economic Research Forum 
(ERF) in the Middle East is also independent of universities and other 
institutions. In this respect it is worth noting that AERC and ERF are entirely 
donor funded and each has a governance structure which is based around a 
board composed of donors, which deals with finance and management issues; 
and a scientific advisory committee, which is responsible for the research 
agenda and quality of the research output.  
[262] CEPR and NBER are thus relatively free standing institutions, while AERC 
and ERF are independent, but closely linked to their donors. CEPR and 
NBER have dealt with the intellectual isolation issue in different ways: 
NBER through its close physical proximity to Harvard and MIT, and CEPR 
by appointing a distinguished researcher as its Research Director (who works 
closely with the Chief Executive Officer) and by organizing its activities into 
seven ‘research programmes’, each with two Programme Directors, who 
have considerable responsibility for providing intellectual leadership and 
quality control in their programme area. The Chief Executive Officer of 
CEPR thus has a sizeable group of academics with whom she works closely 
in selecting research priorities, raising funds for individual projects, 
appointing Research Fellows and Affiliates as members of its network. It is 
noteworthy that AERC has not chosen to organize its activities into 
programme areas in quite the same way, and does not have a senior academic 
to provide leadership and quality control in each of the sub-fields in which it 
is active.24 It is noteworthy as well that AERC experienced some difficulties 
in the past in recruiting and retaining an Executive Director, and its research 
and policy outreach activities lost some momentum for a time as well. Its 
training programmes are, however, highly regarded, and it is interesting that 
the newly appointed Executive Director is the former head of its training 
programme. 
[263] The experience of these networks also suggests that governance issues can 
and do arise, particularly with free standing networks. NBER is very much 
the creation of Martin Feldstein, who continues to run the Bureau, playing a 
much stronger role than the directors of its programmes. It is not clear how 
the governance structures of NBER operate, if at all, given the dominance of 
its founder. CEPR has undergone a succession from its founding Director to 
a Chief Executive Officer, which has been eased to a certain extent by the 
presence of a strong Research Director and a large number of active 
Programme Directors, who have provided continuity in its intellectual 
leadership. Since CEPR relies on a very diverse group of funders, an 
appropriate governance structure has been less obvious, and governance at 
the board level has proved more problematic for CEPR than has intellectual 
continuity in the research programme. AERC and ERF, being entirely donor 
funded, have a governance structure based on a donor consortium, with a 
                                                 
24 Instead, its Advisory Committee and Resource Persons play this general role, but are more active 
during the biannual workshops than at other times. 
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scientific advisory committee responsible for the research agenda. 
Governance in these free standing networks has proved to be less of an issue, 
largely because of the dominant role played by a small set of donors. These 
networks have, however, been somewhat less successful in ensuring strong 
intellectual leadership for their activities, since the scientific advisory 
committees typically meet only once or twice a year and are relatively 
inactive at other times.  
[264] One might conclude from these examples that a research network can in 
principle be autonomous and free standing, but that in practice intellectual 
isolation and governance can be issues. Intellectual isolation can be 
addressed either through a close association and physical proximity to a 
strong centre of research and teaching, or by creating a structure in which 
responsibility for the activities of the network is to some extent decentralized 
through the creation of programme areas which correspond to the sub-fields 
of the discipline. 
[265] On balance, we believe that these arguments do suggest that SISERA would 
find it difficult to sustain itself as a free standing institution, unless it has 
strong links to a teaching / training and research institution, or adopts the 
CEPR model with programme areas directed by senior researchers from the 
sub-field (which seems less appropriate for SISERA, given its very broad 
remit for capacity building). 
9.2.2 An Institutional Home or Strategic Partnership? 
[266] If SISERA does need a home, the first point to note is that the appropriate 
choice of a home depends on what SISERA is and does. It is not sensible to 
select a new home for SISERA without first clarifying its future role and 
strategies. The choice of strategic directions is still under discussion, but the 
point to remember is any choice of strategic directions has implications for 
the choice of a partnership or a merger.  
9.2.2.1 Symmetry or Asymmetry? 
[267] The problems which the experience of other networks suggests are likely to 
arise in a free standing institution suggest that it might be advisable to locate 
SISERA programme within another institution. Such an arrangement could 
take one of two forms, symmetric or asymmetric:  
• The programme might be “housed” within another economic policy 
research institute or university department of economics. In this 
arrangement there is symmetry between the partners, in the sense that 
both the programme and its partner are involved in teaching and/or 
research. Since the institutions have similar missions, maintaining distinct 
operating and governance structures is bound to seem artificial and 
unnecessary in the longer term, and so a symmetric arrangement seems 
likely to lead eventually to a full merger of the institutions involved. 
• The alternative is one in which the programme is “hosted” by another 
institution which is not primarily or exclusively engaged in policy 
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research or capacity building in economics. This arrangement is 
asymmetric, in the sense that SISERA and its host would have somewhat 
different missions. Maintaining a distinct identity and mission for the 
programme seems more likely under an asymmetric arrangement, since 
the institutions involved are likely to have somewhat different missions, 
operating procedures and governance structure, and so merging these 
structures will be less natural and straightforward. 
[268] Under an asymmetric arrangement, SISERA is likely to operate as a 
“project” or “secretariat” of the host institution. There are many precedents 
for such an arrangement, but typically these involve adopting the operational 
systems and procedures of the host institution, but maintaining a separate 
governance structure, usually in the form of a steering committee which 
focuses on strategic choices for programme activities and the recruitment of 
senior management. Financial administration and oversight (and often human 
resources management) are dealt with through the adoption of the host 
institution’s systems and procedures. 
[269] This is in essence the situation since 1997: SISERA has existed as a 
Secretariat within IDRC – a much larger institution, with a broader mandate 
than SISERA. IDRC has long experience of this model, in which an initiative 
functions as a secretariat, typically housed within an IDRC regional office. 
IDRC secretariats use IDRC’s financial and accounting systems and follow 
its personnel procedures.25 Responsibility for the substance of the 
secretariat’s activities lies with a Steering Committee, on which a range of 
stakeholders are represented, along with a senior IDRC official. Each 
secretariat is led by an Executive Director, who is responsible to an IDRC 
staff member on a day to day basis, but more broadly to the chair of the 
Steering Committee as well. 
[270] The IDRC model has been extensively documented and codified and would 
seem to offer a useful blueprint for any ‘asymmetric’ relationship between 
SISERA and an institutional host.26 Such an asymmetric arrangement will in 
many respects resemble the relationship between SISERA and IDRC, of 
course. If appropriately modified, there is no reason why such a relationship 
could not be successful with a different host, whether this is IDEP or another 
institution. 
[271] The IDRC document identifies five issues which are essential for the success 
of the secretariat model: 
• strategic direction, which involves the alignment of the secretariat’s 
vision, mission and core values with those of its host institution (in this 
case IDRC) 
• the need to develop a sound and realistic business plan for the guidance 
of the secretariat’s management and for scrutiny by the secretariat’s 
steering committee and the host institution’s board; the business plan 
                                                 
25 IDRC defines a secretariat as “a program unit which is legally part of IDRC, headed by an Executive 
Director, and funded and governed in partnership with others.” In the present context an institution 
hosting SISERA in the future would play a role similar to that played by IDRC since 1997. 
26The Strategic Framework for Secretariats at IDRC. Ottawa: International Development Research 
Centre 
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must address the issues of focus, capacity and the quality of the 
relationships with the host institutions 
• a systematic approach to performance management, which addresses not 
only the implementation of the scientific program but also the general 
performance of the secretariat, using criteria which include relevance, 
effectiveness, efficiency, and financial viability 
• an accountability framework, which comprises the key accountability 
relationships; a description of the duties which are owed by those who are 
accountable; and the auditing approaches needed to exercise 
accountability, which take into account the dual accountability of a 
secretariat, to its host institution, and to its steering committee donors 
• operations and structure, including human resources issues (the status of 
the secretariat’s director within the host institution), and the accessibility 
of the administrative and support services provided by the host institution 
[272] IDRC’s experience in creating secretariats suggests the importance of giving 
careful attention to each of these issues before the decision is taken to create 
a secretariat within IDRC. Failure to address these issues has typically 
resulted in a lack of focus and unclear mandate for the secretariat, confusion 
and disagreements over accountability, and difficulty in attracting support 
from other donors.  
[273] The IDRC experience suggests the importance of careful ex ante planning in 
designing the relationship between IDRC and one of its secretariats. The 
same issues will inevitably arise in selecting and negotiating with a potential 
host institution, for example in organizing SISERA’s transition from its 
current status into a new status within, say, IDEP. It would therefore seem to 
be important that sufficient time is allowed not only to select the host 
institution, but also to ensure that each of the issues identified above are 
addressed clearly and explicitly in any agreement with the host institution. 
9.2.2.2 IDEP as an institutional home 
[274] A series of concerns regarding SISERA’s current governance and 
functioning have been raised during the course of our evaluation. These 
concerns should be dealt with before the move to IDEP or at least be placed 
at the top of the agenda of IDEP’s dealing with SISERA. 
[275] Francophone centres suggested that SISERA has staff shortage and because 
of that it has been unable to adhere to deadlines. The Secretariat do not agree 
with this observation, and we are somewhat sceptical as well: it seems that 
many of the delays which were mentioned to us are the result of slow 
responses by the centres to requests by the Secretariat. But it is also evident 
that staff shortages mean that the Secretariat cannot always assess as fully as 
it might wish the environment in which potential members of the network 
operate before awarding them grants or technical support; even though this is 
obviously desirable.  
[276] As SISERA moves to IDEP some staff members might be called to carry out 
other activities such as teaching, which will stretch its resources even more 
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thinly, and will require hiring additional staff. Before these decisions are 
made, SISERA needs to determine its future mission and objectives and so 
establish the appropriate level of staff resources needed to achieve its 
objectives.  
[277] SISERA has functioned without a permanent Executive Director for over two 
years. This has had an effect on its relation to donors, users and research 
centres. More importantly, it has had an tended to dampen SISERA’s initial 
momentum and as a consequence SISERA has lost an opportunity to raise its 
profile and gain exposure among research community and policy circles at 
the national, regional and international levels. 
[278] Diery Seck, the first Executive Director or SISERA and now the Director of 
IDEP, has argued that SISERA will be an asset for IDEP precisely to the 
extent that it retains its distinctive identity and successful activities. It is 
therefore in IDEP’s interests to promote and strengthen SISERA, and to 
ensure this success, his intention is that SISERA will deal directly with him.  
[279] This is both reassuring and a matter of some concern. On the one hand, the 
head of the host institution will be highly familiar with and sympathetic to 
SISERA’s aims and objectives. This should bode well for a successful 
relationship. On the other hand, the head of the host institution is also the 
founding director of SISERA, with his own very strong views as about the 
future of the network – which may well differ from those held by the 
Executive Director or the Steering Committee. The relationship is therefore 
likely to be a delicate one, requiring considerable diplomacy and good will 
on the part of both parties. 
[280] Issues of personality are likely to prove transitory, however. The key concern 
raised by a possible move to IDEP is SISERA’s programmatic autonomy and 
the authority of its Steering Committee in establishing and monitoring this 
programme. It is our understanding that such autonomy and authority have 
been successfully embedded in a draft agreement with IDEP and ECA (to 
which IDEP is responsible). We are, however, sceptical that such autonomy 
will be accepted at other levels of the UN system, and would not be surprised 
if the current draft agreement was not called into question by UN 
headquarters in New York. 
[281] Should this happen, and an agreement prove impossible to reach, then 
SISERA would be faced with some very difficult choices in terms of an 
institutional home. We understand that the Steering Committee has insisted 
upon retaining the current level of programmatic autonomy and authority, 
and we endorse this decision. We think it preferable that, should an 
agreement with IDEP not be possible, that a search for a new partner or host 
begin again, and that fresh consideration be given to establishing SISERA as 
a free standing institution, despite the problems of governance and 
professional isolation that this may entail. 
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9.2.3 Leadership and Governance 
[282] As the discussion in the preceding sections has made clear, the choice of 
strategic directions and the choice of an institutional home or long-term 
partner are closely related to the management and governance of programme. 
[283] To date, IDRC has been legally responsible for the programme, acting on 
behalf of a consortium of donors. These donors have been represented on the 
Steering Committee and have provided comment on and review of an annual 
report and participated in general discussions of operational and strategic 
issues. For some donors, the most important aspect of their involvement in 
and oversight over SISERA occurred through these meetings. 
[284] It is our impression that the Steering Committee played an active role in 
SISERA initially, but that its involvement in the programme has diminished 
somewhat in recent years. 
9.2.3.1 Leadership 
[285] The post of Executive Director was filled by Diery Seck from 1997 to 2002, 
and by the Director of the IDRC Regional Office on a temporary basis in 
2002. Elias Ayuk has served as Acting Executive Director since early 2003. 
During this period he has also continued to carry out the duties of one of the 
two programme officers in the Secretariat. During much of this period, 
Catherine Daffé, now the Coordinator for Programme and Operations has 
provided a vital degree of administrative continuity and institutional memory 
for the programme. 
[286] Diery Seck provided very effective leadership during SISERA’s launch 
phase, and played a key role in creating the institutional structures and 
securing the financial resources necessary to launch SISERA. He may, 
however, have been more interested in creating the network, and less 
interested in the task of running and extending the network once SISERA 
became better established. So a transition to a new Executive Director would 
have been entirely natural.  
[287] The failure to ensure a smooth transition to a new (permanent) Executive 
Director is very unfortunate, and has been a major obstacle to the continued 
growth and success of SISERA. That the programme has achieved good 
results over the past two years is due, in our view, to three factors: 
• The soundness of the initial conception of SISERA and the strategic 
directions it has pursued: SISERA is fundamentally a very good idea, and 
satisfies an important need in Africa 
• The ability and dedication of the Secretariat’s staff, in particular the 
Acting Executive Director and the Coordinator for Programme and 
Operations. The Acting Executive Director, for example, has not only 
filled an important gap in the organization’s leadership, but has continued 
his work as a programme officer, working closely with centres in the 
SISERA network and helping to identify new members who might join 
the network. The other members of the Secretariat’s staff, including the 
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Programme Officer, also display a very high degree of dedication and 
professionalism. 
[288] SISERA has continued, if not to thrive, then at least to do valuable work in a 
very effective fashion, first because it is an excellent idea and responds to an 
important need in Africa, and second because it has been fortunate to have 
been able to rely on the loyalty, dedication and professionalism of its staff.  
[289] In this respect, SISERA, and its Steering Committee have enjoyed good 
fortune, but it would be unwise and indeed irresponsible for the Steering 
Committee to let this situation continue. Uncertainty concerning SISERA’s 
leadership compounds the uncertainty concerning its institutional home. In 
combination, they make it very difficult for the programme to sustain its 
momentum, make appropriate strategic choices, and secure the human and 
financial resources necessary to execute its strategy.  
9.2.3.2 Planning Process 
[290] The details of SISERA’s governance structure will be heavily conditioned by 
its choice of an institutional home or long term strategic partnership (or its 
decision to pursue the ‘stand alone’ option). For this reason we think it 
premature to enter into a detailed discussion of alternative governance 
arrangements.  
[291] One aspect does, however, merit discussion. Whatever the choice of 
institutional home and the details of the agreement with the host institution, 
more attention needs to be paid to the planning process in order to ensure that 
the Steering Committee retains effective authority over SISERA’s 
programme so that SISERA retains its programmatic autonomy and 
institutional identity. 
[292] As part of a strengthened governance procedure, the programme will need to 
engage in a fuller planning process, to ensure that all parties have the 
information they need to fulfil their roles. The Steering Committee will need 
financial and programmatic information more than annually to assess 
implementation of agreed plans and adjust where necessary. Management 
will need the formal guidance of a Steering Committee to assure that it is on 
the agreed path and will, ideally, benefit from the SC’s contacts and 
complementary perspectives to make rigorous strategic decisions. 
[293] A typical planning process would revolve around a multi-year plan that 
includes detailed activities for each year and periodic, perhaps quarterly SC 
monitoring of progress to plan. The business plan needs to start with the 
strategic context and decisions, and move from there to activities and their 
financial requirements. 
[294] The SC should therefore require of management more detailed and formal 
planning. Currently, business plans are framed as requests for donor funds, 
rather than a full review of strategy and recommendations of actions 
following therewith. What is missing from the current planning process is an 
action plan, which is organisationally one level below the business plan, 
stipulating administrative steps to be taken to operationalise the business 
plan’s objectives. The link in planning between strategy and actions is at 
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present only implicit, probably as a result of the more informal boundary 
between management and governance in the programme.  
[295] Many donor-led projects succeed in a large part because of the diligence and 
good-will of the individuals involved, and SISERA is no exception. This 
informal approach can work well on smaller scales and over shorter periods 
of time. When creating an institution as complex as SISERA, a clear 
effective governance structure is essential to provide depth to management 
and to protect against many of the risks that the program faces. The size and 
complexity of the tasks that IDRC management and administration have in 
effect been carrying out should not be underestimated. Going forward, the 
tasks facing the SC and management of are at least as large and complex, and 
will require strong leadership on several levels. 
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10 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
[296] We reviewed the specific actions undertaken by SISERA to support African 
economic research centres under five categories: strengthening of 
institutional support, enhancement of managerial capacity of economic 
research centres, networking of African economic research centres, linking 
researchers and end users, and collaboration with other institutions.  
[297] Strengthening of institutional support was carried out through core grants, 
seed grants, technical support, training of researchers and measure to 
improve capacity utilization 
[298] Enhancement of managerial capacity of economic research centres was 
carried out through a ‘hands on’ approach. An important component of the 
Secretariat’s work was focused on key individuals with in each institution; 
e.g. directors and finance officers, who were reached through meetings, 
workshops, seminars and training; and mentoring. 
[299] SISERA also took action to improve the networking of African economic 
research centres, by launching two sub-regional networks. 
[300] Linking researchers and end-users was also viewed as important task for 
SISERA. In principle, this is the responsibility of the individual research 
centres and the sub-regional networks, and in practice, SISERA has not 
played a direct role in these linkages. Instead, it has focused on fostering 
linkages with regional and global actors such as the African Development 
Bank and the World Bank Institute.  
[301] A worrying issue is the imbalance between the work carried out to strengthen 
research centres’ institutional capacities and end users’ capacity to demand 
and use the research produced. Some centres report not being able to engage 
with policy makers in their countries because there is little interest in the 
ideas suggested by policy research. This suggests that SISERA should 
engage more actively in not only linking with but if possible strengthening 
end users’ capacity to demand and apply the knowledge produced at the 
centres in SISERA’s network.  
[302] Collaboration with the World Bank Institute was particularly successful and 
allows SISERA to organize training for researchers in the area of poverty 
reduction. The decision of the WBI to discontinue support for this training 
may have a significant effect on the members of the SISERA network and 
their ability to influence the policy process. The responses to our 
questionnaire and our interviews suggested that such training was one of the 
most popular activities initiated by SISERA, and research related to poverty 
reduction has been a common denominator among the most successful 
centres (EPRC, CREA, DPRU). This decision by the WBI is therefore highly 
unfortunate, and efforts to replace its support with that of UNDP are to be 
encouraged.  
[303] SISERA’s has much too low an institutional profile and ‘brand recognition’ 
in the development policy research community generally and among donors 
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(and potential supporters) in particular. Additional staff and a clearer 
strategic direction regarding these areas specifically are needed to enable 
SISERA to strengthen its profile and establish its ‘brand’ as a recognized 
centre of excellence in institutional capacity building. 
[304] We assessed the perceived benefits of SISERA's interventions from the 
viewpoint of its partner institutions and determine the value-added of its 
activities for its research centres. The impact of SISERA interventions on its 
partner institutions varied considerably. While all directors interviewed 
consider their participation in the network as beneficial for their institutions, 
the services are valued in different ways by each director. A common 
perception, best articulated described by Haroon Bhorat of DPRU, is that the 
support provided by SISERA gives directors ‘breathing space’. Financial 
support in particular, but also the technical assistance, training of researchers 
and other related activities, give directors time to reflect; resources to hire 
new researchers, the opportunity to explore new issues, etc.  
[305] We also assessed the perceived benefits of SISERA interventions from the 
viewpoint of government institutions and determine the value-added of its 
activities to policy making. 
[306] Assessing the impact of research and analysis on policy is an inherently 
difficult exercise, and there are few if any quantitative studies which are in 
any way conclusive. Measuring the impact of investments in capacity 
building such as SISERA is therefore a considerable challenge: it can be 
done, but requires care and good judgement. The reason is simple: even 
when quantitative measures of desired (ultimate) impact are readily 
available, the chain of causal links between an intervention and a change in 
an impact measure can be long and complex, with the outcome affected by 
the actions of a large number of actors, and influenced by many elements in 
the surrounding environment. This is particularly true for ‘upstream’ 
interventions in capacity building, of which SISERA and the centres in its 
network are an example. Assessing impact by associating a particular 
intervention with changes that take place ‘downstream’ in the causal chain 
needs to be undertaken with some care, particularly when a complex chain of 
causality is posited. 
[307] Overall, we would conclude that the impact on policy has been mixed. Some 
policy research institutes in the SISERA network have been outstandingly 
successful in pursing research programmes that have had a significant impact 
on policy discussions and dialogue within their country, and now both 
government and civil society look to these institutes to take a lead in 
producing new and relevant research on certain key policy issues. We give 
examples of these success stories in Table 4, Table 5, Table 6 and Table 7 in 
Section 7.3. Other institutes in the SISERA network, in contrast, have had 
little if any influence on policy. 
[308] Impact on the policy process remains an important goal of the programme, 
and so it is important for SISERA to understand why some of its partners 
have been so successful, and others have had so little impact, and how the 
lessons of the successes can be used to assist partners who are struggling to 
achieve an impact on policy. 
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[309] Based on his experience in Indonesia, Peter Timmer argues, for 
example, that there are:  
“… four factors that can make policy oriented research 
successful. First, the analyst should be involved with the same 
policy-makers or in the same policy setting for the long term. 
Second, there is a need to find a balance between keeping 
analysis and advice confidential and the ultimate publication of 
the key models and results. Third, the analysts should rely on the 
analytical paradigms of the mainstream of the economic 
profession even while examining deviations from their 
underlying assumptions. Lastly, there should be continuing 
demand from policy-makers for problem-oriented analysis.”   
[310] Our interviews and discussions suggested that Timmer’s second and third 
conditions (confidentiality versus publication in the open scientific literature, 
and the degree of reliance on mainstream analytical paradigms) did not seem 
significant in the SISERA’s context. 
[311] His fourth condition, that policy-makers must have a genuine demand for 
analytical work, does, however, seem to be an issue in some countries in sub-
Saharan Africa, in particular the francophone countries and this limits the 
impact of research on policy in a number of countries. 
[312] The issue here may go beyond the government’s appetite for ideas and 
research results. One must consider as well a government’s ‘absorptive 
capacity’ – the ability of its policy analysts to understand the results of 
technical research and communicate the implications of this research to key 
policy-makers. Our discussions suggested that in many countries in which 
SISERA works, the demand side of the policy market is still very weak: 
many governments are unreceptive to new ideas and research findings, or if 
receptive, lack the staff with skills to understand technical research results 
well enough to identify the policy implications of the research. SISERA has 
certainly strengthened the supply side of the policy market, but in many 
countries the demand side remains a significant obstacle to bridging the gap 
between research and policy.  
[313] Whether SISERA could realistically extend its activities to strengthening 
analytical capacity within government is not at all clear, given SISERA’s 
limited resources and the large number of countries in which it operates. 
Leaving aside these weaknesses on the demand side, Timmer’s observations 
also help identify what may be the most important factor affecting whether 
SISERA’s partner institutes have an impact on policy: sustained focus on a 
few key issues. 
[314] In order to achieve significant policy impact, initiatives have to be sustained 
for a significant period of time, so that the researchers involved are able to 
build strong relationships with their counterparts in the government 
ministries. This is not an insurmountable obstacle for the institutes in the 
SISERA network, but it requires a sustained commitment over a long period 
of time. This would in turn entail a decision to focus on a specific and limited 
number of policy issues, since the resources available to these institutes are 
unlikely to be sufficient for long-term initiatives across a large number of 
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policy areas. In order to be successful in policy outreach, then, SISERA’s 
partners must ‘place their bets’, focusing their efforts and resources on just a 
few key policy issues (and on the ministries and researchers likely to be 
involved in these issues), and sustain this focused commitment for over a 
period at least several years.  
[315] We also carried out an institutional assessment of SISERA. 
[316] We assessed first its operational capacities. The most important concern 
regarding operational capacity is the inability, since 2002, to appoint a 
permanent Executive Director. This has diminished the focus on the 
leadership of the Secretariat. In addition and partly as a result of the lack of 
an Executive Director, the workload on individual staff is far too high; the 
existing network includes over 20 economic research institutions in 18 
countries, and in addition the Secretariat receives a steady stream of requests 
from new centres which wish to join the network, must deal with 
relationships with donors, and must function effectively in two working 
languages. It is abundantly clear that the Secretariat requires additional 
human resources. 
[317] The absence of an Executive Director and more importantly, insufficient staff 
numbers has also had an effect on the orientation of SISERA. Current staff 
(e.g. the financial assistant, program coordinator, program assistant and 
secretary) need to focus on the internal organisation, process and activities, 
and so relatively less attention is paid to outwardly oriented, ‘external’ 
activities such as contact with donors, profile raising, attendance at 
international conferences and workshops. 
[318] Access to funding and funding sources has decreased in the recent past 
particularly due to the culmination of the funding cycle and a gap with the 
next one. Initially SISERA received funding from IDRC, CIDA, USAID, 
Coopération Francaise, DGIS, the EU and the AfDB. At present, only IDRC, 
Coopération Francaise and USAID (through the SAGA programme) are 
major donors, and changes in USAID policies give some concern regarding 
the longer term prospects for its support to SISERA. Recent developments 
have, however, been encouraging: SISERA has recently received a grant 
from AfDB and DGIS has approved one of CAD 1.3 million over 4 years. 
[319] Another problem experienced by SISERA has to do with timing of donor 
funding. The delay between the contract negotiation with donors and the 
signature of contracts has meant that on some occasions SISERA’s ability to 
provide support to the members of its network has been subject to delays, 
which frustrate the centres and reduce their loyalty to SISERA. 
[320] The absence of a permanent Executive Director has created some difficulties 
for SISERA. Elias Ayuk has performed very well as Acting Executive 
Director. He has provided not only day to day leadership for the Secretariat 
but has also recently launched a very valuable strategic planning exercise. 
Nevertheless, he has had to perform in effect two jobs, and the human 
resources of the Secretariat are stretched very thin indeed as a result. Centres 
in the SISERA network are clearly aware of this, and it has caused concern 
among many of the centre directors and staff. It is evidenced as well by 
SISERA’s low profile and lack of ‘brand recognition’. 
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[321] Timing is an important element of program and process management, and in 
this area, SISERA has experienced some difficulties. As in the case of 
funding, the time gap between the approval of the work plan by the Steering 
Committee (SC) and the start of the financial year have made it necessary on 
occasion for the Secretariat to begin the implementation of an activity before 
it is approved by the SC. While this does not seem to have resulted in any 
serious difficulties, it is nevertheless an undesirable practice. Such 
difficulties could be overcome by a good information system so that the 
Steering Committee is aware of the work plan and the key implementation 
dates. Accountability and responsibility for the use of funds in these cases 
could be assigned to the research centres, reporting back to the Steering 
Committee.  
[322] The simple and rather flat structure of SISERA and its governing body 
facilitates timely monitoring and evaluation of the performance of each staff 
member. The small size of the Secretariat’s staff also means that their contact 
with individual centres cannot be sustained in some cases, and there have 
been instances where the centres have not respond in a timely manner to the 
Secretariat’s suggestions and requests. Similarly, the information submitted 
by the centres, both in terms of performance evaluation and in the case of the 
research proposals, is not always insufficient to allow SISERA to monitor the 
performance of its centres. Does this call for a uniform monitoring and 
evaluation system, which would require that each centre produce identical 
information, or should the monitoring and evaluation system continue to 
adapt to the capacities of each centre? Both options will require additional 
staff and closer monitoring of each institution, but the latter might make it 
difficult to compare performance across centres. On the other hand, access to 
the inputs needed and the implementation of changes and recommendations 
from the monitoring and evaluation process should be easier.  
[323] We also assessed SISERA’s adaptive capacities.  
[324] The ability of the staff to adapt and respond to changes in the environment is 
significantly hindered by their current workloads. Program officers need to 
keep up to date with issues such as the interests of donors, emerging policy 
issues, as well as methodological advances and new research techniques. To 
do this they require time dedicated to learn, reflect and innovate. This cannot 
be achieved with the current staff numbers and workloads. 
[325] We examined SISERA’s online presence. The url for the website is 
cumbersome, but more important, links to the IDRC website. While formally 
appropriate, this tends to reinforce perceptions of an excessively close 
relationship, which may, as remarked earlier, complicate funding from other 
donors. It would be far better to register another url, such as 
www.sisera.org.sn. 
[326] The SISERA web page provides basic information regarding the Secretariat 
and its activities but almost none (besides contact information) on the centres 
in the network. This is important because the web page appears to be 
intended to inform third parties, rather than to serve as a tool or service 
provider for the research centres members of the network. 
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[327] Although considerable effort is focused on strategic management of the 
secretariat the severe time pressures on the staff limit the time they have 
available for longer term planning. As a result, much of the reflection and 
organizational learning and innovation seem to be occasioned by external 
evaluations. This is undesirable: learning and adapting should, of course, take 
place within the organization, on an ongoing basis. This is important, not 
only for the effectiveness of SISERA, but for its ability to attract, motivate 
and retain good staff.  
[328] Improved monitoring and evaluation is central to the strengthening of 
SISERA’s adaptive capacities. Evaluation is inherently difficult for SISERA, 
because SISERA intervenes to build capacity far upstream in the policy 
analysis and dialogue process. It is difficult, to say the least, for SISERA to 
properly measure its success, because this success depends to a large extent 
on the actions and behaviour of the centres in the network, and their actions 
are only indirectly influenced by SISERA. 
[329] Measuring the impact of policy research itself is widely regarded as a 
difficult and challenging exercise. Measuring the impact of initiatives to 
build capacity for policy research is harder still. Nevertheless, monitoring 
and evaluation of SISERA seems largely confined to some quantitative 
indicators of programme activities, with relatively few attempts to measure 
the impact of these activities on the behaviour of the centres in the SISERA 
network, and no systematic attempt to measure the impact of the Centres on 
the policy process at the national level. The Progress Report by Activity for 
the SAGA Program is to some extent an exception, since it is based on the 
analysis of intermediate performance indicators. These indicators, however, 
only measure the extent to which SISERA carried out specific activities.  
[330] While acknowledging that this is a very difficult task, we recommend that 
more systematic attempts be made in future to measure the impact of 
SISERA on the institutions with which it works directly – the centres in its 
network. 
[331] We recommend that SISERA do this by adopting an alternative approach, 
Outcome Mapping, which focuses on determining whether or not these 
activities are having an effect on the behaviour of those targeted. A change in 
behaviour of ‘boundary partners’, rather than the fact that particular activity 
has been completed, is likely to be a more accurate and useful indicator for 
both management and accountability purposes. 
[332] To assess the performance of SISERA we studied its relevance, 
effectiveness, efficiency and financial sustainability. 
[333] It is undeniable that the creation of SISERA responded to a real and 
important problem facing African countries. This guarantees the institution’s 
relevance from the start, but much needs to be done to maintain it. Its 
methods and initiatives are well designed and respond to the context in which 
they operate. There is continuous contact with the centres. This ensures that 
the staff, and through them the Steering Committee, are well aware of the 
changing internal and external conditions the centres have to face. For 
instance, visits to provide technical support and meetings with directors or 
financial officers provide SISERA staff with an opportunity to monitor the 
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changing environments and capacities of the centres. A question, however, 
still lingers: How is SISERA using this information?  
[334] While it is clear that SISERA has a clear mission, well known by its staff, it 
is not clear that this mission is known at all by all those affected by it. This 
suggests that higher priority be given to raising SISERA’s profile, not only 
among the wider development policy community, but also within its own 
network! 
[335] Its financial sustainability is seemingly secure but a serious problem arises 
due to the mismatch between the funding cycle and the project cycles of the 
secretariat and the centres. SISERA’s efforts in this area should aim towards 
planning their funding cycles to guarantee a steady flow of resources from 
donors to institutions. It should also, though its mentoring and consultations, 
aim to foresee changes in the needs and capacities requirements of the 
centres. 
[336] An analysis of the external operating environment of SISERA clearly shows 
that this has changed. Most importantly it has done so partly due to the action 
of SISERA. We identified two main changes:  
• The increased strength of some of SISERA’s partner institutes, which 
now play an vital and dynamic role in the process of policy dialogue and 
design in their countries 
• A dramatic shift in the way aid modalities, as donors move from project-
oriented to programme-oriented support, and from their to general budget 
support. This shift will, over time, have profound implications for the 
policy research institutes in SISERA’s network.  
[337] It has become increasingly necessary to address the existing capacity of the 
users of the public good (knowledge) that the research centres produce. 
While SISERA has focused, quite successfully, on the supply of policy 
research, less has been done regarding the demand for such research.  
[338] SISERA’s ‘success stories’ are associated with the adoption of a sustained 
commitment to a programme of research which focuses on a few key 
subjects. Besides a stable internal environment, such a long term 
commitment requires an external stability as well. Volatility of governmental 
policy and donor interests do not create the incentives necessary for centres 
to dedicate time and resources over long periods of time. Instead, they 
promote opportunism in conducting research and giving advice. 
[339] Changes in the external environment present both opportunities and (in the 
longer term) serious threats to policy research institutes: 
[340] The opportunities are clear – the shift to general budget support, devolved 
decision-making and local contracting should increase the demand for policy 
analysis on the part of developing country governments. This increased 
demand should widen the opportunities available to the policy research 
institutes already in the SISERA network and stimulate the emergence of 
new centres that can in time join the network.  
[341] The threats are less obvious, but changes in aid modalities are likely to pose 
serious problems for policy research institutes in developing countries. At 
present policy research institutes in developing countries have a range of 
 101
potential clients. A shift to general budget support will replace this range of 
clients with a single client – the country’s own government. It could become 
difficult, for instance, for any research institute to publish research critical of, 
or embarrassing to the government when that government is the only 
purchaser of policy research. 
[342] Without a tradition of support for policy research by the philanthropic sector 
or the private sector in Africa, this threat is a serious one. As a result, it may 
be that donors have to make commitments over the longer term to secure the 
independence of policy research institutes, and this may be one role which 
SISERA might play, as an efficient channel for such support. 
[343] Our study shows us that SISERA must address four strategic issues over the 
medium term: 
• The Programme’s strategic directions, i.e. whether it should continue to 
focus on its current set of activities, or attempt to diversify its portfolio of 
activities. 
• Whether SISERA can exist as a “stand alone” institution, or alternatively 
should seek another institutional home or a long-term, strategic partner – 
and if so, how this partner should be chosen.  
• Both the choice of strategic directions and the choice of an institutional 
home or long-term partner raise issues concerning SISERA’s 
management and governance. 
• The need for a higher and more stable level of funding over the medium 
term, which is in turn linked to the perception of SISERA among donors 
and potential supporters of the programme; the need to establish a clear 
identity and a higher profile for SISERA among the donor community 
and impact on this identity and profile of SISERA’s current relationship 
with IDRC and its future relationship with IDEP and the UN system. 
[344] The Programme’s strategic directions must take into consideration SISERA’s 
competitive advantages. Here it was useful to return to the roles played by 
networks, and SISERA’s ability to play these roles.  
[345] Broadly speaking, we have identified six possible roles which can be played 
by networks: 
• Filter  
• Amplifier 
• Investor / Provider 
• Facilitator 
• Convenor 
• Community builder 
[346] It is clear that the programme can and does act as an investor through its 
grants and training activities, and this has formed a large part of its work. It 
has also acted as a facilitator through organizing training workshops, the 
publication of the SISERA Working Paper series, and other activities. It has 
not been particularly active as an amplifier, and currently does not devote 
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significant resources to this role, but there is no reason to think it would not 
have the technical competence to play this role should it decide to do so. In 
addition SISERA, through its programme of technical assistance, staff visits 
to centres, and meetings of centre directors has also helped build a sense of 
community among the directors and staff of the centres in its network. 
[347] Assessing SISERA’s ability to play the other two roles, of filter and 
convenor, was more complex. Our view is that SISERA should not seek to 
act as an intermediary between research users and research producers, first, 
because it has no particular technical or informational advantage in doing so, 
and second, because this undermines the role and position of the research 
centres which it is trying to strengthen. 
[348] It is possible, however, for SISERA to perform the filtering and convening 
roles with respect to institutions based outside Africa (for example donors, 
international organizations, other research institutions, etc.). In this case, 
SISERA can play an effective “brokering role” between local researchers and 
research institutes and the rest of the world. To some extent the programme 
has already begun to play this role with respect to the EAGER and SAGA 
projects, and has done this very effectively.  
[349] Before considering possible institutional homes for SISERA, we ask whether 
the programme does indeed need a home, or whether it has a sustainable 
future as a free standing institution. Our view is that the programme might be 
organized as a free standing and autonomous institution (even when 
experiences from other networks suggest some difficulties with such 
arrangements).  
[350] Arguments in favour of merging SISERA with a partner or placing it within a 
host institution are based on:  
• Administrative and managerial economies of scale and scope 
• The lack of critical mass within such an institution as small as SISERA 
(which is much smaller than AERC, for example) 
• The current absence of any clear governance structure for the programme 
• The potential intellectual and professional isolation of the person heading 
the programme if the programme is located outside an academic 
institution or a policy research institute 
• The difficulty of fundraising for a purely “virtual” institution such as 
SISERA  
[351] On balance, we think the issues of intellectual isolation and the lack of 
critical mass point in the direction of basing SISERA within a host 
institution, but it is difficult to reach a definite conclusion on this issue.  
[352] Nonetheless, if SISERA does need a home, the first point to note is that the 
appropriate choice of a home depends on what SISERA is and does. The 
choice of strategic directions for is still subject to discussion, but the point to 
remember is any choice of strategic directions has implications for the choice 
of a partnership or a merger.  
[353] If SISERA was located within another institution, such an arrangement could 
take one of two forms:  
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• The programme might be “housed” within another policy research or 
teaching institution. In this arrangement there is symmetry between the 
partners, in the sense that both the programme and its partner are 
involved in economic policy or teaching. 
• The alternative is one in which the programme is “hosted” by another 
institution which is not primarily engaged in economic policy research or 
capacity building. This arrangement is asymmetric, in the sense that 
SISERA and its host have different missions. Maintaining a distinct 
identity and mission for the programme seems more likely under an 
asymmetric arrangement, since the institutions involved are likely to have 
somewhat different missions, operating procedures and governance 
structure, and so merging these structures will be less natural and 
straightforward. This is in essence the situation since 1997: SISERA has 
existed as a Secretariat within IDRC – a much larger institution, with a 
broader mandate than SISERA. 
[354] The proposed move to IDEP would represent an asymmetric arrangement, 
and the key concern raised by a possible move to IDEP is SISERA’s 
programmatic autonomy and the authority of its Steering Committee in 
establishing and monitoring this programme. It is our understanding that such 
autonomy and authority have been successfully embedded in a draft 
agreement with IDEP and ECA (to which IDEP is responsible). We are, 
however, sceptical that such autonomy will be accepted at other levels of the 
UN system, and would not be surprised if the current draft agreement was 
not called into question by UN headquarters in New York. 
[355] Should an agreement with IDEP not be possible, we recommend that the 
search for an appropriate partner or host begin again immediately. The 
selection of such a partner should be guided by the same set of considerations 
outlined in IDRC’s own guidance document for the establishment of 
secretariats. These include: 
• strategic direction 
• the need to develop a sound and realistic business plan  
• a systematic approach to performance management 
• an accountability framework 
• operational and structural issues 
[356] At the same time as the search for a new host takes place, and in parallel with 
this search, we strongly recommend that fresh consideration be given to the 
alternative of establishing SISERA as a free standing institution, despite the 
problems of governance and professional isolation that this may entail. 
[357] Two final points should be made about the governance of SISERA. First, the 
failure to ensure a smooth transition to a new Executive Director is very 
unfortunate, and has been a major obstacle to the continued growth and 
success of SISERA. That the programme has achieved good results over the 
past two years is due, in our view, to two factors: 
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• The soundness of the initial conception of SISERA and the strategic 
directions it has pursued: SISERA is fundamentally a very good idea, and 
satisfies an important need in Africa 
• The ability and dedication of the Secretariat’s staff, in particular the 
Acting Executive Director and the Coordinator for Programme and 
Operations. The Acting Executive Director, for example, has not only 
filled an important gap in the organization’s leadership, but has continued 
his work as the senior programme officer, working closely with centres in 
the SISERA network and helping to identify new members who might 
join the network. The other members of the Secretariat’s staff, including 
the Programme Officer, also display a very high degree of dedication and 
professionalism.  
[358] There is a need to strengthen SISERA’s governance structures. As part of 
this strengthening, SISERA will need to engage in a fuller planning process, 
to ensure that all parties have the information they need to fulfil their roles. 
The Steering Committee will need financial and programmatic information 
more than annually to assess implementation of agreed plans and adjust 
where necessary. Management will need the formal guidance of a Steering 
Committee to assure that it is on the agreed path and will, ideally, benefit 





Table 8: List of Acronyms 
AAU Association of African Universities  
ACBF African Capacity Building Foundation  
ACEG African Centre for Economic Growth  
AfDB African Development Bank  
AERC African Economic Research Consortium  
AIAE African Institute for Applied Economics  
BCEAO Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest  
BEAC Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale  
BIDPA Botswana Institute for Development Policy 
Analysis  
CCCO Campus de Cours Communs à Option  
CEDRES Centre d’Etudes et de Documentation de 
Recherche Economique et Sociale  
Cellule d’Etude de Politique Economique  CEPEC 
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency  
CIRES Centre Ivoirien de Recherche Economique et 
Sociale  
CODESRIA Council for the Development of Social Science 
Research in Africa  
CREA Centre de Recherches Economiques Appliquées  
CTC Consultancy Training Centre, University of 
Swaziland  
DFID Department for International Development  
DGIS Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
DPRU Development Policy Research Unit  
EC Emerging Centre  
EU European Union  
EPRC Economic Policy Research Centre  
ESRF Economic and Social Research Foundation  
FSEG Faculté des Sciences Economiques et de Gestion, 
Yaoundé II  
GREAT Groupe de Recherche en Economie Appliquée et 
Théorique  
GESDRI Gambian Economic, Social and Development 
Research Institute  
IDEP Institute for Economic Development and Planning  
IDRC International Development Research Centre  
INESOR Institute of Economic and Social Research  
IPAR Institute for Policy Analysis and Research 
ISSER Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic 
Research  
LEA Laboratoire d’Economie Appliquée  
MIMAP Micro Impacts of Macroeconomic and Adjustment 
Policies  
NEPRU Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit  
NIEP National Institute of Economic Policy 
NISER Nigerian Institute for Social and Economic 
Research  
ODI Overseas Development Institute  
PI Partner Institution  
PRI Policy Research Institute 
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PTCI Programme de Troisième Cycle Inter Universitaire 
SAGA Strategies and Analyses for Growth and Access  
SEAPREN Southern and Eastern Africa Policy Research 
Network  
SC (SISERA) Steering Committee 
SISERA Secretariat for Institutional Support for Economic 
Research in Africa  
TIPS Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies 
UNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa  
USAID United States Agency for International 
Development  
WBI World Bank Institute  
WECAPREN West and Central Africa Policy Research Network 
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12 ANNEX: LIST OF THOSE INTERVIEWED 
Table 9: List of Those Interviewed 
Individual Institutional 
Affiliation 
Telephone Number Email Address 




+263 4 702 931 a.adeyemo@acbf-pact.org 




+ 1 202 712 1314 RAggarwal@usaid.gov 
Chukwuma Agu Researcher, African 




+234 42 256 644 shookslife@yahoo.com 
Olu Ajakaiye Director, Nigerian 
Institute of Social and 
Economic Research 
(NISER) 
+234 02 810 3941 dg@niser.org.ng 
olu.ajakaiye@skannet.com 
Ernest Aryeetey Director, ISSER, 
University of Ghana 
[SISERA Partner 
Institute] 
+233 21 512 506 aryeetey@ug.edu.gh 
John Ashipala Senior Researcher, 
NEPRU 
+264 61 277500 johna@nepru.org.na 
Melvin Ayogu University of Cape 
Town; also 
Convenor, AERC 
Ph. D Programme in 
Economics 
+27 21 650 2763 mayogu@commerce.uct.ac.za 




+221 864 00 00 ext 
2233 
eayuk@idrc.org.sn 
Jean-Paul Azam Université de 
Toulouse; referee for 
SAGA project 
proposals 
+33 561 128 535 jean-paul.azam@univ-tlse1.fr 
Amadou Bah Director, Cellule 
d’Etude de Politique 
Economique 
(CEPEC) 
+224 43 08 90 abahcepec@afribone.net.gn 
Haroon Bhorat Director, DPRU 
[SISERA Partner 
Institute] 









Director, Trade and 
Industrial Policy 
Strategies (TIPS) 
+27 11 717 8082 cassimr@sebs.wits.ac.za 











+221 864 00 00 ext 
2244 
cdaffe@idrc.org.sn 






+221 824 78 61 crea@ucad.sn 
Jean-Yves Duclos Université de Laval; 
co-director, 
CIRPEE; participant 
in SAGA project 
+1 418 656 7096 jives@ecn.ulval.ca 
Joel Eita Researcher, NEPRU +264 61 277500 joele@nepru.org.na 
Samuel Fambon Researcher, FSEG, 
Université de 
Yaounde II 
+237 222 5753 sfambon@yahoo.fr 
Jeffrey Fine Independent 
Consultant; formerly 
Executive Director 
of AERC; board 
member, African 




+1 613 526 4258 jcfine@telepraxis.com 
Clive Gray Retired, formerly 




Dirk Hansohm Director, NEPRU; 
Director of the 
SEAPREN network 
+264 61 277500 dirkh@nepru.org.na 
Stephen Hanival Executive Director, 
Trade and Industrial 
Policy Strategies 
(TIPS) 
+27 11 645 6404 stephen@tips.org.za 
Bheki Langa Executive Director, 
National Institute of 
Economic Policy 
(NIEP) [SISERA 
+27 11 403 3009 bheki@niep.org.za 
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Emerging Centre] 
Paul Lundall Deputy Director, 
DPRU [SISERA 
Partner Institute] 
+27 (0)21 650 
5705 
plundall@commerce.uct.ac.za 






+254 20 228 057 exec.dir@aercafrica.org 
Allechi M’Bet Special Advisor to 
the President of Cote 
d’Ivoire; Associate 
of CIRES [SISERA 
Partner Institute] 









+254 2 251 179 tnkibua@ipar.or.ke 




+1 860 429 6787 kimenyi@aol.com 
G. Kioko wa Luka Administrator, 





+254 20 251179 kioko@ipar.or.ke 
Basil Jones Senior Programme 
Officer, SISERA 
+221 864 00 00 ext 
2222 
bjones@idrc.org.sn 




+1 613 236 6163 
x2312 
rmedhora@idrc.ca 
Germain Ndjieunde Université de 
Yaounde II 
+237 762 0633 gndjieunde@yahoo.fr 




+254 20 228 057 Njuguna.ndungu@aercafrica.org 










African Institute for 
Applied Economics 
(AIAE) [SISERA 
+234 42 256 644 george_oji@yahoo.com 
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Emerging Centre] 







+27 11 403 3009 moses@niep.org.za 
David Sahn Cornell University, 
Director, SAGA 
project 
+1 607 255 8093 david.sahn@cornell.edu 





+233 21 774 495 asawyerr@aau.org 




+221 864 00 00 ext 
? 
lsavard@idrc.org.sn 



















+ 226 31 38 40 souley@faseg.univ-ouaga.bf 
Adedoyin Soyibo Head, Department of 
Economics, 
University of Ibadan 
+234 02 810 1701 doyin.soyibo@ibadan.skannet.com 
Dirk Stryker AIRD, formerly with 
EAGER Project 






Dschang – FSEG, 
Cameroun 
+237 778 3049 jtabiatem@yahoo.com 
Erik Thorbecke Cornell University; 
also involved in 
SAGA project 
+1 607 255 2066 et17@cornell.edu 
Marc E Wyuts Institute of Social 
Studies, The Hague; 
conducting 
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Secretariat for Institutional Support for Economic Research in Africa, Annual Report 
April 1, 2002 – March 31 2003 
 
Earl, Sarah, Fred Carden, and Terry Smutylo, Outcome Mapping: Building Learning 
and Reflection into Development Programs, Ottawa: IDRC, 2001. [see also 
http://www.idrc.ca/evaluation/outcome.html] 
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Ottawa/Washington DC: International Development Research Centre and Inter-
American Development Bank 
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Ottawa: International Development Research Centre. 
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Former Soviet Union from Within’, in The Humanities and Social Sciences in the 
Former Soviet Union: An Assessment of Need, Washington: The Kennan Institute, 
1998 
 
NEPRU, Funding Proposal for the Southern and Eastern Africa Policy Research 
Network (SEAPREN), May 2003-11-30 
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Report on Activities , January to September 2003, 29 August 2003 
 
Hansohm, D, C Peters- Berries, W Breytenbach, P Meyns, Monitoring Regional 




Hansohm, D, C Peters- Berries, W Breytenbach, T Harzenberg, W Maier, P Meyns, 
Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa, volume 2, 2002, Windhoek: 
Gamsberg Macmillan, 2002 
 
Rudaheranwa, N and M Banga, Quantifying Implicit Transactions Costs of Trade in 
East Africa: A Research Proposal Submitted to the Southern and Eastern African 
Policy Research Network (SEAPREN), Kampala, EPRC 
 
Godana, T, Efficiency and Effectiveness of Capacity Building in Economic Policy 
Making: A Research Proposal Submitted to the Southern and Eastern African Policy 
Research Network (SEAPREN), Windhoek: NEPRU 
 
Lavoie, L P, D Razanadrakoto and I Tvedten (1999), Building African Consulting 
Capacity – Capacity Building and Support to African Consultants in the Private 
Sector. Bergen: Norad/MOFA 
 
Phillips, L C and D Seck (eds), Fixing African Economies: Policy Research for 
Development, London, Lynne Rienner, 2004. 
 
SYNAPSE, Diagnostic et Recommandations sur l’Organization et la Structure de 
SISERA, 2001 
 
Mensah, S. Institutional Assessment Instrument, Accra: SEM International Associates, 
December 2001 
 
Bach, J and D Stark ‘Technology and Transformation: Facilitating Knowledge 
Networks in Eastern Europe’, Technology, Business and Society Programme Paper 
No. 10, Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development 
(UNRISD), October 2003 
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14 ANNEX: SURVEY INSTRUMENTS 
Evaluation of SISERA 
Questionnaire for the Partner Institutions 
November 2003 
SISERA’s goal is to build the capacity of local research institutions and networks in 
sub-Saharan Africa, to enable them to produce high quality, policy relevant research 
and to assist them in communicate their research to policy-makers in their country. 
The ultimate aim is to improve the quality of policy-making in sub-Saharan Africa. 
This short questionnaire, which should take no more than 30 minutes to complete, is 
divided into six sections: 
i. How has SISERA assisted your institution? In what ways has SISERA 
strengthened your institution’s internal capacity to carry out its mission? 
These questions focus on the difficulties you experienced as an 
organization before the SISERA intervention, whether the assistance 
from SISERA was well targeted, i.e. did it address the most important 
difficulties you faced; and the extent to which the SISERA assistance has 
enabled you to overcome these difficulties. 
ii. What has been the impact of SISERA’s assistance on your activities and 
outputs? These questions focus on changes in the nature of the research you 
have carried out, workshops and conferences you have organized, and the 
publications you have issued to communicate your research results to policy-
makers.  
iii. Has SISERA’s assistance increased your impact on the policy process in 
your country? It is difficult to trace the impact of research on policy choices: 
there are many reasons why policy has been chosen. These questions focus 
instead on ‘intermediate’ indicators: whether you met more often with 
policy-makers to discuss your research, whether they cited your research in 
their public statements or background papers on policy issues, and whether 
your research was used in the media or in public debates over policy issues. 
iv. In what ways has SISERA strengthened your institution’s internal capacity 
to carry out its mission? These questions focus on the difficulties you 
experienced as an organization before the SISERA intervention, whether the 
assistance from SISERA was well targeted, i.e. did it address the most 
important difficulties you faced; and the extent to which the SISERA 
assistance has enabled you to overcome these difficulties. 
v. Are you satisfied with the assistance you have received from SISERA? These 
questions focus on whether the assistance from SISERA has been of your 
satisfaction and has dealt with your needs. 
vi. In what ways does the assistance provided by SISERA differ from that 
provided by other donors or funding institutions? These questions focus on 
whether SISERA assistance is more timely, efficient, well-targeted or more 
flexible that other assistance you have received. 
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Notes: 
We encourage you to respond to the questions in your own way. In some cases the 
answers may be simply “Yes” or “No”, but we encourage you to respond to the 
questions by adding additional details or your own comments.  
When we refer to “policy-makers” in this questionnaire, we mean primarily policy-
makers in your country’s government, but this also includes bilateral or multilateral 
donors in your country, regional institutions. By “stakeholders” we mean policy-
makers, civil society organizations, etc. but each institution will have it’s own set of 
stakeholders. 
When we refer to “you” we mean not only you as an individual, but your institution 
and the researchers working in it. 
 
Please return this completed questionnaire  
• by email to enrique_mendizabal@bannock.co.uk 
• by fax to +44 20 7535 0201 
 
If you experience any difficulty in completing this questionnaire, please contact 
Enrique Mendizabal at Bannock Consulting. 
 
His email address is 
enrique_mendizabal@bannock.co.uk 
 
His telephone number is 
+44 20 75350248 
 
 
We would be very grateful if you could provide your name and contact details 
below, in case we need to contact you to clarify your responses to the questions. 
 
Thank you for taking the time to respond! 
 
Completed by   
Name  
Position  
Telephone number  
Fax number  




How has SISERA assisted your institution? 
What kind(s) of assistance has SISERA provided to your institution? 
Table 1: Financial Assistance Provided by SISERA 




Core funding support   
Financial Support for specific 
research projects 
  
Support for electronic connectivity   
Support for sabbaticals and 
internships 
  
Support for organizing conferences 
and workshops 
  
Support for strengthening links with 
the users of research 
  
 
Is the size of SISERA’s support for core funding realistic, in the sense that it covers a 
reasonable proportion of the essential costs of the running your institution? 
Is the size of SISERA’s support for research projects realistic, in the sense that it 
provides the resources necessary to achieve the stated objectives of the research 
proposal? 
SISERA may also have provided non-financial assistance – for example, the services 
of specialists to provide advice on enhancing managerial capacity. Please describe 
such non-financial assistance, in particular the form it took and if possible the 
quantity of such assistance you received (in man-months, for example) 
How did the idea of assistance from SISERA arise? Did your institution approach 
SISERA, or SISERA approach you? 
Note: we understand that you might not have been in your current position at the time 
the SISERA assistance was negotiated. We would be grateful if you could indicate if 
this is the case, and if the information has been obtained from a member of your staff 
who was involved in the negotiations. 
How long did it take to conclude discussions and negotiations with the SISERA 
secretariat? 
Did the initial ideas for assistance from SISERA change or evolve during the 
discussions and negotiations? If so, in what ways? 
Do you think that, in retrospect, these changes to your proposal resulted in assistance 
from SISERA which was more effective than might have been the case with the 
initial ideas? 
 
What has been the effect of SISERA’s assistance on your organization’s activities 
and outputs? 
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How did the assistance from SISERA affect the research you carried out? 
Did your discussions with the SISERA secretariat lead to new ideas for research 
topics? That is, did it influence your choice of research topics, by suggesting new 
topics which you might pursue? 
Did SISERA’s assistance provide you with additional financial resources which 
allowed you to carry out research on new topics? 
Did discussion with the SISERA secretariat lead to changes in the methodology or 
approach you took to the research? Did this lead to more rigorous methodology? 
Did the assistance from SISERA lead to changes in (you are free to choose your own 
indicators for quantity and quality in the questions below, but please indicate in your 
response what indicator you are using): 
i. the quantity of policy relevant research carried out in your institution (such as 
the number of researchers working on policy relevant research or the number of 
research papers produced). Please give a numerical estimate of the change in 
the quantity if possible, otherwise answer yes or no. 
ii. the quality of the research (as measured by the rigour of the methodology used 
or the number of publications in scientific journals which result) 
iii. the composition of your research portfolio, with more research being done on 
some topics and less on others.  
Did the assistance from SISERA allow you to hold more meetings, such as 
workshops, and international conferences? 
Were these meetings mainly meetings involving researchers, to discuss work in 
progress, meetings between researchers and policy-makers?  
Did the assistance from SISERA lead you to disseminate your research through 
different channels? If yes, which new channels have you used  
 
Has SISERA’s assistance increased your impact on the policy process in your 
country? 
After you received assistance from SISERA, did you meet more often with policy-
makers to discuss the research you were carrying out? If so, please give details of 
how SISERA’s assistance helped you to strengthen your links with policy-makers. 
Did policy-makers cite your research in their public statements or in background 
papers on particular policy issues? If so, please give examples. 
Has your research been cited in the media or in public debates over policy issues? If 
so, please give examples. 
Has the assistance from SISERA led to your being consulted more frequently on 
other issues by policy-makers? (For example, you might have been named to a 
committee of experts on related policy issues, or employed by policy-makers to carry 
out other pieces of research in related areas) 
After you received assistance from SISERA, has the way in which you involve 
policy-makers in your research changed? For example, do you now involve policy-
makers in discussions of research priorities, in the design of the terms of reference for 
research projects, or in discussions of research in progress? 
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Please list the key users with whom you have interacted in the past three to five years 
(for instance, policy makers in national governments, regional and international 
development agencies and civil society). Please indicate whether and how your 
relationship with each these policy-makers changed as a result of SISERA assistance. 
Please list the key policy issues and policy processes where you believe you had 
interacted with users and have made a significant contribution in the past three to five 
years. Please indicate whether and how your impact on these policy issues and 
processes changed as a result of SISERA assistance. 
 
In what ways has SISERA strengthened your institution’s internal capacity to carry 
out its mission? 
These questions focus on five aspects of your institution’s organizational capacity: 
• Personnel 
• Infrastructure, technology and financial resources 
• Strategic leadership 
• Programme and process management 
• Networking and linking to stakeholders 
• Networking and linking to other research organizations 
 
Table 2 below is designed to explore, in each of these areas, the difficulties you 
experienced as an organization before the SISERA intervention, whether the 
assistance from SISERA was well targeted, i.e. did it address these difficulties; and 
the extent to which the SISERA assistance has enabled you to overcome these 
difficulties. If you can enter this information in the table below, this would greatly 
assist us in collating the results of the questionnaire. If, on the other hand, you wish to 
respond in a freer format, please do so, but we would ask you to respond using the 
same aspects of organizational capacity as in columns 1 and 2 of the table. You can 
find a list of these aspects in Annex 1 at the end of this document. 
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Table 2: Organizational Capacity 
Capacity area Capacity Difficulties in this 
area before 
SISERA 
assistance? If yes, 
please give details. 
Did SISERA 
assistance attempt 
to address this 




in resolving the 
difficulties? 
Do you receive 
assistance from 
other institutions 
to address this 
difficulty? If so, 
briefly describe. 
Do difficulties 
remain in this 
area? If so, please 
give details. 
Personnel (staff 
refers to both 
research and 
support staff) 
Number of staff      
 Qualifications of 
staff (degrees, etc.) 
     
 Staff training (short 
courses, etc.) 
     
 Recruitment 
procedures 
     
 Performance 
appraisal systems 




Financial resources      
 Accounting and 
financial controls 
     
 Facilities      
 Availability of 
technology 
     









Strategic planning      




     
 Performance 
oriented polices and 
procedures 
     
 Guidelines and 
incentives for 
performance in 
relation to the 
organization’s 
objectives 
     
Governance Governance 
structures 
     











     
 Monitoring and 
evaluation 
     
 Reporting      
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Networking and 









     





     




belong to the 
SISERA family of 
networks 
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Are you satisfied with the assistance you have received from SISERA? 
Please feel free to answer these questions in whatever format and at whatever length 
you prefer. 
 
In relation to Question 1 above: 
a) Do you consider that the size of the grants you receive from SISERA is 
appropriate in relation to your needs?  
 
b) What would you have done in the absence of assistance from SISERA? (e.g. 
apply for similar grants from other organisations, develop partnerships, 
nothing) 
 
In reference to your experience working with SISERA, please indicate your level of 
satisfaction with the services provided by SISERA, using the criteria in Table 3 
What are the most important difficulties facing your organization which SISERA’s 
assistance has already enabled you to tackle? 
What are the most important difficulties which still face your organization where 
assistance from SISERA (or other donors) is still needed? 
 
How does SISERA’s assistance compare to that provided by other donors? 
 
In Table 2 above you have indicated those specific aspects of your organization’s 
capacity that have been strengthened by assistance from SISERA and from other 
donors. We also need to determine how the general characteristics of SISERA’s 
assistance compare to other donors. Table 3 (comparison to other donors) allows not 
only you assess the quality of SISERA’s services, but also to compare SISERA’s 
services to those provided by other donors, in terms of efficiency, flexibility, efficacy 
and adherence to timeliness.  
More generally, does the relationship with SISERA bring benefits which are not 
available from other donors and sources of funding? 
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Table 3: Levels of Satisfaction with Services Provided by SISERA 
 
Question 25 (please tick the 
appropriate level of 
satisfaction) 
Question 28  
 Very satisfied Satisfied Unsatisfied
Comparison to other donors (e.g. 
better, worse, the same) Details 
Efficiency and Flexibility: Whether 
SISERA provides goods and services 
with low administrative, procedural, 
evaluation or monitoring costs.  
     
Efficacy: Whether or not SISERA 
achieved its goals within their original 
parameters with reference to your 
institution. For instance, are there any 
outstanding goals that have not been met 
by SISERA or required extra resources 
to be met? 
     
Responsiveness to your needs: 
Whether or not SISERA is quick to 
identify and respond to your institutions 
needs by providing appropriate solutions 
     
Adherence to timelines: Whether 
SISERA fulfils its commitments to your 
institution within the agreed timelines 
     
Accountability and transparency: 
Whether you feel that SISERA shares 
information with your organisation and 
encourages and takes into consideration 
your critiques and recommendations? 
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Annex 1 
This series of questions is an alternative to Table 2, should you find this table difficult 
to complete. You do not need to complete this section if you have already filled in 
Table 2. 
 
For each of the aspects of organizational capacity listed below, please describe the 
difficulties you experienced as an organization before the SISERA intervention, 
whether the assistance from SISERA addresses these difficulties, and the extent to 
which the SISERA assistance has enabled you to overcome these difficulties. 
 
Personnel 
 Staffing levels 
 Staff training 
 Recruitment procedures 
 Performance appraisal systems 
Infrastructure, technology and financial resources 
 Financial resources 
 Accounting and financial controls 
 Facilities 
 Availability of technology 
Planning and management of infrastructure, technology and financial 
resources 
Strategic leadership 
 Strategic planning 
 Identifying new ideas and opportunities for research 
 Performance oriented polices and procedures 
Guidelines and incentives for performance in relation to the 
organization’s objectives 
Governance 
 Governance structures 
 Clear division of roles, responsibilities and authority 
Programme and process management 
 Programme planning and formulation 
 Monitoring and evaluation 
 Reporting 
 Communications 
Networking and linking to stakeholders 
 Identifying stakeholders  
 Communicating and building relationships with stakeholders  
Networking and linking to other research organizations (for example as potential 
research partners) 
 Identifying other relevant research organizations  
Communicating and building relationships with other research 
organizations 
Communicating and building strong relationships with organisations 
which belong to the SISERA family of networks 
Questionnaire 
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Evaluation de SISERA 
Questionnaire pour les Institutions Partenaires et les Centres en Emergence 
Novembre 2003 
 
L´objectif du SISERA est de développer les capacités des institutions et des réseaux 
de recherche locaux en Afrique sub-saharienne afin de leur permettre de réaliser des 
projets de recherche de qualité axés sur les politiques et de les assister en ce qui 
concerne la communication de leurs résultats aux décideurs dans leur pays. L’objectif 
ultime est d´améliorer la qualité de l’élaboration des politiques économiques en 
Afrique sub-saharienne. 
 
Ce court questionnaire est divisé en six sections; le compléter ne vous prendra pas 
plus de 30 minutes: 
i. Comment le SISERA a-t-il aidé votre institution? Par quels moyens le 
SISERA a-t-il renforcé la capacité interne de votre institution à mettre en 
œuvre sa mission? Ces questions concernent les difficultés que vous avez 
rencontrées en tant qu´institution avant l´intervention du SISERA, si 
l´aide du SISERA a été correctement ciblée, c’est-à-dire si elle a abordé 
les plus importantes difficultés auxquelles vous avez eu à faire face, et 
dans quelle mesure l´aide du SISERA vous a permis de surmonter ces 
difficultés. 
ii. Quel a été l´impact de l´aide du SISERA sur vos activités et résultats? Ces 
questions concernent les changements dans la nature de vos programmes de 
recherche, des ateliers et des conférences que vous avez organisés, et des 
publications que vous avez réalisées pour communiquer les résultats de vos 
travaux de recherche aux décideurs. 
iii. Est-ce que l´aide du SISERA a accru votre influence sur le processus 
d’élaboration des politiques dans votre pays? Il est difficile de mesurer 
l´impact des travaux de recherche sur les choix de politiques: il y a de 
nombreuses raisons qui expliquent pourquoi une politique a été choisie. 
Ces questions portent plutôt sur les indicateurs «intermédiaires»: si vous 
avez rencontré plus souvent des décideurs pour discuter de vos travaux de 
recherche, si ces décideurs ont cité votre recherche dans leurs 
déclarations publiques ou documents de référence sur des questions liées 
aux politiques, et si vos travaux de recherche ont été utilisés dans les 
médias ou dans des débats publics sur les politiques. 
iv. Par quels moyens le SISERA a-t-il renforcé la capacité interne de votre 
institution à mettre en œuvre sa mission? Ces questions concernent les 
difficultés que vous avez rencontrées en tant qu´institution avant 
l´intervention du SISERA, si l´aide du SISERA a été correctement ciblée, 
c’est-à-dire si elle a abordé les plus importantes difficultés auxquelles vous 
avez dû faire face, et dans quelle  mesure l´aide du SISERA vous a permis 
de surmonter ces difficultés. 
v. Etes-vous satisfait de l´aide que vous avez reçue du SISERA? Cette question 
vise à savoir si vous avez été satisfait de l’aide du SISERA et si elle a 
répondu à vos besoins. 
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vi. Dans quelle mesure l´aide fournie par le SISERA diffère-t-elle de celle 
fournie par d´autres bailleurs de fonds ou institutions de financement . Cette 
question vise à savoir si l'aide du SISERA est plus efficace, plus opportune, 
mieux ciblée ou plus souple que d’autres aides que vous avez reçues. 
Remarques: 
Nous vous encourageons à répondre aux questions à votre manière. Dans certains 
cas, les réponses pourront consister simplement en un «oui» ou «non», mais nous 
vous incitons à répondre en apportant des détails complémentaires ou vos propres 
commentaires. 
Quand nous parlons des “décideurs” dans ce questionnaire, nous pensons 
principalement aux décideurs/dirigeants du gouvernement de votre pays, mais ce 
terme inclut aussi les bailleurs de fonds bilatéraux ou multilatéraux dans votre pays 
et les institutions régionales. Par «parties prenantes», nous entendons les décideurs, 
les organisations de la société civile, etc., mais chaque institution aura son propre 
ensemble de parties prenantes. 
Quand nous utilisons le terme “vous”, nous voulons dire non seulement vous en tant 
que personne individuelle mais également votre institution et les chercheurs qui y  
travaillent. 
 
Veuillez retourner ce questionnaire rempli 
• par courrier électronique à enrique_mendizabal@bannock.co.uk 
• par fax au +44 20 7535 0201 
 
Si vous rencontrez des difficultés en remplissant ce questionnaire, veuillez contacter 
Enrique Mendizabal à Bannock Consulting, dont  l’adresse e-mail est 
enrique_mendizabal@bannock.co.uk et le numéro de téléphone est +44 20 75350248. 
 
Nous vous serions très reconnaissants de bien vouloir nous donner votre nom et 
vos coordonnées ci-dessous, au cas ou nous aurions besoin de vous contacter 
pour clarifier vos réponses. 
 
Merci de prendre le temps de répondre à ce questionnaire! 
 






Numéro de Fax  
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Comment le SISERA a-t-il aidé votre institution? 
 
Quel(s) genre(s) d´aide le SISERA a-t-il fourni à votre institution? 
 
Table 1 : Aide financière fournie par le SISERA 
Type d’appui Montant Détails 
Appui financier de base   
Appui financier pour des projets 
spécifiques 
  
Appui pour la connectivité 
électronique 
  
Appui pour les congés sabbatiques et 
les stages  
  
Appui pour l´organisation des 
conférences et des ateliers 
  
Appui pour le renforcement des 
liens avec les utilisateurs de vos 
travaux de recherche  
  
 
Est-ce que  le montant de l’appui du SISERA pour le financement de base est réaliste, 
dans le sens où il couvre une proportion raisonnable des coûts essentiels de 
fonctionnement de votre institution ? 
Est-ce que le montant de l’appui du SISERA pour les projets de recherche est 
réaliste, dans le sens où il accorde les ressources nécessaires pour atteindre les 
objectifs établis de la proposition de projet de recherche? 
Le SISERA peut également avoir fourni un appui non financier, par exemple les 
services de spécialistes pour donner des conseils en ce qui concerne l´amélioration 
des capacités de gestion. Veuillez décrire cet appui non financier, en particulier la 
forme qu´il a pris et, si cela est possible, la quantité d´aide de ce type que vous avez 
reçue (en mois-homme par exemple). 
Comment l´idée d´une aide du SISERA a-t-elle germé? Est-ce votre institution qui a 
pris contact avec  le SISERA, ou est-ce le SISERA qui a pris contact avec vous? 
 
Remarque: Naturellement, il est possible que vous n’occupiez pas votre poste actuel 
au moment où l´aide du SISERA a été négociée. Nous vous remercions de bien vouloir 
indiquer si cela est le cas et si l´information a été obtenue d’ un membre de votre 
personnel qui a participé aux négociations. 
Combien de temps a-t-il fallu pour conclure les discussions et les négociations avec 
le secrétariat du SISERA? 
Est-ce que les idées initiales en ce qui concerne l´aide du SISERA ont changé ou 
évolué durant les discussions et les négociations? Si cela est le cas, de quelles façons? 
Pensez-vous rétrospectivement que les changements apportés à votre proposition ont 
abouti à une aide plus efficace de la part du SISERA que cela n’aurait été le cas avec 
les idées initiales? 
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Quel a été l´effet de l´aide du SISERA sur les activités et les résultats de votre 
organisation? 
Comment l´aide du SISERA a-t-elle influencé les projets de recherche que vous avez 
réalisés? 
Est-ce que vos discussions avec le secrétariat du SISERA ont mené à de nouvelles 
idées pour des sujets de recherche? C´est-à-dire, ont-elles influencé votre choix de 
sujets de recherche en suggérant de nouveaux thèmes que vous pourriez explorer? 
Est-ce que l´aide du SISERA vous a fourni des ressources financières 
additionnelles qui vous ont permis de réaliser des projets de recherche sur de 
nouveaux sujets? 
Est-ce que les discussions avec le secrétariat du SISERA ont mené à des 
changements dans la méthodologie ou dans l’approche adoptée pour vos projets de 
recherche? Est-ce que cela a entraîné une méthodologie plus rigoureuse? 
Est-ce que l´aide du SISERA a conduit à des changements dans: (vous êtes libre de 
choisir vos propres indicateurs quantitatifs et qualitatifs dans les questions ci-
dessous, mais, s´il vous plaît, indiquez dans votre réponse quels indicateurs vous 
êtes en train d´utiliser). 
i. La quantité de projets de recherche axés sur les politiques réalisés par votre 
institution (tel que le nombre de chercheurs travaillant à des projets axés sur 
les politiques ou le nombre d’articles/mémoires produits). S´il vous plaît, 
donnez si possible une estimation numérique du changement en terme de 
quantité, autrement, répondez par oui ou par non. 
ii. La qualité de la recherche (telle qu’elle est mesurée par la rigueur de la 
méthodologie utilisée ou par le nombre résultant de publications dans des 
revues scientifiques). 
iii. La composition de votre dossier de recherche, avec davantage de projets de 
recherche réalisés dans certains domaines et moins dans d´autres. 
Est-ce que l´aide du SISERA vous a permis de tenir davantage de réunions, telles 
que des ateliers et des conférences internationales? 
Est-ce que ces réunions étaient principalement des réunions de chercheurs pour 
discuter du travail en cours, ou des réunions entre chercheurs et décideurs? 
Est-ce que l´aide du SISERA vous a amené à diffuser les résultats de vos travaux de 
recherche à travers différents canaux?Si oui, quels nouveaux canaux avez-vous 
utilisés? 
 
Est-ce que l´aide du SISERA a augmenté votre impact sur le processus 
d’élaboration des politiques dans votre pays? 
Après avoir reçu l´aide du SISERA, avez-vous rencontré plus fréquemment des 
décideurs pour discuter des travaux de recherche que vous meniez? Dans ce cas, 
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Est-ce que les décideurs ont cité votre recherche dans leurs déclarations publiques 
ou des documents de référence sur des questions de politique particulières? Si oui, 
veuillez donner des exemples. 
Est-ce que vos travaux de recherche ont été utilisés dans les médias ou les débats 
publics sur des questions de politique? Si oui, veuillez donner des exemples. 
Est ce que l´aide du SISERA a fait que vous soyez consulté plus fréquemment sur 
d´autres sujets par les décideurs. (Par exemple, vous avez peut-être été invité à 
participer à un comité d´experts sur des questions de politique liées, ou employé par 
des décideurs pour réaliser d´autres travaux de recherche dans des domaines liés. 
Est-ce que la manière de laquelle vous associez les décideurs à vos projets de 
recherche a changé, après que vous ayez reçu l´aide du SISERA? Par exemple, est-
ce que vous incluez maintenant des décideurs dans les discussions concernant les 
priorités en matière de recherche, dans l´élaboration des cahiers des charges des 
projets de recherche ou bien dans les discussions des projets de recherche en cours? 
Veuillez établir une liste des utilisateurs clés avec lesquels vous avez collaboré au 
cours des trois à cinq dernières années (par exemple, décideurs au sein des 
gouvernements nationaux,  agences de développement régionales et internationales, 
et société civile). 
Veuillez établir une liste des questions de politique et des processus politiques clés 
dans lesquels vous estimez avoir eu une interaction avec des utilisateurs et avoir 
apporté une contribution significative au cours des trois à cinq dernières années.  
 
De quelles manières le SISERA a-t-il renforcé la capacité interne de votre institution 
à accomplir sa mission? 
Ces questions se concentrent sur cinq aspects de votre capacité organisationnelle : 
• Personnel 
• Infrastructures, technologies et resources financières. 
• Leadership stratégique 
• Gestion des programmes et des processus 
• Réseaux et liens avec les parties prenantes 
• Réseaux et liens avec d´autres organisations de recherche 
 
Le tableau 2 ci-dessous a été élaboré pour explorer, dans chacun de ces domaines, les 
difficultés que vous avez rencontrées en tant qu’organisation avant l´intervention du 
SISERA, si l´aide du SISERA a été correctement ciblée, par exemple, a-t-elle abordé 
ces difficultés, et dans quelle mesure l´aide du SISERA vous a permis de surmonter 
ces difficultés. Si vous pouvez entrer cette information dans le tableau ci-dessous, cela 
nous aidera grandement à collationner  les résultats du questionnaire. Si toutefois vous 
préférez répondre dans un format plus libre, veuillez le faire, mais nous vous 
demanderions de répondre en utilisant les mêmes aspects de la capacité 
organisationnelle que dans les colonnes 1 et 2 du tableau. Vous trouverez une liste de 
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Table 2 : Capacité organisationnelle 
Domaine de 
capacité  








Est-ce que l´aide 
du SISERA  a 
abordé ces 
difficultés? Si 
oui, comment?  
Est ce que l´aide du 
SISERA a été 











Est-ce que des 
difficultés 
demeurent dans ce 
domaine? Si oui, 
veuillez donner des 
détails. 
Personnel (inclut 
les chercheurs et le 
personnel de 
support) 
Niveau des effectifs      
 Qualifications du 
personnel (diplômes, 
etc.) 
     
 Formation du  
personnel (cours de 
courte durée, etc.) 
     
 Procédures de 
recrutement  
     
 Systèmes d´évaluation 
de la performance 





Ressources financières      
 Contrôles comptables 
et financiers 
     
 Infrastructures       
 Disponibilité des 
technologies  
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 Identification de 
nouvelles idées et 
opportunités de 
recherche  
     
 Politiques et processus 
orientés vers la 
performance  
     
 Directives et 
incitations en matière 
de  performance par 
rapport aux objectifs 
de l’organisation 
     
Gouvernance  Structures de 
gouvernance 
     
 Division claire des 
rôles, des 
responsabilités et de 
l’autorité 
     
Gestion des 





     
 Suivi et évaluation       
 Reporting      
 Communications      
Création de 
réseaux et de liens 
Identification des 
parties prenantes 
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avec les parties 
prenantes 
 Communication et 
développement des 
relations avec les 
parties prenantes 
     
Création de 
réseaux et de liens 










     
 Communication et 
développement de 
relations avec d´autres 
organisations de 
recherche 
     
 Communication et 
développement de 
relations solides avec 
des organisations 
appartenant à la 
famille de réseaux 
SISERA  
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Etes-vous satisfait de l´aide que vous avez reçue du SISERA? 
 
N’hésitez pas à répondre aux questions sous la forme et la longueur que vous préférez. 
En relation à la Question 1 ci-dessus: 
c) Est-ce que vous considérez que le montant des subventions que vous recevez du 
SISERA est approprié par rapport à vos besoins? 
d) Qu´auriez-vous fait en l’absence d’une aide du SISERA? (par exemple, demander des 
subventions similaires à d´autres organisations, développer des partenariats, rien) 
 
En vous référant à votre expérience de travail avec le SISERA, veuillez indiquer votre 
degré de satisfaction à l’égard des services fournis par le SISERA, en utilisant les critères 
du tableau 3 ci-dessous. 
Quelles sont les difficultés les plus importantes auxquelles votre organisation doit faire face 
et que l’aide du SISERA vous a déjà permis d’attaquer? 
Quelles sont les difficultés les plus importantes auxquelles votre organisation doit encore 
faire face, et pour lesquelles elle a encore besoin de l´aide du SISERA (ou d’autres 
bailleurs de fonds)? 
 
Comment l´aide du SISERA soutient-elle la comparaison avec celle d´autres 
bailleurs de fonds? 
 
Dans le tableau 2, vous avez indiqué les aspects spécifiques des capacités de votre 
organisation qui ont été renforcés par l´aide du SISERA et d´autres bailleurs de fonds. 
Nous devons également déterminer comment les caractéristiques générales de l’aide du 
SISERA soutiennent la comparaison avec l’aide d’autres bailleurs de fonds. Le tableau 3 
(comparaison avec les autres bailleurs de fonds) vous permet non seulement d’évaluer la 
qualité des services du SISERA, mais aussi de comparer ces services à ceux fournis par 
d´autres bailleurs de fonds sur le plan de l´efficacité, de la flexibilité, de l´efficience et du 
respect des délais prescrits. 
 
D’une manière plus générale, est-ce que la relation avec le SISERA apporte des 
bénéfices qui ne sont pas disponibles de la part d´autres bailleurs de fonds et 
sources de financement? 
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Table 3: Degrés de Satisfaction à l’égard des services fournis par le SISERA 
 
Question 25 








Satisfait Insatisfait Comparaison avec d´autres bailleurs de fonds (par ex. meilleur, pire, égal) Détails 
Efficacité et flexibilité: 
Si SISERA fournit des biens et 
des services avec de bas coûts 
d´administration, de procédure, 
d’évaluation et de suivi ou pas. 
     
Efficience/Capacité de 
rendement:  
Si SISERA a atteint ses objectifs 
dans le cadre de ses paramètres 
originaux par rapport à votre 
institution ou pas. Par exemple, y 
a-t-il des objectifs importants qui 
n´ont pas été atteints par le 
SISERA ou qui ont nécessité des 
ressources supplémentaires pour 
être atteints? 
     
Réactivité à vos besoins: 
Si le SISERA identifie et répond 
rapidement aux besoins de votre 
institution en offrant des solutions 
appropriées . 
     
 Respect des délais: 
Si le SISERA remplit ses 
engagements envers votre 
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institution dans les délais 
convenus. 
Responsabilité et transparence: 
Si vous estimez que le SISERA 
partage l’information avec votre 
organisation et encourage et prend 
en considération vos critiques et 
recommandations ?  
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Annexe 1 
Cette série de questions est une alternative au tableau 2  si vous trouvez que le tableau est 
difficile à remplir. Vous n´avez pas besoin de remplir cette section si vous avez déjà rempli le 
Tableau 2. 
 
Pour chacun des aspects de la capacité organisationnelle énumérés ci-dessous, veuillez 
décrire les difficultés que vous avez rencontrées en tant qu’organisation avant 
l´intervention du SISERA, si l´aide du SISERA aborde ces difficultés, et dans quelle 
mesure l´aide du SISERA vous a permis de surmonter ces difficultés.  
 
Personnel  
Niveau des effectifs 
Formation du  personnel  
Procédures de recrutement 
Systèmes d´évaluation de la performance 
 
Infrastructures, technologies et ressources financières 
Ressources financières 
Contrôles comptables et financiers 
Infrastructures 
Disponibilité des technologies 




Identification de nouvelles idées et opportunités de recherche 
Politiques et procédures orientées vers la performance 




Structures de gouvernance 
Division claire des rôles, des responsabilités et de l’autorité 
 
Gestion des programmes et des processus 
Planification et formulation des programmes 




Création de réseaux et de liens avec les parties prenantes 
Identification des parties prenantes 
Communication et développement de relations avec les parties prenantes  
 
Création de réseaux et de liens avec d´autres organisations de recherche (par exemple 
comme partenaires de recherche potentiels) 
Identification d´autres organisations de recherche appropriées 
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Communication et développement de relations avec d´autres organisations de 
recherche 
Communication et développement de relations solides avec des organisations 
appartenant à la famille de réseaux SISERA 
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15 ANNEX: TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE 
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